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EUROPEANIZATION, DOMESTIC POLITICAL CHANGE AND  
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 Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Aylin Güney 
 
December 2007 
 
This dissertation explores the impact of the European Union on domestic political 
change in the area of civil-military relations in Turkey. The history of modern 
Turkey is characterized by the objective of becoming a full member of the European 
society of states. For this purpose, Westernization and modernization are the 
constituting discourses and practices of the modern Turkish Republic. Yet beginning 
in the 1960s and culminating in the 1990s, the deepening of the process of European 
economic and political integration has led to serious transformations in the European 
state system and society. Recent works studying the nature and scope of this change 
conceptualize this process as Europeanization. According to these studies, the 
European Union is the main variable triggering domestic transformation in the 
member states and candidate countries. The impact of the European Union is also 
strongly felt in Turkey, which is a candidate for membership in the phase of pre-
accession. This dissertation analyzes domestic political change in the realm of civil-
military relations from the perspective of the Europeanization approach. The 
framework proposed to study the Turkish case is intended to contribute to the 
knowledge of Europeanization and Turkey-European Union relations. 
 
Keywords: Europeanization, Civil-Military Relations, Turkey and European Union 
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ÖZET 
 
AVRUPALILAŞMA, SİYASAL DEĞİŞİM VE  
TÜRKİYE’DE SİVİL-ORDU İLİŞKİLERİ 
 
Karatekelioğlu, Petek 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
 Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Aylin Güney 
 
Aralık 2007 
 
Bu tez Avrupa Birliği’nin Türkiye’de siyasal değişime olan etkisini incelemektedir. 
Bu bağlamda, çalışmanın odağı Avrupalılaşma ve sivil-ordu ilişkileridir. Modern 
Türkiye tarihinin belirleyici özelliklerinden bir tanesi Avrupa devletler topluluğunun 
tam üyesi olma hedefidir. Bu amaçla, Batılılaşma ve modernleşme söylem ve 
uygulamaları modern Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin oluşturucu öğelerindendir. Ancak, 
1960’lı yıllardan başlayarak günümüze Avrupa ekonomik ve politik entegrasyon 
süreci derinleşmiştir. Bir siyasi bütünleşme projesi içeren bu süreç, Avrupa devlet 
sisteminde ve Avrupa toplumlarında önemli dönüşümlere yol açmıştır. Bu oluşumu 
inceleyen son dönem çalışmaları bu değişim sürecini Avrupalılaşma olarak 
nitelemektedirler. Bu çalışmalara göre, Avrupa Birliği üye ülkelerde ve üyeliğe aday 
olan ülkelerde siyasi, ekonomik ve toplumsal dönüşüm süreçlerinin en belirleyici 
öğesidir. Avrupa Birliği’nin etkisi üyelik müzakereleri sürecinde olan Türkiye’de de 
azımsanamayacak ölçüde hissedilmektedir. Bu tez, Türkiye’de sivil-ordu ilişkileri 
alanındaki siyasal değişimi Avrupalılaşma açısından ele alan bir perspektifle analiz 
etmektedir. Türkiye örneğini incelemek üzere önerilen bu kuramsal yaklaşım, 
Avrupalılaşma teorilerine ve Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği ilişkileri konusunda sürdürülen 
akademik çalışmalara katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupalılaşma, Sivil-Ordu İlişkileri, Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Over the past decade, Turkey’s reform process aimed at opening accession 
negotiations with the European Union (EU) has been remarkable. Turkey’s political 
will to become a member of the EU can be considered an extension of its 
modernization and Westernization politics, going back to the establishment of the 
Republic of Turkey. However, relations between Turkey and EU, which date back to 
the 1960s, have been marked by ups and down. One of the important aspects of this 
uneasy relationship is that according to the EU, Turkey has to fully comply with the 
Copenhagen political criteria in order to become a member. The customs union, 
which went into effect in January 1996, and Turkey’s EU membership candidacy at 
the end of 1999, made the policy option of a Turkey more integrated with Europe 
more viable. These developments were major motivations towards fulfilling the 
political criteria for membership. In response, successive Turkish governments 
(1999-2006) undertook major political reforms and showed their willingness to ease 
Turkey’s relations with the EU. 
 
In this context, the improvement of the democratic governance of civil-military 
relations is a major component of the ongoing process of Turkey’s Europeanization. 
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Starting with the Association Agreement (1963) and extending to Turkey’s 
membership application (1987), on several occasions the EC/EU has voiced concerns 
about democratization and the civilianization of Turkish politics. In this connection, 
the reports of the European Parliament in particular have included sharp criticisms of 
the state of civil-military relations in Turkey while referring to past interventions in 
Turkish politics. After the introduction of the Copenhagen political criteria (1993), 
and Turkey’s inclusion in the pre-accession strategy (1997), EU institutions through 
the European Commission Regular Reports (1998-2006) and Accession Partnership 
documents (2001, 2003, and 2006) have communicated more concrete evaluations in 
this respect. The European Commission Regular Report of November 2001 stated 
“The basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, but a number of 
fundamental issues, such as civilian control over the military, remain to be 
effectively addressed” (European Commission, 2001: 97).  
 
Turkey’s increasing interest and strong determination to become an EU member is a 
major factor that has caused the military to rethink and redefine its role in Turkish 
politics – in particular, its relations with the civilian elites. The military has several 
times reiterated that the Turkish Armed Forces has always acted as the driving force 
of modernization, and Turkey’s accession to the EU will mediate the realization of 
this objective. Similarly, successive Turkish governments have undertaken 
comprehensive reform programs towards complying with the political conditionality 
in the area of civil-military relations. However, how far Turkey has complied with 
the EU’s political conditionality for membership in this particular area remains an 
issue of debate in both Turkey and the EU.  
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An important aspect of these debates is that so far, studies of civil-military relations 
in Turkey have mostly ignored the relevance of theories of European integration for 
understanding what is changing or not in the context of Turkey’s EU membership 
process.1 The available literature on the reforms concerning civil-military relations in 
Turkey has a tendency to link Turkey’s EU candidacy with the broader scholarly 
literature on democracy and civil-military relations, including “civil democratic 
control of the armed forces.”2 These studies diverge over whether the EU provides 
adequately framed guidelines for reforms concerning its common position on the 
democratic governance of civil-military relations. However, four common positions 
that can be derived from these recent studies are insightful. The first is that among 
other international political actors, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the 
EU plays a particular role in providing a framework for reforms regarding civil-
military relations in Turkey. A second, rather critical outlook is that in monitoring 
and redesigning the framework for reforming civil-military relations, the EU has to 
take into consideration Turkey’s specific domestic political/institutional setting. A 
related third position is that, in spite of the centrality of the EU’s direct legal-
institutional reform strategy to trigger democratization in this area, further substantial 
aspects of institutional adaptation, such as policy alignment and the mindset of the 
                                                 
1  Sarıgil (2007: 40-41) provides supportive argument emphasizing that Turkey’s Europeanization 
process is “an under-investigated issue.” According to Sarıgil (2007: 40) “more theoretical efforts 
would not only contribute to our understanding of the reform process in post-Helsinki Turkey, but 
also contribute to the Europeanization literature in general.”  
 
2 For diverse approaches to democratic governance of civil-military relations in Turkey, see Güney 
and Karatekelioğlu (2005), Cizre (2004), Jenkins (2001), Knoonings and Kruijt (2002), Duman and 
Tsarouhas (2006), Karabelias (2003), Güney (2002a), Danopoulos and Zirker (2006), Greenwood 
(2006), Narlı (2006), and Drent (2006). 
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actors running these institutions, need to be explored.3 Studies on the discourse of the 
military concerning the EU and democracy are of particular relevance to an 
understanding of these aspects of domestic politics within the framework of Turkey’s 
EU candidacy.4 Finally, these works also emphasize the complementary nature of the 
civilian and military dimensions of EU-triggered domestic political change.5 In other 
words, they point to the need to reinforce the mechanisms through which civilian 
institutions may be empowered to participate in political processes in general. 
Moreover, they emphasize the need for furthering the development of civilian 
knowledge of, and expertise in, national security and defense policies.  
 
 
1.1 The Purpose of the Study 
 
The distinctiveness of this dissertation is that it analyzes the EU’s impact on civil-
military relations in Turkey through the lens of the Europeanization approach to 
European integration. This should help us understand to what extent the EU is an 
effective outside trigger in stimulating change in this particular area. The process of 
European integration, now ongoing under the umbrella of the EU, is described as one 
of the main variables of domestic political transformations in member states and EU 
membership candidates (Hix, 1999; Nugent, 2004). This process, the subject of a 
great deal of recent scholarship, is referred to as Europeanization. There are many 
                                                 
3 (Misrahi, 2004: 25) explores the limits of the legal-institutional approach to EU’s impact on civil-
military relations in Turkey. 
 
4 For an in-depth analysis of the discourse of the military in the context of Turkey’s EU membership 
process, see Heper (2005a, 2004).  
 
5 Cizre (2004: 118) proposes the study of “civilian empowerment” aspects of the democratic 
governance of civil-military relations. Similarly, Demirel (2004) demonstrates the relevance of the 
study of civilian institutions for our understanding of the evolution of civil-military relations in 
Turkey.    
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different approaches to explaining Europeanization, with some common ground 
found in the idea that it refers to the impact of European integration on domestic 
political change (Olsen, 2002; Hix and Goetz, 2001). A growing number of 
Europeanization studies are shifting from a focus on the impact of EU membership to 
one on domestic political change in the candidate countries. In the case of the 
candidate countries, it is argued that the political conditionality for membership is the 
major mechanism through which the EU induces domestic change. Moreover, in 
explaining the process of Europeanization, it is most commonly argued that “national 
features continue to play a role in shaping the outcomes” of domestic adaptation to 
the EU (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 1; Börzel, 2002).  
 
The research question of this dissertation is: to what extent does the EU induce 
change in the area of civil-military relations in Turkey. For this purpose, the study 
focuses on three aspects of the EU’s political conditionality in this area. Three 
propositions are developed out of the scholarly work on Europeanization: 
1. Through its political conditionality for membership, the EU induces change 
in formal institutional structures in the area of civil-military relations in 
Turkey. The focus of this aspect of Europeanization is on the formal, legal 
aspects of institutional restructuring. EU harmonization laws (Avrupa Birliği 
Uyum Yasaları) are the main mediating variables of domestic institutional 
adaptation. This process of change is referred to as Europeanization and 
formal institutional change. 
2. Through its political conditionality for membership, the EU induces policy 
change in the area of civil-military relations. This aspect of Europeanization 
focuses on Turkey’s policies of integration with the EU, which covers the 
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democratic governance of civil-military relations. The approximation of 
domestic policy formulation and the alignment of foreign policies are the 
main mediating variables of change. This process of change is referred to as 
Europeanization and policy change. 
3. Through its political conditionality for membership, the EU triggers change 
in informal institutional structures in the area of civil-military relations. The 
diffusion of EU norms and discourses is the major mediating variable of this 
aspect of change. The diffusion of the EU norms is expected to bring about 
substantial institutional change in mindsets, or attitudes, of domestic political 
actors, such as the military, the government or the public. In this dissertation, 
this aspect of Europeanization focuses on the military’s change in attitude 
towards issues arising from Turkey’s EU membership process. The process of 
change is referred to as Europeanization and informal institutional change. 
 
The underlying contribution of this study is to further elaborate the links between 
Turkey’s EU membership process and domestic change in the area of civil-military 
relations. First, the Europeanization approach provides the analytical tools to help 
delineate EU-driven and domestically driven mediating variables, which either 
facilitate or hinder the process of change in the context of EU membership. It aids in 
an understanding of why, how and under what conditions the EU induces change in 
this specific area. Second, it provides an analytical frame of reference to test whether 
domestic political change in the area of civil-military relations varies across different 
legal structures, policy issues, etc. Finally, the study goes beyond the investigation of 
legal reforms to analyze more substantial aspects of the reform process such as 
policy change, and also informal aspects of institutional change. By investigating an 
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area that has not been adequately covered, this study aims to contribute to broader 
knowledge of the impact of the process of European integration on domestic political 
change in Turkey with specific emphasis on civil-military relations. 
 
 
1.2 Methodology  
 
The methodology of this study has two aspects. First, the theoretical framework is 
based on a review of the literature on the Europeanization approach to the EU’s 
impact on domestic political change. The three propositions of the dissertation are 
based on this literature review. The second aspect of the methodology is empirical 
research, which aims to measure and demonstrate these three proposed forms of 
Europeanization in the area of Turkish civil-military relations. 
 
In order to test the formal aspects of institutional change, the empirical data are based 
on the content of available official and legal documents. These firstly include 
documents issued by EU institutions, namely, the Regular Reports of the European 
Commission, European Council decisions, the Accession Partnership documents, the 
reports of the European Parliament and other official texts published within the 
framework of the EU’s pre-accession strategy. However, the primary focus is on the 
reports of the European Commission and the Accession Partnership documents. The 
underlying reason is that these are binding on the candidate countries if they aim to 
acquire EU membership status. Second come the legal texts issued by Turkey, which 
are the Constitution, laws and regulations, the Official Gazette, the National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, EU harmonization packages including 
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reform laws and constitutional amendments, and official documents of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Secretariat General of the 
National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği), the Turkish 
Armed Forces, and Ministry of National Defense (Milli Savunma Bakanlığı). Finally 
come the documents issued by the Turkey-EU Association Council, Association 
Agreement, decisions of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, customs union, and 
documents related to accession negotiations.  
  
The policy aspect of change is tested through discourse analysis. The analysis centers 
on the policy discourses of the EU and domestic actors, such as the military and the 
government. Official EU publications, as cited above, are analyzed to delineate the 
political conditionality concerning policy alignment. The analysis is completed with 
a discourse analysis of statements made by the military and the government as they 
appeared in Turkish newspapers, and official web pages of the political parties, and 
in official declarations of the military such as the Turkish General Staff 
(Genelkurmay Başkanlığı), the Turkish Armed Forces, and the Secretariat General of 
the National Security Council. The discourse analysis covers the official policy 
positions of the government, Parliament and related ministries. The data analysis 
concentrates on the period before and after the European Commission reports and the 
European Council decisions so as to measure the extent to which policy change is 
triggered by EU membership motivations.  
 
Discourse analysis is also employed to test the informal aspects of institutional 
change. EU rhetoric on Turkey’s EU membership as well as its conditionality on 
informal aspects of institutional change is an integral part of the research. These 
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include the EU’s official reports, public opinion polls and the speeches of EU 
leaders. Equally important is the analysis of the speeches of senior military officers 
on EU-related matters over the years. For this purpose, in addition to the official web 
page of the Turkish Armed Forces, Turkish newspapers are the main sources of 
information. Similarly, the discourse of the government and Turkish public on EU-
related issues is also examined. However, in line with the purpose of the study, the 
stand of the military is the primary focus of the analysis.  
 
The empirical analysis undertaken in this dissertation focuses on change experienced 
in the area of civil-military relations in terms of various aspects of legal-institutional 
reforms, policy alignment and informal aspects of institutional change. Furthermore, 
the empirical research mainly covers the period from 1999 to 2006, which 
corresponds to Turkey’s EU membership process. However, the study also explores 
some of the important historical landmarks in Turkey-EU relations. Finally, 
historical-comparative research is employed in order to examine the pre-existing 
domestic structures in Turkey and analyze the extent to which there has been change. 
During the process of research and writing, significant amounts of both secondary 
and primary data have been analyzed. Qualitative data analysis methods, such as 
discourse analysis, have been employed, supported by available quantitative data 
such as surveys, statistical data, and content analysis. 
 
 
1.3 Overview of the Study  
 
The next chapter, Chapter 2, explains the theoretical framework of the dissertation. 
First, it reviews earlier approaches to European integration. Second, it explores the 
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Europeanization approach to the EU’s impact on both member states and candidate 
countries. The chapter’s final section explains the three aspects of the 
Europeanization process, through whose lens change in the area of civil-military 
relations in Turkey is then analyzed. The theoretical framework proposed is tested, 
complemented and modified through the findings of the empirical data presented in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
 
Chapter 3 analyzes Turkey’s legal-institutional reforms in the area of civil-military 
relations. The first section of the chapter explores the pre-existing legal-institutional 
setting. The second analyzes the impact of the EU’s political conditionality on the 
formal aspects of institutional change. The analysis covers: (1) the EU harmonization 
reforms concerning the functioning and composition of the National Security 
Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu), and (2) EU harmonization reforms associated with 
the issue of the accountability and transparency of the military with respect to 
civilian institutions. The chapter’s final section delineates the mediating 
factors/variables facilitating or hindering Turkey’s closer integration with the EU in 
this particular area.  
 
Chapter 4 analyzes the extent to which the EU’s political conditionality induces 
policy change. The first section of the chapter explores the policy legacy of the 
military through a historical perspective. The second section analyzes the process of 
policy alignment along the lines of the EU’s political conditionality. The analysis 
focuses on (1) Turkey’s policies of integration with the EU, such as the 
approximation of domestic policy formulation, and (2) foreign policy alignment 
regarding the promotion of peaceful relations with neighboring countries, the 
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European Security and Defense Policy and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus 
problem. The section investigates mediating factors facilitating or impeding this 
aspect of Europeanization. The chapter’s overall aim is to test whether in the 
formulation of these policies, the civilian authority has been further strengthened 
during Turkey’s EU membership process. 
 
Chapter 5 analyzes informal aspects of institutional change, such as whether the 
diffusion of EU norms and discourses has brought about change in the 
attitudes/mindsets of the military with regard to issues arising from Turkey’s EU 
membership candidacy. The first section explores the factors that are influential in 
the military’s attitude formation. The second focuses on the impact of the diffusion 
of EU norms and discourses on this attitude. Two major periods are compared to 
analyze the factors that facilitate or hinder informal institutional change: (1) 1999-
2004 is studied as a period when the expectations on Turkey’s EU membership were 
relatively high, and (2) 2004-2006 is studied as a period marked with ruptures in 
Turkish-EU relations.  
 
In the concluding chapter, the Europeanization approach proposed in Chapter 2 is 
evaluated through the findings of the empirical analysis provided in Chapters 3, 4 
and 5. The three propositions on domestic change covering formal and informal 
institutions and policies are assessed in terms of what kind of change is coming about 
and why the EU is a major trigger in stimulating change in the area of civil-military 
relations in Turkey. The impact of the EU is explained through the mediating 
variables of Europeanization. This includes a discussion of domestically driven 
aspects of political change and the EU-driven factors. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: EUROPEANIZATION 
AND POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY 
 
 
Europeanization emerged as a new approach making use of the analytical tools of 
earlier work on European integration. It aims to explain the EU’s impact on domestic 
change in member states and candidate countries. This new approach is an important 
contribution, as it helps clarify the mechanisms through which the EU induces 
domestic change. This chapter undertakes a constructive reading of Europeanization 
studies to reflect on the empirical links between the EU and domestic political 
change in Turkey. The first section summarizes the theories of European integration 
upon which the Europeanization approach developed. The second explains the 
Europeanization approach to European integration. The final section focuses on the 
theoretical framework with which Turkey’s process of Europeanization in the area of 
civil-military relations is analyzed in this dissertation. Three forms within which 
Europeanization occurs are identified: formal institutional change, policy change, 
and informal institutional change. 
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2.1 Earlier Approaches to European Integration  
 
The process of European integration went hand in hand with theories of European 
integration. These theories explained the various conjunctures in the evolution of the 
EC/EU, and the current context determined the dominant approach. Earlier theories 
of integration explored the reasons for the evolution of the EC/EU as a supranational 
authority and its impact on nation-states. They studied the consequences of 
integration on the member states’ sovereignty, policy-making capacity and autonomy 
(Hoffmann, 1966; Milward et al., 1993; Bornschier, 2000; Wallace, 1990; Barkin 
and Cronin, 1994; Aalberts, 2004). These earlier approaches tended to focus on 
international relations aspects of integration.  
 
Since the 1990s, new theories have emerged to explain the changing dynamics of 
integration. With the establishment of the Treaty on the European Union (1993), the 
EU’s impact on the national politics of member and candidate countries grew much 
more visible. Therefore, relatively recent approaches have shifted emphasis to a 
theoretical and empirical investigation of European integration’s impact on domestic 
political dynamics (Schmidt, 1999; Hix, 1999; Goetz and Hix, 2001; Börzel, 2002; 
Mair, 2001; Ladrech 1994). This demonstrates that the study of domestic politics 
occupies an increasingly important place in contemporary European politics. These 
studies mostly build on comparative politics. Before explaining Europeanization, we 
need to cover these earlier approaches. 
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2.1.1 The 1960s and After: Supranational Versus Intergovernmental Axis 
 
After the establishment of the European Economic Community (1957), the dominant 
debate over European integration revolved around the neofunctionalist and 
intergovernmentalist axis (Nelsen and Stubb, 2003). These two approaches have 
different perspectives for explaining the dynamics of the integration process. 
 
2.1.1.1 Neofunctionalism 
 
In postwar Europe, achieving peace through the spread of liberal democratic norms 
and values became the dominant political discourse, and the realist approach to 
international relations was seriously challenged.6 The economic and political 
integration of European states at high levels of regional cooperation was seen as a 
way to prevent wars, which were blamed on the predominance of state-centered 
interests in international relations (Haas, 1958). In the 1960s, growing out of the 
functional approach7, the neofunctional approach explored the reasons for the 
transfer of competencies by member states and the subsequent evolution of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) into the EEC and EC (Rosamond, 
2000). Under this theory, the political integration process at the European level is an 
inevitable function of the process of institutionalization at the supranational level 
precipitated by economic integration (Rosamond, 2000: 52; Balassa, 1994).  
 
                                                 
6 For a discussion of the realist approach and other approaches to international relations, see Olson 
(1991). 
 
7 The functionalist approach explained integration in terms of the “spillover effect” of functional 
integration processes from one policy sector to the others (Lindberg, 1994; Haas, 1958).  
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Neofunctionalism’s central claim is that the process of European integration is led by 
a supranational authority with jurisdictional powers in the member states’ territories, 
and is evolving as an alternative to the political system now governing the modern 
nation-state (Linberg, 1994). In this sense, neofunctionalism is a challenge to the 
realist paradigm, as it goes beyond the state-centric vision. Indeed, as it turned into 
the EU, the EC gradually evolved from an economic community into a political one, 
along the way acquiring legal and political authority which pushed for domestic 
change. The EU is evolving as a supranational institution, and most of the political 
and economic decisions made by its institutions are legally binding on the member 
states. This has brought a new understanding to the concept of the member states’ 
territorial sovereignty (Held et al., 1999).  
 
2.1.1.2 Intergovernmentalism  
 
Since the 1960s, EU members have made changes to their legal and institutional 
arrangements to allow for the delegation of authority to a supranational level and the 
sharing of an increasing number of policy competency areas with the EU (Dinnage 
and Murphy, 1996).8 However, this has led to tensions in relations among the 
different levels of policy-making.9 The Luxembourg Compromise of 196610 resulted 
in more power for the Council of Ministers, the intergovernmental decision-making 
                                                 
8 The delegation of policy competencies ranges from economic and social policies to policies relating 
to justice and home affairs and common foreign and security policy. Depending on the issue of 
integration in question, the member state share political sovereignty at varying levels (Nugent, 2003). 
 
9 Namely, the EU’s supranational institutions such as the European Commission, European Parliament 
and European Court of Justice; intergovernmental institutions such as the European Council and 
Council of Ministers; and domestic political institutions. For more information on the legal aspects of 
EU decision-making processes, see Nugent (2003). 
 
10 The Luxembourg Compromise (1966) came at the time of the French Presidency and introduced 
unanimous voting at the Council of Ministers on several issues, most relating to the preservation of 
the member states’ national interests (Dinan, 57-59). 
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body within the EC’s institutional framework. Additionally, Europe’s economies 
were hurt by the oil crisis of the 1970s. These economic and political developments 
led to a slowdown in the political integration process, and this in turn was reflected 
in theories of European integration.  
 
These developments led European studies to question the validity of the 
neofunctional approach for explaining the process of integration. Critiques of 
neofunctionalism focused on the intergovernmental approach, arguing that decisions 
on economic or political integration came from preference convergence among 
member states through processes of inter-state bargaining and negotiations at the 
EC/EU level (Rosamond, 2000). In this sense, intergovernmentalism goes back to 
state-centric perspectives to explain European integration. Therefore, contrary to 
neofunctionalist claims, the significance of the relative power of the member states in 
decision-making processes remained undisrupted by the EC (Moravcsik, 1998b).  
 
According to the intergovernmental approach, policy alignment and integration is 
proceeding more easily in some policy areas than in others (Hix, 1999). For example, 
the formulation of common foreign and security policy faces the challenge of 
member state opposition on issues concerning their immediate national policy 
objectives. However, trade policies and the common market are evolving with much 
less controversy. Indeed, the integration process is made up of various stages, and the 
problematic lies in deepening the political dimensions where member states are 
reluctant to share major foreign or domestic policy competencies with EU 
institutions when this appears to conflict with national preferences and interests 
(Newman, 1996). Furthermore, the diffusion of EU norms in several cases produces 
 16
conflict between national identity/preferences and EU-level norms and standards 
(Meehan, 1993; Wiener, 1998). 
 
In the early 1990s, liberal intergovernmentalism became the dominant approach. The 
approach came from the need to explain how national interests and preferences are 
formulated. It follows the logic of classical intergovernmental approaches to 
European integration. Yet it involves a liberal-pluralist emphasis in which national 
preferences and interest formation are viewed as a consequence of state-society 
interactions (Rosamond, 2000; Moravcsik, 1998a). According to this perspective, 
domestic actors are important variables in explaining the process of European 
integration. Therefore, there is a necessity to rethink state power along the relative 
importance of domestic political actors involved in policy-making (Bulmer 1983; 
Schmitter and Streeck, 1994). Domestic policy-making is a process involving a 
plurality of actors. EU institutions intervene in this process by setting up an 
alternative political environment for the domestic actors, i.e. political parties, civil-
society, citizens.  
 
2.1.2 The 1990s and After: The Rising Importance of Domestic Politics 
 
The 1987 Single European Act, followed by the 1993 Treaty on the European Union, 
led to the revival of integration theories to explain the new EU momentum. 
Historically speaking, from the 1957 Treaty of Rome onwards, the EU has evolved 
from being an Economic Community into a project of European economic, monetary 
and political unification. Now the competencies of EU institutions include economic, 
social, and cultural policy issues along with other areas such as the environment, 
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foreign and security policy, justice, and home affairs.11 This is a result of the 
deepening12 of integration to produce a “panoply of new practices in the context of 
an expanding European economy and an emerging European polity” (Schmidt and 
Radaelli, 2004: 183; Sweet and Sandholtz, 2003).  
 
In this context, traditional approaches were revised along the lines of multi-level 
governance and new institutional approaches. They developed as new paradigms out 
of the old ones to explain the mechanisms and consequences of the economic and 
political unification project (Rosamond, 2000). These approaches emphasize the role 
of intra-state policy-making processes behind national preference and interest 
formation and their impact on furthering integration.  
 
2.1.2.1 Multi-Level Governance Approach 
 
These theories focus on studying the EU’s governance system. Accordingly, the EU 
is conceived as a political system coexisting with that of the modern nation-state 
(Marks et al., 1996). They argue that the integration project faces several hurdles 
related to tensions between the different levels of governance as a result of the 
expansion of EU political competencies to many areas (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). 
Multi-level governance is one of the terms most commonly invoked to explain 
complex EU policy-making processes involving “overlapping competencies among 
                                                 
11 The areas of competence of the EU are defined in the treaties (Rome, Maastricht, Amsterdam, 
Nice), as well as in the rules and regulations issued by the supranational (Commission, Parliament, 
Court of Justice) and intergovernmental (European Council and the Council of Ministers) institutions 
of the EU. See the EU’s official web site for more information on its legal system: http://europa.eu
 
12 “Deepening” refers to the process of institutional reforms aiming at either increasing the areas of 
competencies of the EU or reforming the decision-making mechanisms before the process of 
enlargement (“widening”). The second reform aims at adapting the institutional framework of the 
Union to allow for the participation of more member states. For further explanation of discourses and 
practices relating to the evolution of the European Union, see Dinan (1994). 
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multiple levels of governments and the interactions of political actors across those 
levels” (Marks et al., 1996: 41; Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996).13  
 
The central proposition of these theories is that the “EU has become a polity where 
the authority is dispersed between different levels of governance and between actors, 
and where there are significant sectoral variations in governance patterns” 
(Rosamond, 2000: 110). In this definition, the EU is not conceived of as a monolithic 
entity but a supranational institutional form of governance. Accordingly, the EU is 
composed of different member states, governance layers and political actors that 
interact through bargaining processes at the intergovernmental and supranational 
levels.14 In order to influence EU policy decision, these political actors are making 
use of the new political spaces – which coexist with the traditional national ones.  
 
2.1.2.2 New Institutionalism 
 
New institutional approaches are concerned with the “ways in which institutional 
configurations have an impact upon political outcomes” (Rosamond, 2000: 113). 
They focus on the relative importance of institutions in the study of agent-structure 
relations in determining political change (Knill and Lenschow, 2001b; Knill, 2001).  
                                                 
13 Multi-level governance denotes the “differential empowerment of domestic actors” that is translated 
in “a new process of governing that does not solely rely on centralized, hierarchical form of 
government” (Kochler-Koch and Eising, 1999). 
 
14 This perspective on EU governance is developed out of the principle of “subsidiarity”, meaning the 
empowerment of different levels of government on policy-making. The principle was officially 
introduced by the TEU (1993) and launched by J. Delors (1989). The underlying argument was that 
each decision should be taken by the proper political unit. It “appeared as the guiding principle 
delineating the competences of Brussels versus other administrative authorities, such as national states 
and regions,” and its implication is that there should be a “separation of the responsibilities between 
the European Commission, the member state and sub-national governments or other local authorities” 
(Kersenbergen and Verbeek, 1994: 231-236). Yet, “subsidiarity” and its implications are largely 
debated. 
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In this connection, “structure-based approaches emphasize the role of existing 
institutional configuration as independent explanatory factors in the analysis of 
political outcomes and institutional development” (Knill and Lenschow, 2001a: 193). 
They consider institutional structures to be primary explanatory factors shaping 
policy and institutional change. The main problem of this first approach is whether 
the institutions are independent of intervening variables shaping political outcomes. 
“Agency-based approaches attach a less determining role to institutional factors,” but 
they “explain policy or institutional development (continuity and change) by 
reference to the prevailing actor constellation in a given institutional context” (Knill 
and Lenschow, 2001a: 195). The main problem associated with this latter approach is 
gauging the extent to which political actors’ resources and behavior is independent of 
the institutional settings they operate in.15  
 
In sum, according to new institutionalism, domestic institutions and actors are 
important variables in explaining the process of domestic institutional change within 
the context of European integration. The Europeanization approach explores in-depth 
variants of the new institutional approach such as rational choice, historical and 
sociological. It uses their analytical tools to explain the varying EU impact on 
specific domestic institutional settings and political actors’ constellations.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 For further descriptions and interpretations of new institutional approaches, see Powell and 
DiMaggio (1991), March and Olsen (1989), and Thelen, Steinmo and Longstreth (1992). 
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2.2 Europeanization Approach 
 
As the new millennium began, the EU had accumulated a history of nearly fifty years 
of economic and political integration, and had come to encompass twenty-seven 
member states as well as several candidate countries, including Turkey and Croatia, 
seeking accession.16 Yet the process of integration, as of 2000 and the years since, 
has not evolved as smoothly as predicted by theory. The outcomes of legal and 
institutional adaptation to the EU, and the degree of alignment of policies, norms and 
standards, have varied across member states. This has led some to argue that there is 
an urgent need for new analytical frameworks to explain the EU’s varying impact on 
domestic political change in different areas and countries (Jachtenfuchs, 2001; 
Börzel, 2002). The Europeanization approach transcends the earlier approaches to 
European integration outlined above. However, it goes beyond perspectives centered 
on international relations. It mainly builds on approaches that bring in analytical 
tools of comparative politics into the theoretical literature on the EU.  
 
The theoretical and empirical work to date has conceptualized Europeanization in a 
variety of ways. It has been used to explain the different trajectories of the process of 
European integration and the complex set of mechanisms through which it affects the 
domestic politics of member states. However, the most common agreement is that 
                                                 
16 The current members of the European Union are Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, 
Sweden, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia, and the current candidates for EU membership are Turkey and Croatia. In November 
2006, the European Commission issued a communication to the European Parliament and European 
Council explaining its enlargement strategy and the main challenges. The communication introduced 
the present enlargement agenda covering the countries of the Western Balkans and Turkey. These 
countries are at various points along the road to accession. The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia became a candidate country in December 2005. See the EU’s official web site for more 
information: http://europa.eu. Updated information on the EU’s enlargement agenda is also available 
from http://www.euroactiv.com/en/enlargement
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Europeanization describes the impact of European integration on domestic political 
change. More importantly, the common ground adopted is that domestic political 
institutions, policy processes and political actors do matter in delineating the EU’s 
impact.  
 
This study derives from two manifestations of Europeanization process studied in the 
literature. (1) The impact of the EU17 on domestic political change in the member 
states (Olsen, 2002; Hix and Goetz, 2001). (2) The impact the EU’s political 
conditionality in the candidate for membership within the framework of the 
enlargement process (Olsen, 2002; Wallace, 2001). Turkey is studied as an example 
of the second process. 
 
2.2.1 The EU’s Impact on Domestic Political Change in Member States  
 
One major aspect of Europeanization is concerned with changes in member states. 
Domestic change emerges as a result of structural change involving the adjustment of 
institutional norms and values. Thus, Europeanization investigates “how the process 
of European integration and Europeanization in general affect the domestic structures 
in the EU.” The term is defined as 
the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance, that is of political, legal, and social institutions associated with 
political problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of 
policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules. 
Europeanization involves the evolution of new layers of politics that interact 
with older ones. (Cowles and Risse, 2001: 217)  
 
In Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001: 4-5), domestic structures are defined as “those 
components of a polity or society consisting of regularized and comparatively stable 
                                                 
17 Here the EU is defined as the governance system formed at the supranational level as a result of the 
European integration process.  
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interactions” in the sense that change in structures “implies more than changes in the 
policies or preference of the political actors.” The notion “entails both formal and 
informal institutions” (March and Olsen, 1989; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). 
Institutions are defined in sociological terms as “systems of rules both formal and 
informal” (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 5). First, formalized institutions are 
organizations with written norms and procedures, prescribing behavior. Second, 
domestic structures also encompass informal institutions. They “capture elements of 
political culture including the understanding and meanings attached to political and 
societal institutions as well as collective identities” (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 
2001: 5). Informal institutions embed unwritten norms and value systems. Therefore, 
change comes from domestic structural adaptation, which comprises formal and 
informal institutional adjustments, and policy alignment. 
 
Europeanization primarily denotes a process of building institutional structures at the 
EU level in response to economic, political or policy problems arising from 
globalization18 (Cowles and Risse, 2001). This political institutionalization occurs 
through the development of common rules, procedures, norms, policies and practices 
at the EU level that are binding on the member states (Cowles and Risse, 2001). Here 
the Europeanization approach is interested in studying the impact on member states 
of the emergence of Europe-wide policies, norms and values. Member states both 
constitute these rules and adjust their national institutions to these emerging 
European structures. These new practices and rules, structures of meaning and 
                                                 
18 It is important to distinguish between Europeanization and globalization. Globalization refers to a 
worldwide phenomenon in which economic and political interdependence between nation-states 
becomes increasingly visible (Held et al., 1999). Europeanization, on the other hand, denotes the 
process of regional integration in Europe and explores the mechanisms through which it is becoming 
an integral part of national political systems in Europe (Axtmann, 1998). 
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resources have a reciprocal effect on the national and sub-national systems of 
governance to transform domestic structures (Börzel, 2002).  
 
Therefore, the conception of Europeanization implies a twofold causal process in 
which a complex set of institutionalization processes at the EU level occurs through 
the interactions of domestic and EU actors. Europeanization denotes a convergence 
in policies, political processes and political behavior which is to some extent 
imposed on the member states and their societies by EU governance (Diez, 
Agnantopoulos and Kaliber, 2005). In Ladrech’s words (1994: 69), “the political and 
economic dynamics of the EU become part of the organizational logic of the national 
politics and policy-making.” The EU has a direct influence over “domestic 
discourses, identities, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2000: 4).  
 
However, the extent to which Europeanization is experienced by member states also 
depends on pre-existing institutions, and political actors operating within the national 
political systems (Goetz and Hix, 2001; Börzel, 2002; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 
2001). The compatibility between national policies, objectives and the requirements 
of policy alignment with the EU is among the important sources of convergence or 
divergence, depending on the policy issues in question (Hix, 1999; Newman, 1996). 
In this sense, Europeanization is not only meant to refer to new EU-led political 
formations but also to investigating the mechanisms of expansion of this political 
institutionalization into national political systems. An institutional perspective, 
meaning the evolution of institutionalization patterns in a given country in historical 
perspective is one of the main components of the Europeanization approach to 
European integration (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001; Börzel, 2002). According 
 24
to this perspective, institutional factors play a central role in explaining a country’s 
Europeanization process.  
 
In sum, Europeanization refers to a set of complex mechanisms through which the 
EU induces domestic change. The sources of this change are both EU driven and 
domestically driven. First of all, this change is conceptualized as a process whereby 
domestic conditions affect the outcome of supranational institution-building and 
policy-making (Börzel, 2002; Cowles and Risse, 2001). Second, it is seen as a 
process whereby domestic political structures, including policies, norms and 
discourses, adjust to European integration (Börzel, 2002; Knill, 2001; Knill and 
Lehmkuhl, 2002). Thirdly, it is described as a circular and interactive process in 
which both the first and the second approaches to the impact of European integration 
are active (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Radaelli and Schmidt, 2004).  
 
Europeanization studies have drawn criticism for using the concepts of convergence, 
integration and adaptation interchangeably (Rosamond, 2002). Additionally, related 
criticisms center on analytical difficulties in the delineation of cause-effect 
relationships. This includes analytical weaknesses in separating structure from agent 
within the process of Europeanization. Papadimitriou and Phinnemore (2003) argue 
that a careful disentangling of the mechanisms or mediating factors through which 
Europeanization transforms domestic politics would be a major step in solving these 
problems. A delineation of the mechanisms of EU-led political transformation that 
apply to the present study will appear in the section on three forms of 
Europeanization later in this chapter. For our current purposes, such criticisms 
underline the reasons behind the transcendent nature of Europeanization theories. In 
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order to explain the process of change, this new approach uses the analytical tools of 
the just-covered interdisciplinary theories of European integration. In this sense, 
Europeanization is rather an organizing theoretical framework reflecting “renewed 
efforts to model the dynamics of European change” (Olsen, 2002: 923; Knill and 
Lehmkuhl, 2002). 
 
2.2.2 The Expansion of EU Governance Through the Enlargement Process  
 
EU enlargement acts as a tool of Europeanization leading to domestic structural 
changes, meaning the adjustment of institutions, policies, and norms and value. 
Studies in this field focus on the expansion of the territorial reach of the 
supranational system of governance to include new members (Olsen, 2002). The 
argument is that European transformations are not limited to member states but have 
been extended to include candidates for membership (Wallace, 2001; Nugent, 2004). 
This process of Europeanization is no different from the previous one applied to 
member states. Yet the EU’s political conditionality for membership adds an extra 
layer.  
 
2.2.2.1 Political Conditionality 
 
EU governance extends beyond its territory through the process of enlargement. This 
mainly consists of the pre-accession process, which is part of the EU’s foreign policy 
objectives. The Treaty of Rome (1957) states that “any European state may apply to 
become a member of the Community.” In the post-Maastricht era, the treaty has been 
amended to fit in with the more concrete criteria required of EU aspirant countries. 
These criteria are political and economic. According to the Copenhagen criteria, 
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adopted at the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, EU membership requires that 
the candidate country has achieved  
• stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for the protection of minorities (political criteria); 
• existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope 
with the competitive pressures and the market forces within the Union 
(economic criteria);  
• and the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence 
to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
Additionally, in order to create the conditions for political and economic integration, 
the country has to adopt the acquis communautaire19 and adjust its administrative 
and judicial structures to that of the EU (Madrid European Council, 1995). The 
Treaty on the European Union (1993), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), Agenda 2000 
(1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2000) asserted the EU’s commitment to the 
Copenhagen criteria for enlargement considerations. For this purpose, the 
establishment of a pre-accession strategy20 is envisaged for each of the aspiring 
                                                 
19 This comprises the entire body of EC legislation that has accumulated and been revised over the last 
40 years. It includes the founding Treaty of Rome as revised by the Single European Act (1987) and 
the Maastricht Treaty (1993), Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and the Nice Treaty (2000), and all the 
regulations and directives issues by the Council of Ministers as well as the rulings of the European 
Court of Justice. 
 
20 The pre-accession strategy is the EU’s main policy tool to integrate the candidate countries in 
Community agencies and programs, and to allow for their participation in the meetings relating to the 
accession process held between the member states and the EU. At the Helsinki European Council on 
10-11 December 1999 it was concluded, 
 
Building on the existing European strategy [which developed from the 1993 Copenhagen 
Council’s resolutions], Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession 
strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include financial and technical 
assistance, participation in community programs, agencies and committees, association 
agreements and accession partnerships and the national programs for the adoption of the 
acquis towards deepening the relations between the associated countries, the member states 
and the institutions of the Union (strengthening the structured dialogue).  
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member. All these decisions denote a process of Europeanization at the EU level on 
enlargement issues.21  
 
The EU communicates its conditionality by recommending political reforms, 
proposing policies, monitoring reforms and preparing reports on the ongoing reform 
processes, providing technical and financial support, twinning exercises, etc. 
(Grabbe, 2001). The process has a normative dimension. It embeds liberal 
democratic norms of appropriate political behavior, and socioeconomic development 
discourses into the agenda of EU integration (Manners, 2002; Risse, Ropp and 
Sikkink, 1999).  
 
Wallace (2001) proposes investigating the impact of the EU’s political conditionality 
on both the candidates and the “next neighbors.” She argues that the outcomes can be 
analyzed from the Europeanization perspective. This approach contributes to 
understanding the mechanisms of domestic transformation in the aspirant countries 
(Sedelmeier, 2001; Grabbe, 2001; Lippert, Umbach and Wolfgang, 2001). However, 
as Papadimitriou and Phinnemore (2003: 8) argue, “a wider use of Europeanization, 
to account for transformation dynamics outside the geographical boundaries of the 
EU, requires a rethink of some aspects of the existing literature.” Enlargement is part 
of the European economic and political integration processes. It means a wider 
Europe participating in the decision-making mechanisms of the EU. Expanding the 
EU to include new members has the consequence of reconstituting Europe 
                                                                                                                                          
In Turkey’s case enhanced political dialogue, with an emphasis on progress towards fulfilling the 
political criteria for accession is an additional tool. See for further information the official web page of 
the Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey: http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int   
 
21 The decisions on EU enlargement are basically taken at the European Council based on the 
recommendation of the European Commission. However, in this process the recommendations of the 
European Parliament to the European Commission and public opinion in the member states are also 
taking on increasing importance (Nugent, 2004). 
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economically, socially, culturally and politically. Consequently, institutional, 
socioeconomic and political considerations are active in shaping the EU foreign 
policy approach to enlargement (Müftüler-Baç, 2002b; Zienlonka, 2001). Yet the 
same concerns apply to membership candidates, who are expected to experience 
domestic political change while becoming EU members. This does not deny the 
arguments that enlargement is also to some extent a twofold process. According to 
Mény (1996:8), the Europeanization process “creates a permanent challenge to the 
national political systems, which are forced to adapt to a normative and strategic 
environment that they have as yet partially mastered.”  
 
However, the study of Europeanization in membership candidates, such as the 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)22 or Turkey, poses relatively few 
analytical problems compared to the study of member states, since the former, before 
gaining membership, had no direct involvement in EU decision-making mechanisms 
(Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2003). For instance, candidate states have limited or 
no power in “the making of the EU acquis,” but rather in its adaptation and 
implementation at the national level. Taking its cue from research findings on the 
impact of European integration on the CEECs, the argument is that the 
Europeanization approach provides even more insightful analytical tools for studying 
candidates for EU membership because the process of pre-accession demonstrates 
peculiar cases of Europeanization (Grabbe, 2003; Lippert, Umbach and Wolfgang, 
2001). Particularly, studies of the CEECs are providing important insights for 
analyzing the impact of the EU’s political conditionality on various areas of domestic 
change (Schimmelfenning, Engert and Knobel, 2003). 
                                                 
22 Almost all of the CEECs, including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, have been members of the EU since 2004, excepting Bulgaria and 
Romania, which joined in 2007.   
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The Europeanization approach allows a clearer view of the mechanisms through 
which the EU is transforming governance beyond its territory. First, EU-imposed 
criteria for membership determine what needs to be domestically changed. In this 
connection, the EU’s credibility concerning a country’s prospective membership is 
the major push-factor of political reform (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2003; 
Tocci, 2005; Uğur, 1999). Second, the political will of the candidate states in 
fulfilling the requirements for full membership is the main determinant (Müftüler-
Baç, 2005). The EU’s Copenhagen criteria have a binding effect on the candidates as 
long as EU membership is a top political priority. The EU provides an agenda that 
guides and empowers the ongoing process of political transformation (Grabbe and 
Hughes, 1998). However, membership candidates are not passive receptors of EU 
prescriptions. Within the framework provided by the Europeanization approach, 
empirical findings demonstrate that the domestic political dynamics of the candidate 
states are an important variable that mediates the ways in which change occurs.  
 
How the EU’s political conditionality impact on the domestic structures in specific 
applicant countries requires further exploration. For this purpose, systematic analysis 
of the relative importance of the domestic institutions, policies and strategies of 
political actors on different aspects of the evolving relationship between the EU and 
candidate states is important to explain Europeanization. For instance, domestic 
responses to European integration might vary based on whether an issue falls under 
the domain of “low politics” or “high politics” (Hix, 1999). The overall argument is 
that theories of Europeanization and domestic change can be extended to study the 
membership candidates. This will contribute to “the refinement of the rather blurred 
conceptual content of the theories of Europeanization and provide the analytical tools 
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to understand transformation beyond the existing members” (Papadimitriou and 
Phinnemore, 2003; Wallace, 2001).  
 
Work on Europeanization and enlargement assumes that empirical research based on 
smaller, precise case studies is relatively more helpful for understanding the reform 
process in membership candidates. According to this perspective, it allows for a 
clearer view of “the differing meanings of Europeanization across different sectors 
and countries as well as to locate the different mechanisms and the diverse domestic 
settings that mediate its success” (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2003). This is one 
reason why this dissertation’s exploration of the impact of European integration 
confines itself to studying domestic structural change in the realm of civil-military 
relations within the framework of the EU’s political conditionality.23  
 
2.2.2.2 Turkey as an Example of the EU’s Enlargement Process 
 
Turkey is an important component of the European enlargement strategy. Although 
there has been wide-ranging research on the EU’s impact on CEECs, Turkey’s 
candidacy is a relatively recent area for study in political science (Zielonka, 2001).24 
In any discussion of Turkey’s Europeanization process, there is a need to explore 
how available study of the impact of the EU on domestic political change bears on 
the Turkish case.  
 
Starting with Turkey’s EU membership candidacy in 1999, several themes in Turkish 
politics are studied. The political unification of Europe and its consequences for the 
                                                 
23 That is, focusing on the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria.  
 
24 For further studies of the CEECs, see Papadimitriou and Phinnemore (2003), Schimmelfennig, 
Engert and Knobel (2003), Phinnemore (2006), and Grabbe (2001). 
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Turkish nation-state (Tekeli and İlkin, 2000; Müftüler-Baç, 2001), the EU’s political 
conditionality and its impact on Turkey’s democratization process (Aydın and 
Keyman, 2004; Hale, 2003b; Rumford, 2001), and the impact of Europe on the 
transformation of Turkey’s social and economic structures (Keyder, 2003) have been 
the main areas studied to date. Additionally, the impact of the EU’s conditionality on 
various policy issues and institutions has only recently been probed, and researches 
remain rare.25  
 
Several insights on the EU impact on domestic politics can be derived from these 
recent Turkey-EU studies.26 The first contribution is a multidimensional analysis of 
Turkish-EU relations. The international context, EU-level developments and 
domestic political processes are important for explaining the results so far of 
Turkey’s quest for EU membership. Secondly, a shift in focus from external to 
domestic processes that have affected Turkey’s relations with the EU stresses the 
importance of domestic politics in understanding change (Canefe and Uğur, 2004: 8). 
Accordingly, public opinion, domestic institutional and policy designs, discourses, 
and political actors all matter. In this respect, delineation of the various conditions 
under which the EU induces domestic political change is facilitated. In this 
connection, the framework proposed by Diez, Agnantopoulos and Kaliber (2005) is a 
significant departure in terms of extending the Europeanization literature to studying 
the cases of EU aspirants. They identify four aspects of domestic change produced 
by the EU’s conditionality. First, the Europeanization of policies refers to the impact 
of European integration on policy-making. Second, the Europeanization of political 
                                                 
25 For diverse analysis of EU’s impact on various aspects of Turkish politics, see Sofos (2001), Bek 
(2003), Çayhan (2003), Çarkoğlu (2004), and Sarıgil (2007). 
 
26 For further studies on Turkey-EU relations, see Uğur and Canefe (2004), Tocci and Evin (2004), 
and Çarkoğlu and Rubin (2003).   
 32
processes refers to the impact of European integration on domestic institutional 
structures. Third, the Europeanization of identity or “societal Europeanization” refers 
to a process of change in collective identities and appropriate norms of political 
behavior in the context of European integration. Fourth, the Europeanization of the 
public discourses or “discursive Europeanization” refers to analysis of the extent to 
which reference to the EU has increased in public discourse. With reference to this 
approach, empirical works analyzing domestic change argue that the EU is an 
intervening variable which leads through the EU’s political conditionality to the 
democratization of the legal and institutional context domestic actors operate in 
(Müftüler-Baç, 2005). Additionally, the EU’s pre-accession strategy provides 
material support as well as a normative basis for domestic actors favoring reforms 
(Tocci, 2005; Rumelili, 2005). A complementary finding is that the EU has 
strengthened the pre-existing pro-reform actors who have supported and given 
direction to Turkey’s Europeanization process (Göksel and Güneş-Birden, 2005). 
The three forms of Europeanization that are identified in this dissertation build on 
these approaches to the impact of the EU on domestic politics covered in section 2.2. 
 
2.3 Three Forms of Europeanization 
 
So far, theoretical and empirical findings on Europeanization have been shown to be 
insightful in understanding the mediating factors and varying consequences of the 
impact of the European integration process on both member states and candidates. 
Olsen (2002: 923), based on his finding that the “different conceptions of 
Europeanization complement rather than exclude each other” in the sense that “they 
refer to different but related phenomena,” has proposed “categorical models of 
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Europeanization” relevant to the case at hand in order to enable the systematic study 
of EU-induced change.27  
 
Following this line of argumentation, this final section distinguishes between three 
forms of Europeanization relevant for the study of the EU impact on civil-military 
relations in Turkey. These forms come out of the current studies on member states 
and candidates explored in the previous section. They cover the formal and informal 
aspects of institutional change, as well as policy change. The three forms of 
Europeanization are employed in the empirical chapters to demonstrate the extent to 
which the EU’s political conditionality produces change in the specified areas of 
civil-military relations in Turkey.  
 
2.3.1 Formal Institutional Change 
 
Europeanization can be approached from a formal, legalistic perspective. This refers 
to the impact of the process of European integration on formal “domestic 
institutional structures and political processes” (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001; 
Diez, Agnantopoulos and Kaliber 2005: 4). It focuses on legal-institutional aspects of 
transformation. The main mechanism through which formal institutional change 
occurs is the legal harmonization process and consequent domestic institutional 
adaptation. These processes aim at coordinating national political structures with the 
EU. Thus, the implementation of the EU’s common policies at domestic levels is 
facilitated through structural adaptation. 
 
                                                 
27 Similarly, the emphasis of Cowles and Risse’s (2001: 217) approach is on the necessity to identify 
the Europeanization process relevant to the empirical domain. 
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Studies of member states have focused on formal dimensions of the EU impact on 
the adaptation of the national executives, administrative structures and judicial 
structures (Goetz, 2001; Heritier, 2001; Conant, 2001). Empirical research in this 
field demonstrates that Europeanization occurs at varying degrees and that “national 
responses varied considerably according to national characteristics” (Diez, 
Agnantopoulos and Kaliber, 2005: 5; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002; Cowles and Risse, 
2001). These studies emphasize the relative importance of the national institutional 
settings. European integration is conceived either as a trigger or as an intervening 
variable in domestic legal and institutional developments rather than the major 
driving force. Thus, the EU facilitates legal change rather than causing it outright. 
 
Additionally, research on Europeanization in member states has also explored the 
expansion of these legal and institutional restructurings on domestic political actors 
such as parties, interest groups, parliaments, local governments and voters (Börzel, 
2002; Raunio and Hix; 2001; Ladrech, 2002; Gabel, 2001; Cowles, 2001). Empirical 
findings demonstrate that one outcome of European integration is the empowerment 
of certain national political actors. The EU empowers these actors by providing them 
with new exit opportunities, veto points and informational advantages (Hix and 
Goetz, 2001). The new or amended legal and institutional arrangements allow for the 
redistribution of powers in the political system. This captures an important 
dimension of EU-induced political change. These actors’ usage of such new 
opportunity structures has a significant role in guiding the trajectory of domestic 
political reform. In this connection, EU-induced change does not necessarily 
reinforce national governments and executives but does alter the positions of other 
political actors within the national political system. 
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To some extent one can draw the basic tenets of common EU standards and practice 
from the acquis communautaire and supporting official documents. However, as 
empirical research has demonstrated, the institutional adaptation of member and 
candidate states to the EU level has taken varying degrees (Börzel, 2002). The pace 
of adaptation depends on pre-existing domestic structures such as legal, 
administrative or policy.28 In this respect, one can argue that domestic inputs are 
decisive in designating the extent of EU-led transformation.  
 
The analysis of Europeanization in candidates requires a rethinking of these 
theoretical assumptions and empirical findings. The pre-accession strategy of the EU 
underlines legal harmonization/approximation. In this context, Europeanization 
refers to the impact of the EU’s political conditionality on formal, legal aspects of 
institutional change in the membership candidates. Political reforms cover the EU 
harmonization laws and corresponding formal aspects of institutional change. The 
guidelines provided by the EU are set forth in the regular reports, Accession 
Partnership documents as well as in the National Programme for the Adoption of the 
Acquis. For example, the EU recommends reforms in the governance of civil-
military relations in Turkey. Compliance in this case involves the military’s 
institutional adaptation to reform legislation. The process of legal harmonization also 
applies to changes to the Foundations Law as well as laws concerning freedom of 
expression. These involve the adaptation of the judicial and civil society institutions. 
These legal reforms concerning the civilian dimension aim at expanding political 
participation. Therefore, a number of political actors are empowered to influence 
                                                 
28 For further studies of the EU impact on institutional change, see Knill and Lenschow (2001), and 
Knill (2001). 
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policy decisions relating to, for instance, the content of political reforms (Müftüler-
Baç, 2005).  
 
Mediating Factors Regarding Formal Institutional Change 29
The main mechanism of Europeanization in the case of membership candidates is the 
EU’s political conditionality. However, delineating the mediating factors of 
Europeanization is important for gauging how major a driving force the EU has been 
for legal-institutional change in Turkey. There are both EU-driven and domestically 
driven factors that either facilitate or hinder domestic reforms. 
 
To begin with EU-driven factors mediating change, following empirical studies of 
Europeanization in membership candidates, scholars have argued that the impact of 
the EU can be observed in the form of direct interference in domestic political 
transformations (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore; 2003; Grabbe, 2001). The EU’s 
political conditionality directly influences political reforms through reinforcement. In 
order to become a member, political reforms need to be adopted. According to 
Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel (2003), the EU reinforces compliance through 
several strategies, ranging from increasing financial and technical assistance to 
strengthening institutional ties.30 Integration into the common market and the 
promise of EU membership are important tools for reinforcing compliance with EU 
                                                 
29 “Mediating factors” primarily denotes the domestic political factors (i.e. institutions, actors) through 
which the EU’s pressures and challenges toward Europeanization are mediated to produce domestic 
political change or continuity (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 9-12). The usage of this analytical 
tool helps to establish links between the domestically driven and EU-driven sources of 
Europeanization and domestic change.  
 
30 The EU provides several incentives to candidate states to support the adaptation of economic and 
political structures, including financial and technical assistance, trade and cooperation agreements via 
association agreement, and accession partnership. 
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norms and standards. These entail benefits from trade and investment and 
participation in EU decision-making mechanisms (Nugent, 2004; Grabbe, 2003).  
 
The EU’s credibility plays an important role in the pace of domestic reforms 
(Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2003). A related factor is the implementation 
of EU democracy standards within the member states. Furthermore, the positive 
outcomes of compliance with the political conditionality for the membership 
candidates reinforce the position of the EU as a credible anchor to guide the domestic 
reform process (Uğur, 1999). These factors reinforce compliance.  
 
Equally important are the domestically driven factors that play a determinant role in 
the Europeanization process. This implies that the reasons for legal and institutional 
reforms are not restricted to reinforcement mechanisms applied by the EU. 
Compliance with the political criteria for membership depends on several domestic 
factors. The domestic conception of the prospect of EU membership is a major 
incentive behind the political reforms. A main mechanism through which the EU 
induces domestic political change is the EU’s political conditionality as long as 
membership remains a top domestic and foreign policy goal. 
 
First, the adoption of legal reforms depends on the domestic political cost of 
compliance for both the government and other political actors such as state 
institutions, civil-society etc. Therefore, one of the membership candidate’s 
dependent functions of compliance with the political criteria is the role of domestic 
political preferences in fulfilling the political criteria. On the one hand, domestic 
actors consider the potential impact of EU harmonization laws on pre-existing 
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institutional settings, on the “security and integrity of the state, on the government’s 
[political actors’] domestic power base, and its core political practices for power 
preservation” (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2003: 499; Lippert, Umbach and 
Wolfgang, 2001). On the other, they consider the material gains from financial 
support and increased institutional ties with the EU. Effective support from domestic 
actors for EU reforms depends on the strength of these actors to influence 
governmental policies. Harmonization laws are an integral part of membership 
candidates’ policies of integration with the EU. These legal and institutional reforms 
are expected to alter domestic policy structures to varying degrees (Lippert, Umbach 
and Wolfgang, 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). These reforms open up new 
political spaces by expanding, for example, the scope of political participation 
through political and civil rights. According to empirical findings, as harmonization 
laws alter domestic actors’ opportunity structures, the reform-oriented or pro-
European sectors are expected to gain more power over shaping policy decisions 
(Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002; Oğuzlu, 2004a). Hence, reforms affect the distribution 
of power and resources among domestic political actors. Furthermore, identification 
with European norms and values facilitates the reform process and deepens structural 
changes (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2003). How much the beliefs and 
expectations of domestic actors are altered by the spread of EU norms are 
complementary determinants of compliance with EU conditions (Grabbe, 2001). This 
latter mediating factor is further elaborated in section 2.3.3 vis-à-vis the informal 
aspects of domestic institutional change.  
 
Second, theoretical and empirical studies of Europeanization have concluded that 
“the domestic impact of Europe,” among other variables, “is institution-dependent” 
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(Börzel, 2002: 27; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001; Goetz and Hix, 2001; Knill 
and Lenschow, 2001b). Domestic political change in the candidate countries is 
dependent on pre-existing domestic formal institutional settings. The varying 
outcomes of Europeanization across countries or political issues are mostly attributed 
to degrees of “adaptational pressures” as a result of a fit or misfit between pre-
existing institutional designs and EU pressures for adaptation (Risse and Cowles and 
Caporaso, 2001: 6-9).  
 
Institutional factors can facilitate or hinder political change. Risse, Cowles and 
Caporaso (2001: 6-12) propose a three-step approach to study Europeanization and 
domestic institutional change. Under this approach, the process of Europeanization at 
the EU level is the first step of analysis. This refers to formal and informal rules, 
regulations and practices at the European level that the candidate countries have to 
adopt. In the present case, the political conditionality for EU membership 
corresponds to the relevant process of Europeanization at the EU level. The first 
mechanism of Europeanization is the EU’s conditionality providing a framework of 
legal and institutional adaptation at the domestic level.  
 
Europeanization at the domestic level consists of institutional adaptation to the 
political conditionality. This means mainly the political reform process. This is the 
second level in identifying the EU impact on domestic change. It focuses on 
domestic responses. With the framework provided in this approach, the “goodness of 
fit” is a main factor determining the extent of Europeanization (Cowles and Risse, 
2001: 221-222). This refers in the present case to the degree of compatibility of 
domestic legal and institutional designs to the EU political conditionality. When 
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incompatibility arises, high “adaptational pressure,” which corresponds to high levels 
of change in the pre-existing institutional structure, can result (Börzel, 2002). 
Conversely, resistance to change is another probable outcome.  
 
Therefore, the major determinants of Europeanization at the domestic level are the 
mediating factors (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 10). These factors range from 
domestic institutional structures – including legal, political and organizational 
cultures – to power channels and the strategies of political actors. The direction of 
the relation between domestic political actors and domestic institutional settings 
plays a central role in determining the parameters of Europeanization (Hix and 
Goetz; 2001). Pre-existing domestic structures act as constraints on the formation of 
political actors’ preferences. Indeed, the main works on Europeanization base their 
theoretical framework on the analytical tools provided by historical, sociological and 
institutional approaches. They imply that historicity and the sociological construction 
of political institutions both matter in analyzing Europeanization. They help to clear 
up the ways in which they influence the behavior of political actors in a given 
political system (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999; Risse, 2001; Knill and Lenschow, 
2001a). The study of institutions and their historical development is central in 
understanding the scope of Europeanization. However, the “rational choice” variant 
of the new institutional approach brings in a complementary factor (Hix and Goetz, 
2001; Knill and Lenschow, 2001a). One aspect of political reform is that it involves 
change in the existing domestic power structures. In other words, political reforms 
significantly alter the opportunity structures of domestic actors, thus providing them 
with new political rights and resources (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2003). They 
either resist change or make use of the new resources opened up by the 
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harmonization process. Domestic actors, though constrained by the surrounding legal 
and institutional settings, are also capable of changing the domestic structures (Knill 
and Lenschow, 2001a). In this connection, the EU intervenes in domestic political 
processes by empowering, at least in some cases, the pro-reform political actors’ 
positions.  
 
In sum, in the case of the candidate states, in addition to the incentives/reinforcement 
provided by the EU, domestic change also depends on pre-existing institutional 
conditions. These conditions expand to include the political preferences of the 
domestic actors. The first form of Europeanization outlined above focuses on formal 
and legal aspects of institutional change. Therefore, this dissertation’s first research 
question is how much the EU’s political conditionality induces legal-institutional 
change in Turkey’s civil-military relations.  
 
However, the impact of Europeanization on membership candidates is even more 
profound. Legal reforms are also expected to influence domestic policy structures 
and informal institutions. In fact, the political criteria require not only constitutional 
and legal changes but also their implementation by the institutions in question. This 
has consequences for the policies and behavior of domestic actors. It is argued that 
“Europeanization during the membership candidacy is by no means restricted to 
formal adaptation processes” (Diez, Agnantopoulos and Kaliber, 2005: 3). The 
transformations are more substantial, and include changes pertaining to policy 
structures. Furthermore, collective systems of meaning associated with system-wide 
domestic structures31 are also influenced. Although the starting point of this study is 
                                                 
31 This is based on Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001: 5) definition that the institutions are situated in 
“system-wide domestic structures pertaining to the nation-state, its society and economy as a whole. 
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the analysis of legal aspects of change, the approaches discussed in this chapter so far 
propose a theoretical understanding of the enlargement process due to the need to go 
beyond in-depth empirical studies of legal documents. Europeanization in this 
context is more than EU-ization or harmonization with EU law (Wallace, 2001). It 
also involves the alteration of policy-making styles, socialization into European 
norms, and change in collective systems of meanings. These forms of 
Europeanization are laid out below. 
 
2.3.2 Policy Change 
 
The Europeanization of policy refers to the impact of European integration on 
domestic policy change. This second aspect of EU-induced change undertaken in this 
dissertation concentrates on the impact of European integration on policy-making 
“including political actors, policy problems, instruments, resources and styles” (Diez, 
Kaliber and Agnantopoulos, 2005: 4; Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004). The analysis 
covers the study of change in policy structures that “imply more than changes in 
policy subject matter at the domestic” level but also denotes “political, legal and 
administrative structures that interpret and carry out policies” (Risse, Cowles and 
Caporaso; 2001: 5). Policy structures are “issue-area specific and might vary quite 
substantially across policy sectors in a given domestic polity” (Risse, Cowles and 
Caporaso; 2001: 5). The main mechanism through which this form of 
Europeanization occurs is the process of policy alignment at the national level to EU-
level common policies and policy propositions. 
                                                                                                                                          
Often, these structures are embedded historical and cultural practices,” such as collective meanings 
attached to the nation-state. This broader understanding of institutions is also employed in this study. 
The dependent variable of the thesis is the military as an institution and civil-military relations as a 
“domestic structure.” 
 43
There is a wide range of policy change analyses in the context of European 
integration, from ones emphasizing a top-down perspective, to bottom-up approaches 
that focus on the role of domestic political dynamics. In this section, a combination 
of these approaches to Europeanization is employed. Studies of domestic policy 
change in member states have concentrated on the transfer of policy competences to 
the EU, alignment with EU policies at the national levels, and their coordination and 
implementation (Hix and Goetz, 2001). In this connection, there are two noteworthy 
aspects of Europeanization and policy change that emphasize the analytical 
separation between “the process leading to the formation of a certain policy and the 
reverberation of that policy in the national arenas” (Radaelli, 2003: 6). The first 
dimension is the common policies referred to in the acquis that the member states 
must follow and implement (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004). These common policies 
are adopted at the EU level and coordinated at the national level. The second 
dimension concerns issues that are left to domestic regulation or discretion, such as 
some EU policies relating to social issues and immigration, and various aspect of 
foreign and security policy. Member states work to develop common policies, but 
these are decided on and coordinated at the national levels (Schmidt and Radaelli, 
2004). Consequently, “EU policies exercise different degrees of institutional pressure 
for change on the member states” (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 190; Knill and 
Lehmkuhl, 2002). Therefore, the EU impact on national policies is either direct, 
through the adjustment of domestic policies to policies “descending from Brussels 
onto the member states” (including policy competencies transferred to the EU), or 
else indirect, left to the domestic policy options available in the member states such 
as the open coordination method, leaving the substance of the policy open to 
interpretation (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004).  
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The Europeanization of foreign policy, gender equality policy and environmental 
policy are among the subjects of empirical studies conducted in member states. 
These studies are restricted to a single policy domain (Iokimidis, 2000; Caporaso and 
Jupille, 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002), with the exception of Radaelli 
(1997,2003) and Schmidt and Radaelli (2004), who employ a broader comparative 
approach focusing on policy change and discourse in Europe across policy issues.  
 
Policy alignment is demonstrated to take varying degrees. It depends on a number of 
mediating factors such as the nature and scope of policy issues, receptivity of states, 
and timing of the policy issue raised (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Hix and 
Goetz, 2001). “European integration is an explanatory factor in domestic continuity 
and change,” (Hix and Goetz, 2001: 1) but how far domestic policy designs are 
capable of adjusting to EU rules and norms does matter. Additionally, alignment 
depends on how much importance the candidate country places on particular 
policies.  
In the historical development of European integration, governments have 
often differentiated between ‘high politics’ and ‘low politics’. High-politics 
issues are those which touch on fundamental definition, identity and security 
of the nation-state. Low-politics, in contrast, are issues that are not 
threatening to the viability of the nation-state, such as European economic 
integration, the single market programme, and EU social and environmental 
regulation. As a result, governments are more likely to allow supranational 
policy competences on low-politics issues than high-politics issues [i.e. 
central to the definition of the nation-state].32  
 
 
Mediating Factors Regarding Policy Change 
The main mechanism of change in EU candidate countries is policy alignment along 
the guidelines of political conditionality. In this connection, domestic policy change 
is partly dependent on the EU’s strategies to stimulate policy alignment, and partly 
                                                 
32 For further study on these aspects of integration, see Hix (1999: 322), and Neil Nugent (2003). 
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on the existing policy structures at the national level (Cowles and Risse, 2001; 
Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). In this respect, the EU has both a direct and an 
indirect impact on policies in membership candidates.  
 
There are various EU-driven factors that mediate domestic policy change. Empirical 
studies of policy Europeanization provide more generalizable findings in the study of 
the domestic impact of integration (Diez, Agnantopoulos and Kaliber, 2005). These 
studies are applicable to candidates for EU membership. However, these countries 
have relatively less power in the formulation of the EU’s common policies because 
they do not have membership status. According to Grabbe (2001: 1020), the EU 
imposes policies or proposes guidelines for policy formulation onto the applicant 
countries through various tools. These tools are part of the pre-accession strategy, 
such as the provision of particular policy models, legislative and executive templates, 
financial aid and technical assistance, giving advice and twinning of administrative 
staff, formal benchmarking and monitoring, and “gate-keeping”.33  
 
However, there are different rules of compliance for alignment with different EU 
policy areas. In some cases the EU specifies the rules that countries have to follow, 
while in others the rules are less specific and may even take the form of suggestions 
(Grabbe, 2003). In other words, the EU’s strategy to ensure compliance is policy-
issue dependent. In some cases it is directly involved in the process of change by 
correlating membership prospects with the implementation of a specific policy. In 
other cases, it leaves the policy option or its coordination up to the initiative of 
national governments (Smith, 2000). The main policy areas are set forth in the acquis 
                                                 
33 In Grabbe (2001) “gate-keeping” is used to refer to “access to negotiations and further stages in the 
accession process.” These are important mechanisms used instrumentally by the EU to effect policy 
change through conditionality for membership. 
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communautaire, regular reports, and Accession Partnership documents. These cover 
political criteria, economic criteria and other policy issues.34  
 
Complementing the EU’s various rules of compliance for policy alignment, its 
capacity to mobilize domestic political forces also plays a significant role in policy 
Europeanization. Mobilization occurs through the alteration of material and moral 
expectations and normative beliefs “leading to changes in cognition and preference 
formation” (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2003: 4). Policy discourses and ideas 
across Europe are thought to influence domestic policies (Schmidt and Radaelli, 
2004; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003).35 Additionally, EU harmonization laws and 
the credibility of EU policies are important factors that influence domestic policy 
structures.  
 
Firstly, a number of domestic political actors are involved in formulating policies on 
issues concerning EU membership. State policies, governmental policies, political 
                                                 
34 These are foreign policy, security policy, justice and home affairs, competition policy, 
transportation policy, taxation, agriculture, fisheries, social policy and employment policy, science 
and research, culture and audiovisual policies, environment, consumers and health protection, custom 
union, etc. See the official web site of the European Union for more information on the EU’s common 
policies: http://europa.eu
 
35 A part of the empirical chapter concerning policy change analysis, and the chapter on the informal 
aspects of institutional change focusing on the analysis of the spread of EU norms and attitude change, 
are devoted to discourse analysis method. In Schmidt and Radaelli (2004: 184-192), “discourse is 
defined in terms of its content, as a set of policy ideas and values, and in terms of its usage, as a 
process of interaction focused on policy formulation and communication” and argues that discourse 
must be set in institutional context “in terms of the vast range of rules – culturally framed, path-
dependent, or interest-based on the national level, institutionally agreed at the EU level – that affect 
policy-making in a given socio-political setting.” Thus, policy decisions are results of deliberations on 
alternative policy options, where discourse is a bridge between the institution and the actor. According 
to Radaelli (2004: 184-192), the EU 
  
discourse helps create an opening to policy change by altering actors’ perceptions of the 
policy problems, policy legacies, and ‘fit,’ influencing their preferences, and thereby, 
enhancing their political institutional capacity to change … discourse is fundamental in 
giving both shape to new institutional structures, as a set of ideas about new rules, values and 
practices, and as a resource used by entrepreneurial actors to produce and legitimate those 
ideas, as a process of interaction focused on policy formulation and communication. 
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parties and civil society participation as well as public support for these actors’ 
policies all play a role in policy Europeanization. One integral part of the EU-driven 
dimension of change is its ability to alter domestic divisions and empower the 
reform-oriented sections of society through harmonization laws. Secondly, the EU’s 
credibility gives legitimacy to domestic policies formulated within the framework of 
political conditionality (Rumelili, 2005). Specifically in the case of candidate 
countries, the credibility of EU policies and decisions are demonstrated to be a 
significant boost in aligning domestic policies with those of the EU (Uğur, 1999). EU 
membership discourse provides the domestic political actors with a normative and 
legitimate framework for domestic policy change towards fulfilling the political 
criteria and policy alignment on a number of issues.  
 
Equally importantly, there are several domestic factors that play an important role in 
shaping policy Europeanization. First, a consistent EU membership policy is a 
necessary condition. The political will to become an EU member state facilitates 
policy alignment. Second, compliance with the political conditionality depends 
greatly on a candidate country’s ability to adopt the EU’s common policies. This 
includes the ability to alter current domestic policy structures when necessary. In this 
context, domestic institutional settings and policy legacies matter along with the 
EU’s policy incentives and discourse (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). 
 
Pre-existing policy structures in a given domestic institutional setting are capable of 
framing political actors’ problem-solving capacities and policy preferences (Schmidt 
and Radaelli, 2004). Policy Europeanization depends on the degree of challenge and 
pressure posed by the misfit between domestic policy designs and EU 
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imposed/proposed ones (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004). Comparable to the analysis of 
EU-triggered domestic change in formal and legal institutional structures, several 
analytical tools of the new institutional approach are employed to analyze this form 
of Europeanization. Within the analytical framework provided by the historical 
institutional approach, emphasizing institutional path-dependencies in processes of 
adaptation, the reason for change is the need for policy adjustment. This is due to the 
existence of a misfit between longstanding domestic policy legacies and the policies 
proposed by the EU (Cowles and Risse, 2001). A high level of compatibility signifies 
that the political structures will adjust to the proposed policies without major 
problems. Consequently, how much the EU’s common policies affect domestic 
change depends greatly on “policy practices and the political and institutional 
structures of the country in question” (Heritier, 2001: 44). The institutional capacity 
to realize policy change and adjust to the EU matters. There are complementary 
mediating factors which either facilitate or hinder policy change:  
These are the policy problems that establish the need for change, the policy 
legacies that may or may not ‘fit’ proposed policy solutions, the policy 
preferences that may or may not change in light of the problems and 
proposed solutions, the political-institutional capacity of actors to respond to 
the problems through new policy initiatives even if these reverse policy 
legacies and preferences, and the discourse that serves to enhance capacity 
for change by altering perceptions of problems and legacies by influencing 
preferences (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 186).  
 
 
In sum, there are various mediating factors facilitating or constraining policy 
Europeanization. The second research question of this dissertation is how much the 
EU’s political conditionality has induced policy change in the area of civil-military 
relations in Turkey.  
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2.3.3 Informal Institutional Change 
 
Europeanization not only affects formal institutions but also informal ones. 
Europeanization is a process of change in informal institutions, most notably norms 
and collective identity. The latter denotes “collective understandings of actors” such 
as norms of citizenship, or collective identities pertaining to nation-state (Risse, 
Cowles and Caporaso; 2001: 5). This does not mean the substitution of national 
identities for a European one but the influence of European integration in the 
construction and reproduction of domestic political identification with reference to 
the EU and issues arising from prospective membership (Risse, 2001).  
 
There are two noteworthy categorizations of this form of Europeanization in the 
current literature. First, societal Europeanization is defined as “a process of change in 
the construction of systems of meaning and collective understandings within the 
context of European integration” (Cowles and Risse, 2001: 219 cited in Diez, 
Agnantopoulos and Kaliber 2005: 5). Second, discursive Europeanization is the 
extent to which “public claims make reference to the EU, specific European actors or 
policies, and how this has changed over time” (Diez, Agnantopoulos and Kaliber, 
2005: 7). Within the analytical framework provided by the sociological institutional 
approach, these correspond to the investigation of how (self-) conceptions/definitions 
of the domestic actors evolve through the European integration process. In other 
words, these two forms of Europeanization relate to the EU’s domestic social and 
discursive influence in terms of commitment to Western and European identity, and 
to the norms and values of liberal democracy (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 
2003). It is argued that the spread of EU norms has an impact upon collective 
understandings of appropriate behavior. Compliance with these norms supports the 
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credibility and legitimacy of political actors in the domestic and international 
environment created by European integration (Sarıgil, 2007: 42). 
 
Mediating Factors Regarding Informal Institutional Change 
In the case of EU candidate countries, increasing interdependence and interactions 
lead to cooperation between several political actors at the EU and domestic levels. 
Additionally, political conditionality for membership has become an integral part of 
domestic politics through the adoption of political reforms. Political “learning” is one 
of the factors influencing attitudes. Furthermore, challenges and pressures posed by 
alignment with the EU’s common policies have resulted in domestic debates on a 
number of policy issues in this respect (Avcı, 2003; Çayhan, 2003b). As a result, the 
penetration of the EU’s political discourses into the political system has led to an 
increase in information about European norms and values (Schmidt and Radaelli, 
2004). This is reflected in public discourses. It is argued that the processes through 
which EU norms are diffused in public discourses serve to influence the political 
attitudes of the actors to varying degrees. This form of change depends on both EU-
driven and domestically driven factors.  
 
The EU’s pre-accession strategy mediates the spread of new rules and regulations, 
norms and values into the political system. Consequently, the EU intervenes in 
domestic policy processes through the diffusion of normative discourses which alter 
domestic actors’ beliefs and expectations (Manners, 2002; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 
1999). The adoption of rhetoric reflecting European norms and values is one 
example. The normative discourse of democracy associated with EU membership is 
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becoming an important frame of reference for acquiring legitimacy in international 
society (Manners, 2002).  
 
The EU has a clear commitment to norms of democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999). According to Manners (2002: 242), the 
normative basis of the EU consists of “core norms” set forth in the acquis. All the 
member and candidate states should comply with these norms: liberty, democracy, 
the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The theoretical 
literature looks at the emergence of a common European identity through the process 
of norm diffusion (Risse, 2001). Additionally, there are norms contested within 
member states which are left to domestic discretion, as follows: social solidarity, 
non-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance “to ensure that 
basic political and social rights become more widely known to the EU citizenship” 
(Manners, 2002: 242). With member states, the EU transcends the “Westphalian” 
norms and impinges on state sovereignty to ensure compliance (Manners, 2002).36
 
Similarly, compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria embeds a process of 
socialization into norms and values spread in the international context 
(Schimmelfennig, 2003). The “commitment to peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of 
law and human rights” as set forth in the acquis caummunautaire are accepted as 
international principles governing relations between nation-states and their respective 
legitimacy within the international system. Particularly important is democratic 
control of the armed forces (Edmunds and Forster, 2003). Smith (2000) has referred 
to the role of European ideas in legitimating domestic political reforms in the sense 
                                                 
36 The EU’s strategy is based on its founding principles, which go back to the postwar era, to increase 
cooperation among the European states, prevent conflicts and sustain peace and development. 
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that they promise international recognition at most and at least membership status. 
This relates to the analysis of cases in which the Europeanization process extends to 
producing change in collective understandings of appropriate forms of political 
behavior.  
 
In sum, the internalization of the democratic norms and practices set forth in the 
Copenhagen political criteria aims at deepening democracy along the EU 
membership process. The EU plays an overt role by spreading these norms in the 
candidate states through tools provided by the pre-accession strategy. These norms 
are reconstructing the self-identification/conception of domestic actors in relation to 
Europe. However, research has demonstrated that the EU’s credibility concerning a 
country’s accession facilitates informal aspects of institutional change, such as the 
attitude of domestic actors with regard the issues arising from EU membership 
process (Schimelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2003).  
 
There are also domestic factors shaping this form of Europeanization. Ideas and 
norms across Europe serve the reconstruction of interests/identity and preferences by 
domestic actors. However, this process cannot be separated from domestic 
institutional settings. First, a given county’s general positive attitude toward EU 
membership is a very important factor that facilitates the overall process of 
institutional change. Overall agreement on legal and institutional reforms and policy 
change are factors that facilitate informal institutional change. Second, the diffusion 
of EU norms, values and discourses within the political system does not imply their 
immediate internalization or change the collective understanding of appropriate 
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forms of behaviors. Domestic institutions and practices still play a central role in 
shaping political actors’ attitudes.  
 
The influence of political conditionality depends on the prevailing informal 
institutional structures as mediating factors that might hinder or facilitate change 
along the spread of EU norms. The evolution over time of the “structure of state-
society relations” determines the nature of constraints posed by informal institutions 
on political actors, such as whether they will internalize the norms and values 
associated with EU-driven domestic reforms (Checkel, 2001). According to Checkel 
(2001: 180), two understandings of norms and institutions can be used to explain 
change in the collective understandings of the actors. First, the constructivist reading 
of a “thick” understanding of the role of norms and institutions implies that 
institutionalization matters in providing a sense of belonging and a new 
understanding of interests. Second, the rationalist conception of a “thin” 
understanding implies that they are “simply constraining the choices and behavior of 
self-interested actors.” With the fulfillment of the Copenhagen political criteria, 
informal institutional change can be analyzed based on these variants of institutional 
approaches. 
 
Empirical findings suggest that a close correspondence between European and 
domestic ideas leads to high levels of receptiveness to EU norms and rules (Weaver, 
2004; Weiner, 1998; Risse, 2001). In this case as well, the degree of compatibility 
between prevailing informal institutional structures and those in the EU plays a key 
role in shaping Europeanization. However, the internalization of EU norms does not 
necessarily correlate with positive attitudes towards membership. Several actors 
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might still oppose various aspects of political change depending on how much they 
challenge collective systems of meaning, interests and identities vis-à-vis system-
wide structures such as the nation-state (Checkel, 2001). The EU impact on these 
domestic attitudes might vary from one political issue to the other. 
 
However, positive discourses in the EU towards a country’s membership prospects is 
a most important factor facilitating the deepening of reforms by boosting positive 
attitudes toward the issues arising from EU membership. In candidate countries, 
divisions prevail between supporters and opponents of political reforms as well as 
pro-EU and Euro-skeptical attitudes (Avcı, 2003; Schimelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 
2003; Çarkoğlu, 2004). It has been demonstrated that rising expectations that EU 
membership will bring socioeconomic benefits, the stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, and the deepening of democratization provide a certain 
legitimacy to Europeanization (Diez, Agnantopoulos and Kaliber, 2005: 2). Thus, 
these factors influence the formation of a positive attitude towards supporting the 
fulfillment of the Copenhagen political criteria.  
 
There are several hurdles to measuring informal aspects of institutional change, such 
as the attitudinal dispositions of domestic actors. With the exception of large polls 
such as Eurobarometer and analyses of speeches by political and state elites, attitude 
formation towards issues arising from EU aspirations remains at the interpersonal 
level. However, attitude change is relatively slow compared to legal and policy 
changes. This provides reliability to the study. Along these lines, analysis of the 
impact of the spread of EU norms on the rhetoric of political actors is central. Hence, 
one major yardstick of attitudinal change is just how much the rhetoric of the 
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military as an actor/institution on issues relating to the EU’s political conditionality 
has changed since 1999.  
 
In sum, the effect of European integration can be viewed as a process of domestic 
political change involving new discourses on the democratization of institutions, or 
policies affecting by varying degrees the collective norms and values of domestic 
actors. Legal-institutional change and policy alignment are expected to bring about 
the internalization of EU norms and change the attitudes of domestic actors to 
influence political behavior. However, there are various EU-driven and domestically 
driven factors facilitating or hindering the deepening of Europeanization. This is 
particularly applicable in the case of candidate countries such as Turkey. Therefore, 
the third research question of this dissertation is how far the EU’s political 
conditionality has induced informal institutional change in the area of civil-military 
relations in Turkey. 
  
The following chapters test the impact of the EU’s political conditionality on civil-
military relations in Turkey. The empirical analysis is done from the perspective of 
the three forms of Europeanization laid out in this section. Chapter 3 focuses on 
formal, legal aspects of institutional change. Chapter 4 focuses on change in 
domestic policy structures. Chapter 5 focuses on informal aspects of institutional 
change.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EUROPEANIZATION, FORMAL INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the first aspect of Europeanization. It analyzes the extent to 
which the EU’s political conditionality triggered legal-institutional change in the area 
of civil-military relations in Turkey. In line with the EU’s formal institutional 
strategy, legal aspects of domestic institutional adaptation are one of the most 
important issues in the regular reports of the European Commission (1998-2006). 
The EU addresses two major aspects related to the governance of civil-military 
relations in Turkey. The first concerns the composition and functioning of the 
National Security Council, and the second relates to the issue of accountability and 
transparency building. The first section of this chapter explores the pre-existing 
institutional setting of these two structures. The second section explores the post-
1999 reform process’ attempt to comply with the relevant provisions of the EU’s 
political conditionality. EU harmonization laws are the main focus. The final section 
summarizes factors, which either facilitate or hinder Europeanization and formal 
institutional change with regard to civil-military relations. 
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3.1 The Pre-Existing Legal-Institutional Setting37  
 
This section focuses specifically on two major themes. First, it lays out the legal 
evolution of the functioning and composition of the National Security Council. 
Second, it explores the development of legal structures related to the issue of 
accountability and transparency in security and defense affairs. The latter covers the 
evolution of relations between military and civilian institutions such as the 
legislature, judiciary, and executive as well as civil society.  
 
3.1.1 National Security Council (NSC) 
 
The NSC is a constitutional institution made up of both civilians and military 
officials. It is a formal platform for regular meetings aiming to develop policy 
strategies relating to the country’s national security.38 The NSC has gone through 
several stages of institutionalization. The main sources through which one can trace 
the institutionalization of the NSC and its consequences for the evolution of civil-
military relation patterns are: (1) the legacy of the late Ottoman and early Republican 
periods, (2) the effects of military interventions (1960, 1971, and 1980) on the legal-
institutional setting of civil-military relations, and (3) the constitutional (1924, 1961, 
and 1982) provisions and complementary legal regulations concerning the 
institution.39  
 
                                                 
37 Pre-existing denotes the evolution of the legal-institutional structure before the legislation of EU 
harmonization packages and constitutional amendments. 
 
38 For further information, see Ministry of National Defense (1998: 9-12). 
 
39 For more comprehensive study of these aspects of the evolution of civil-military relations in 
Turkey, see Hale (1996), Yazıcı (1997), and Akyaz (2002). 
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“The military in Turkey has been both the subject and the object of modernization as 
Westernization” (Heper, 2005a: 33). Going back to late Ottoman times and from the 
early Republican period to the present, it has been a critical actor in the establishment 
of modern Turkey. From the 18th century onwards, the military bureaucratic 
apparatus became the main locus of the state, which framed a modernization project 
in order to catch up with developments in the West (Harris, 1988; Turfan, 2000). 
Victory in the War of Independence and the establishment of the Republic in 1923 
provided the military with a legitimate basis as a political actor. It became a credible 
driving force in the modernization and Westernization of the newly founded nation-
state built on the model of its European counterparts (Knooning and Kruijt, 2002). 
Complementarily, military officers recognized democracy as an integral part of 
Western civilization (Karaosmanoğlu, 1994: 125; Heper, 1988). The founders of the 
Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü, adopted a parliamentary system 
of government and started a process of civilianizing politics. This was based on past 
experience demonstrating that involvement with day-to-day politics would have a 
detrimental effect on military professionalism (Heper, 2005a: 34; Karaosmanoğlu, 
1993). In this context, the military has been an important partner of Kemalist elites in 
establishing and safeguarding the secular-democratic order, and maintaining a 
unitary state with a reform agenda and orientation towards Europe (Güney, 2002a).  
 
The 1924 Constitution established the main parameters of a parliamentary system of 
governance and impelled the separation of the Armed Forces from politics.40 The 
Turkish Armed Forces were empowered to defend the 1924 Constitution – including 
the unitary nature, secular character and democratic ideal of the Republic – if they 
                                                 
40 See the 1924 Constitution. 
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were ever endangered. In this connection, the functions of the Turkish Armed Forces 
evolved into the state’s safeguard against threats both internal and external 
(Bölügiray, 1989).  
 
The military intervened in Turkish politics three times: on May 27, 1960, March 12, 
1971, and September 12, 1980. Several factors led to these interventions. One of the 
most important was civilian governments’ incompetence at responding to the 
political and economic problems of a newly modernizing society (Heper and Güney, 
2004: 184). Additionally, the consequent rising fragmentation and polarization of the 
political system led to outbreaks of political violence (Özbudun, 2000). Third, the 
failure of political elites to act responsibly to safeguard the basic tenets of the 
Republic led the military to act (Karpat, 1988). The dilemma of these interventions 
was that they were initiated on the grounds that the military had a legal obligation to 
act responsibly to safeguard the secular-democratic order (Cizre, 1997). However, 
during the interventions, “the military did not intend to establish enduring military 
regimes but rather to restore democracy within a reasonably short period of time” 
(Özbudun, 2000: 24). Consequently, the institution “started a reform path to 
democracy” where “the conditions and the modalities of the transition” were 
carefully controlled (Özbudun, 2000: 24).  
 
Following these interventions, the establishment of the 1961 Constitution, 1971-73 
constitutional amendments and the 1982 Constitution had important legal 
consequences for the functioning and composition of the NSC and the evolution of 
patterns of civil-military relations. Historically speaking, laws concerning the NSC 
embedded a conception of the “guardianship role” the military has been tasked with 
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in Turkish politics (Güney, 2002a; Cizre, 2004). The primary sources of the 
military’s legitimacy in Turkish politics and society are the legal-institutional 
functions attributed to it by these constitutions and associated legislation. Each time 
the military believed that national interests were endangered and civilian institutions 
had become incapable of solving emerging crises, it intervened in the political 
process “to put things in order” and “to save democracy from itself” on the basis of 
these legal-institutional obligations (Heper and Güney, 1996). The gradual 
construction of the military’s role in modern Turkey as the “ultimate guardian of the 
Republic” provided a justification for the predominance of the military in terms of 
maintaining national unity and secularism (Cizre, 1997; Güney, 2002a). 
 
The 1961 Constitution 
The 1961 Constitution formally institutionalized the NSC.41 This institutionalization 
aimed at establishing a dialogue between the military and civilians on matters 
directly related to national security in order to head off future political crises.42 The 
military “had a legal and institutionalized means of conveying its view to the 
government” that “could lessen the possibility of future military interventions” 
(Heper, 2005a: 35). Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution defined the institution as 
                                                 
41 In the postwar period, based on the model of national security institutions in several countries, the 
evolution of the NSC allowed Turkey to institutionalize its own national security system. First, the 
General Secretariat of the Supreme Defense Assembly was formed by a decree in 1933 and “was 
responsible for national mobilization issues.” Then reformed in 1949, the role of the National Defense 
Supreme Board and General Secretariat “was expanded to cover the preparation of national security 
policy.” Finally, Act No. 129, passed on December 11, 1962, “envisaged the establishment of the 
NSC and the General Secretariat of NSC.” For more information, see Ministry of National Defense 
(1998: 9). Further information on the evolution of the legal-institutional setting of the NSC and 
General Secretariat of the NSC is also available from http://www.mgk.gov.tr/tarihce  
 
42 The first military intervention has been justified on the grounds that the Democrat Party 
government, while oppressing the opposition Republican People’s Party, was becoming increasingly 
authoritarian. It challenged the secular, democratic tenets of the Republic by appealing to the public’s 
religious sentiments and by acting as an irresponsible government through the mobilization of the 
periphery against the center. This was considered a major reason for political instability. Additionally, 
the government was accused of economic mismanagement (Karpat, 1988: 137-141). 
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chaired by the president of the Republic, and composed of the prime minister, the 
chief of the General Staff (Genelkurmay Başkanı), and the ministers and 
commanders of the forces specified in the law on the NSC and the Secretariat 
General of the NSC (Law No. 129, dated December 11, 1962).43 Additionally, 
ministers and experts convoked by the prime minister would participate in the 
regular meetings depending on the relevant agenda items. The secretary general of 
the NSC (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreteri) would also attend the meetings. 
Therefore, it was established as an institution composed of both civilian and military 
officials and chaired by the president of the Republic. The supremacy of civilian 
members is observed. Under the law, the NSC met on a monthly basis. 
 
In terms of the functioning of the institution, the 1961 Constitution (Article 111) 
stipulated that the NSC “conveys” to the Council of Ministers its views on measures 
to be taken concerning national security matters and required coordination.44 The 
military acquired legal authority to communicate its evaluations on national security 
matters through the NSC. Therefore, it was originally established as an advisory 
body to assist the government on both internal and external security issues. In this 
way, military officials were enabled to influence the process of policy formulation 
relating to security and defense matters during periods of civilian rule (Özbudun, 
2000; Yazıcı, 1997). The constitutional arrangements were supported by the Internal 
Service Law of the Turkish Armed Forces, Law No. 211 (Article 35), enacted on 
January 4, 1961, making the military statutorily responsible for “defending both the 
                                                 
43 The cited law on the NSC specifies the deputy prime minister, the ministers of national defense, 
foreign affairs, interior affairs, finance, labor and transportation, and the commanders of the Army, 
Navy, Air Forces and the Gendarmerie: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/kanun.html  
 
44 “Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, Milli Güvenlik ile ilgili kararların alınmasında ve koordinasyonun 
sağlanmasında yardımcılık etmek üzere gerekli temel görüşleri Bakanlar Kurulu’na bildirir.” (1961 
Anayasası, Madde 111). 
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Turkish fatherland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the Constitution.” 
Additionally, the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Regulations (Article 85) 
stipulate that the “Turkish Armed Forces should defend the country against internal 
as well as external threats,” and conferred authority to fulfill this responsibility “if 
necessary by force.” Consequently, during NSC meetings the military members are 
expected to act in accordance with these duties. “When the country faced a grave 
threat and civilian governments seemed indifferent toward or unable to effectively 
deal with that threat,” the military had legal means to intervene in domestic affairs 
(Heper, 2005a: 35). 
 
1971-73 Constitutional Amendments 
Military interventions in 1971 and 1980 were justified on the grounds that the 
military fulfilled its legal-institutional obligations. One of the consequences of the 
1971 memorandum was to revise the functions granted to the NSC. Article 111 of the 
1961 Constitution was amended so as to empower the NSC to “recommend” 
measures to the government. Prerogatives granted by constitutional amendments 
from 1971 to 1973 were quite significant. They strengthened the legal basis of the 
NSC influence over the Council of Ministers. Therefore after the 1960 intervention 
and following the 1971 memorandum, the competencies of the NSC were enhanced. 
Consequently, the power of the institution in the formulation of national security 
policy was increased. This legal institutionalization strengthened the autonomy of the 
military with respect to civilian institutions within the political system (Cizre, 1997).  
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The 1982 Constitution 
Formulated after the September 12, 1980 intervention, the 1982 Constitution had 
several legal and institutional consequences for civil-military relations. The 
constitutional provisions reconstituted the functioning and composition of the NSC. 
According to Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution, the institution meets under the 
chairmanship of the president of the Republic and consists of the following 
members: the prime minister, the chief of the General Staff, the ministers of national 
defense, internal affairs, and foreign affairs, and the commanders of the Army, Navy 
and Air Forces and the general commander of the Gendarmerie. Depending on the 
issue being discussed, relevant officials can also be invited to NSC meetings. The 
law directed that the NSC secretary general only be appointed from among high-
ranking military officers and that the council convene once a month under the 
chairmanship of the president of the Republic.45 Therefore, the military had a 
quantitative supremacy in the institution. Additionally, according to the new 
constitutional provisions (1982, Article 118) and legislation (Law No. 2945) on the 
organizational structure, duties and responsibilities of the NSC and its General 
Secretariat, 
The NSC advises the Council of Ministers of its views on the determination 
and implementation of national security policy and required coordination. 
The NSC determines the necessary measures to maintain the existence and 
independence of the state; the integrity and indivisibility of the country; and 
peace and security of the society. The decisions taken by the NSC are 
prioritized for evaluation by the Council of Ministers.46
 
                                                 
45 Law No. 2945 dated November 9, 1983 on the NSC and the Secretariat General of the NSC. 
 
46 See also Ministry of National Defense (1998: 11).  
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Table 1    The Duties of the NSC Under Law No. 2945 (November 9, 1983) on organizational structure, duties and responsibilities of the  
              NSC and the NSC’s Secretariat General 1  
 
• Determination of policies concerning the planning and the implementation of the state’s national security policy decisions and the 
necessary coordination in this regard 
• Determination of measures relating to the implementation of national objectives, plans and programs prepared in accordance with 
national security policy 
• Closely monitoring and evaluating national elements of power that influence the state’s national security policy and the social, 
economic, cultural and technological environment and developments. Determination of the fundamental principles that will strengthen 
them in the direction of national objectives 
• Determination of measures required to maintain the existence and independence of the state and integrity of the country and to maintain 
public peace and security 
• Determination of measures to maintain the constitutional order, ensure national unity and integrity, and unite the Turkish nation around 
the ideology, principles and reforms of Atatürk and the national values and ideals, all of which will guide the nation towards the 
national objectives 
• Determination of views for States of Emergency, Martial Law, mobilization and states of war 
• Determination of necessary principles for the inclusion of measures and funds related to the following issues in the development of 
plans, programs and annual budgets: General defense done by the public, private institutions, organizations and citizens in times of 
peace or war or in postwar periods, national mobilization and other issues 
• Determination of measures for the inclusion of programs and annual budgets, services oriented to society – financial, economic, social 
and cultural – and other issues required by the general defense services 
• Proposing options regarding past and future international treaties in the field of national security. The NSC notifies the Council of 
Ministers about the views, measures and principles of court decisions and fulfils other tasks specified in the acts 
 
 
                                                 
1 This table covers the legal responsibilities of the institution before the introduction of EU harmonization packages, listed in Ministry of National Defense (1998: 11-12). 
The decisions of the NSC are “formulated in line with the definition of the concept of 
national security” (Güney and Karatekelioğlu, 2005: 446). The legal responsibilities 
of the NSC under Law No. 2945 are described in Table 1.47  
 
Therefore, the 1982 Constitution did not merely maintain the previous legal structure 
on the NSC but in fact granted additional functions to the institution. The major 
reason for this legal change can be attributed to the domestic political context that 
paved the way for the 1980 military intervention.  
From the 1960s onward, with the fragmentation and polarization of Turkish 
politics on the dimensions of the left-right, secular-Islamic, and cultural 
versus ethnic nationalism, and with the shift of the Republican People’s Party 
from the center to periphery, the military remained virtually the sole protector 
of the secular-democratic state in Turkey. (Heper and Güney, 2004: 184)  
 
The effect of the decisions of the NSC was further extended. The Council of 
Ministers was to consider its recommendations “with priority.” Additionally, the 
composition of the council was changed. The quantitative influence of its military 
members on government decisions was increased (Yazıcı, 1997: 185). The NSC, 
originally established as a forum to maintain dialogue between civilians and the 
military, gradually evolved into the locus of the military’s “guardianship” role. 
 
3.1.2 Accountability and Transparency in Civil-Military Relations 
 
A complementary legal dimension in the evolution of civil-military relations patterns 
is related to modalities of accountability and transparency building (Narlı, 2006). The 
issue of accountability and transparency involves relations between the military and 
                                                 
47 This table covers the legal responsibilities of the institution before the introduction of EU 
harmonization packages, listed in Ministry of National Defense (1998: 11-12). 
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legislative, executive, and judiciary institutions, including its relations with civil 
society and the public in the broadest sense.48  
 
3.1.2.1 The Legislature and the Military 
 
In this context, the primary issue is parliamentary oversight. This refers to the 
military’s accountability to Parliament on security and defense-related matters. The 
1982 Constitution established the basic structures for a well-functioning democracy 
in Turkey. Additionally, under the 1982 Constitution, sovereignty belongs to the 
nation. Article 7 states that the “legislative power is vested in the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly [Parliament] on behalf of the Turkish Nation” and “this power 
cannot be delegated.” Therefore, the legislative process is finalized upon the 
approval of Parliament. On behalf of Parliament, the Audit Court (Sayıştay) reviews 
the budget of public institutions (1982 Constitution, Article 160). However, legal 
provisions (Law No. 1488 Article 127) issued in 1971-73 excluded Turkish Armed 
Forces expenditures of from review by the Audit Court. In addition to these legal 
limitations, Law No. 832 dated February 21, 1967 on the Audit Court also delimited 
the transparency of the Turkish Armed Forces’ public expenditures. These were 
exempt from judicial review and control of the Audit Court based on the “secrecy 
clause” (Narlı, 2006: 168). In connection with the latter, the exemption from Audit 
Court review and the lack of full knowledge of national security and defense 
expenditures weakened parliamentary oversight.  
 
                                                 
48 Accountability assumes a responsiveness and responsibility of political action with regard to other 
political actors within the political system. Transparency building in the defense sector is tightly 
linked to the issue of accountability in civil-military relations. It refers to the dissemination of 
information concerning security and defense matters (Narlı, 2006). 
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A secondary issue is related to wider democratic oversight over the military’s 
activities. This includes defense and security experts, scholars, interest groups, civil 
society and individual citizens. The civilian dimension is very important in any 
analysis of civil-military relations and democratic governance. In the Turkish case, 
the institution of the military enjoys widespread support from most sectors of 
Turkish society as a state institution responsible for providing security and defending 
the country. Skepticism over the ability of elected representatives and political 
parties to deal with political crises and the relative weakness of civil society 
institutions are major reasons for the relatively high level of trust in the military 
(Hale, 1996; Demirel, 2004). These factors have been central in the evolution of a 
political tradition in which the military has become relatively autonomous from 
civilian institutions (Narlı, 2000). Therefore, they helped structure the legal basis of 
the military’s role in politics and shape the modalities of accountability. They also 
contributed to civilians’ relative lack of expertise on security and defense policy 
issues. Instead of assuming responsibility themselves, civilians entrusted the Turkish 
Armed Forces with “protecting secularism and democracy”(Narlı, 2006: 159). 
Furthermore, previous constitutional amendments made during the 1971-1973 period 
as well as the 1982 Constitution (prior to recent amendments), while increasing some 
competencies of the military, also to varying degrees limited channels of political 
participation (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004). These constitutional developments 
hindered the institutionalization of wider democratic oversight over security and 
defense matters, in the style of Europe’s contemporary liberal democracies. 
 
For comprehensive democratic reforms in the realm of civil-military relations, it is 
important to grasp that the strengthening of democracy in civilian institutions is as 
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important as reforming the military. One mark of civilian empowerment in 
democratic oversight is that it “requires an effort by civil and political society to 
empower themselves to increase their own capacity for control” (Stepan 1998: 114 
cited in Cizre, 2004: 118). This is a major step towards improving government 
performance as well.  
 
In contemporary Western liberal democracies, elected representatives are expected to 
collaborate with the military on developing common defense and security polices as 
well as in their implementation, but the balance of power is on the civilian side, 
especially in issues outside the realm of military professionalism (Cafario, 1998). 
However, just as important in this context is that accountability and transparency 
building is also dependent on several additional political conditions. These are 
related to the “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law.” 
Boosting civilians’ competency and expertise in the formulation of defense and 
security policies, and in oversight of defense expenditures, is related to the quality of 
the democratization process. Moreover, a well-informed, educated public improves 
civilian expertise and knowledge in security and defense policy-making. Though the 
main structures for such political socialization are present within the political system, 
the deepening of democracy essentially requires a longer period. The improvement 
of civilian institutions in Turkey is very important for consolidating accountability 
and transparency on national security, defense affairs and budgetary matters.  
 
3.1.2.2 The Executive and the Military 
 
The chief of the General Staff is made responsible to prime minister “in the exercise 
of his duties and powers” (1982 Constitution, Article 117). The roots of the 
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development of legal provisions concerning the chief of the General Staff’s status lie 
in the era of single-party rule (1923-1946). On May 30, 1949, Law No. 5899 
subordinated the chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of National Defense. 
Following this era, in order to prevent politicization of the military through its being 
directly accountable to the ministry, the 1961 Constitution (Article 110) and the 1982 
Constitution (Article 117) stipulated that the chief of the General Staff is responsible 
to the prime minister (Yazıcı, 1997: 81).  
 
The president of the Republic represents “the Supreme Military Command of the 
Turkish Armed Forces on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly,” meaning 
Parliament (1982 Constitution, Article 104). According to the 1982 Constitution 
(Article 117), the chief of the General Staff “shall be appointed by the President of 
the Republic following the proposal of the Council of Ministers.” The chief of the 
General Staff is in charge of the overall command and control of the Turkish Armed 
Forces and is responsible for the effective execution of military operations and the 
readiness of the Turkish Armed Forces.49 According to two constitutional provisions 
(1961 Article 110, and 1982 Article 117), the Council of Ministers is responsible to 
Parliament “for national security and for the preparation of the Armed Forces for the 
defense of the country.” The Armed Forces’ defense policy is agreed upon by the 
Council of Ministers. 
 
According to Law No. 1324 the Turkish General Staff conveys its views to the 
government and the NSC in the determination of the priorities, principles and main 
                                                 
49 More information on the organization of the Turkish Armed Forces is available from the Ministry of 
National Defense (1998: 51-57). See also the Defense White Paper 2000 available from 
http://www.msb.gov.tr  
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programs concerning national security and defense policy.50 Additionally, it is 
consulted in the determination of military aspects in the implementation of 
international agreements. The institution determines personnel, intelligence, 
mobilization, education, and logistics issues for the effective conduct of military 
operations. The Ministry of National Defense, on the other hand, in accordance with 
Law No. 1325 issued on July 31, 1970 is made responsible for political, legal, social, 
financial and budgetary services for the duties of national defense.51 Furthermore, 
the law stipulates that for the purpose of the integrity and effectiveness of Armed 
Forces services, the Ministry of National Defense and the Turkish General Staff 
should work in close coordination and cooperation.52 Therefore, the division of 
power between these institutions is clearly set forth in the legal provisions. 
 
One remaining aspect of the evolution of the relationship between the military and 
the executive came in the 1980s, with the appointment of several officers to 
administrative institutions. The Higher Education Council (Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu), 
established by the 1982 Constitution (Article 130), included a military representative 
among its civilian members. Additionally, the Supreme Council of Radio and 
Television (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu) also included a military representative 
before the advent of EU harmonization laws. The presence of military officers at 
state institutions responsible for administrating and supervising education and 
                                                 
50 The headquarters of the Turkish General Staff has been established to assist the chief of the General 
Staff in the exercise of its duties and responsibilities. The Turkish Armed Forces operates under the 
Turkish General Staff, and is composed of the commands of Land, Navy and Air Forces and the 
general command of the Gendarmerie. See the official web page of the Turkish Armed Forces 
(available in English): http://www.tsk.mil.tr. For further information on the defense structure see also 
Maliye Bakanlığı (Ministry of Finance) (1993/9: 93-95). 
 
51  For further information, see Ministry of National Defense (1998:51). 
 
52 More information on the organization of defense is available at the official web page of the Ministry 
of National Defense: http://www.msb.gov.tr. See also for further information on budgetary issues 
Maliye Bakanlığı (1993/9: 91-93).  
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communication policy spurred fierce debate after Turkey gained EU candidate status 
until the advent of reforms in this area. 
 
3.1.2.3 The Judiciary and the Military 
 
The final aspect of the issue of accountability and transparency is related to the 
evolution of laws arranging relations between the military and judicial institutions. 
During the 1970s, high levels of right-left political polarization and fragmentation 
and widespread incidents of street violence led to various preventive measures. First, 
the State Security Courts (Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri), composed of civilian and 
military judges, were established in 1973 by constitutional amendments (1961 
Constitution, Article 136). The laws authorized these courts to try crimes targeting 
the security of the state. Article 143 of the 1982 Constitution stipulated that  
State Security Courts shall be established to deal with offenses against the 
indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, the free 
democratic order, or against the Republic whose characteristics are defined in 
the Constitution, and offenses directly involving the internal and external 
security of the State. 
 
In spite of being subject to review by civilian supreme courts and the High Court of 
Appeals (Yargıtay), these new courts gave the military jurisprudence regarding 
judicial processes (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 1996). This extended to periods of civilian 
governance.  
 
Second, the declaration of martial law and the establishment of martial law courts 
were made easier by Article 124 of the 1961 Constitution. According to new 
legislation, “certain powers of the civilian authorities shall be transferred to military 
authorities – such as certain judicial powers and security services – under the 
circumstance of the martial law” (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004: 34). However, the 
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1982 Constitution’s Articles 120, 121, and 122 stipulate that civilian authorities 
make final decisions concerning states of emergency, martial law, mobilization and 
states of war. These are decided upon by the Council of Ministers meeting under the 
chairmanship of the president of the Republic after consultation with the NSC. 
Decisions are submitted to Parliament for approval.53 Additionally, in one or more 
regions where a state of emergency is declared, it shall not exceed six months. The 
responsibility resides under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (State of Emergency Law 
No. 2985), and the regional governor may employ military forces to combat 
terrorism if necessary. This law also relates to the definition and interpretation of 
national security policy, as will be explained in the next chapter. According to 
Article 120 of the 1982 Constitution, the declaration of a state of emergency is based 
on “indications of widespread acts of violence and serious deterioration of public 
order.” According to Articles 120 and 121, decisions relating to states of emergency 
are taken  
In the event of natural disaster, dangerous epidemic diseases or serious 
economic crisis … In the event of serious indications of widespread acts of 
violence aimed at the destruction of the free democratic order established by 
the Constitution or of fundamental rights and freedoms, or serious 
deterioration of public order because of acts of violence. 
 
In this context, in line with the nature of the situation, a number of “fundamental 
rights and freedoms” may be suspended or restricted.54  
 
Third, in 1971, the Supreme Military Administrative Court (Askeri Yüksek Idare 
Mahkemesi) was established and authorized to resolve administrative conflicts 
                                                 
53 “The Assembly may alter the duration of the state of emergency, extend the period, for a maximum 
of four months only, each time at the request of Council of Ministers, or may lift the state of 
emergency” (Article 121, 1982 Constitution). 
 
54 For comparison, see also the 1982 Constitution (Article 122) on martial law, mobilization and states 
of war. 
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concerned with military authorities or matters. Thus, even as the military acquired 
influence in judicial processes, the powers of the civilian Council of State (Danıştay) 
were restricted (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004: 33). Additionally, the State Supervision 
Council (Devlet Denetleme Kurulu), established by the 1982 Constitution (Article 
108), functions under the control of the president of the Republic. All administrative 
institutions, with the exception of the judiciary and the Turkish Armed Forces, are 
subject to the legal control of this council.  
 
The legal-institutional setting explained so far reinforced the military’s institutional 
role in Turkish political life. Paradoxically, contrary to these developments, 
following the 1983 election of the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi), significant 
degrees of “demilitarization and civilianization of the regime” were seen (Evin, 
1994, Karaosmanoğlu, 1993), and relations between the military and civilians 
seemed to normalize by the mid-1980s (Heper, 1985). After 1985, in terms of the 
evolution of civil-military relations, Turkey’s April 1987 application for EC 
membership was an important juncture that prepared the ground for prospective 
reforms in this realm.55  
 
 
3.2 The Impact of the EU on Legal-Institutional Change 
 
Historically speaking, the reactions of EC/EU institutions to military interventions in 
Turkey constituted an important aspect shaping the trajectory of EC/EU-Turkish 
relations. The peculiar role of the military in Turkish political life and its past record 
                                                 
55 Among other factors such as liberalization policies followed by elected governments, the EC/EU 
membership process is listed as an important trigger for domestic reforms (Özbudun, 2000). 
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of interventions in politics raised questions about whether it could be classified 
among the world’s “political armies.”56 This peculiar role challenged Turkey’s closer 
integration with the EC/EU. The military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980 were 
considered in EU circles both symptoms of political and economic instability and 
infringements on Turkish democracy, the rule of law and human rights.57  
 
The EC’s responses to the 1960 and 1971 interventions were not as clearly stated 
compared to recent official reports about formal institutional factors concerning the 
military’s role in politics. However, during Turkey’s transitional military regimes, 
the EC followed a policy of slowing down relations through suspending bilateral 
agreements. It emphasized the transition to a democratic regime as a prerequisite for 
greater economic integration such as the establishment of the customs union 
(European Community, 1971). This is further demonstrated by events following the 
September 12, 1980 military intervention. On January 21, 1982, based on the 
recommendation of the European Commission, the EC unilaterally suspended the 
Association Agreement “until the political and human rights situation has improved.” 
This act was accompanied by cancellation of the regular meetings of the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee and Turkey-EC Association Council.  
 
                                                 
56 “Political armies” is used “for those military institutions that consider involvement in – or control 
over – domestic politics and the business of government to be a central part of their legitimate 
control.” Although debate continues over ideal types of “non-political” military, the former form of 
military institutionalization is seen as the “antithesis of democratic governance” by the Western 
alliances (Knoonings and Kruijt 2002). 
 
57 This perspective is mainly derived from the reports of the European Parliament assessing problems 
associated with Turkey’s accession to the EU. The institutional setting of the EU allows for the 
European Parliament to express its position and influence the Union’s major policy decisions on 
enlargement and accession issues. Additionally, similar concerns were also voiced in the meetings of 
the Turkey-EU Association Council. 
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The return to civilian government shortly after the coup, and public statements by 
Turkish state and political elites reaffirming their commitment to democracy and EC 
membership, contributed to the improvement of Turkish-EC relations (Birand, 2005). 
By 1986, relations had begun to normalize following Turkey’s positive response. The 
establishment of the 1982 Constitution, elections the next year, economic 
liberalization policies adopted by the Motherland Party government, and the lifting 
of both the ban on political parties and political restrictions on participation through 
the 1987 referendum were among major factors that led to improved bilateral 
relations with the EC. In this period, legislative initiatives helped repair Turkey’s 
relations with the European Community (Müftüler, 1993).58
 
Against these developments, in 1989, preceding the European Council’s rejection of 
Turkey’s application for full membership in the EC, the European Commission 
presented its list of obstacles to membership. High on the list were the state of 
democracy in Turkey, the country’s relative economic backwardness, the Kurdish 
problem, Turkey’s disputes with Greece, the Cyprus issue and the lack of respect for 
human rights. However, at the same time, the EU continued to provide incentives in 
order to ensure Turkey’s Westernization. The Commission (1989) “suggested the 
operation of the Association Agreement and the realization of the Customs Union as 
foreseen by the Additional Protocol … and adopted a Package for Turkey” which 
provided for financial, political and technical assistance in order to finalize the 
customs union negotiations.  
 
                                                 
58 For a detailed analysis of the reforms adopted in this period, see Meltem Müftüler-Baç (2000), and 
Özbudun (2000), the reforms are also available in the Official Gazette (1987-1999).  
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Therefore, the EC’s 1989 decision to reject Turkey’s application signified that the 
Community was not yet ready to deepen the process of political integration with 
Turkey but instead preferred to reinforce economic ties within the framework of the 
Association Agreement. This aimed at providing further political incentives for 
liberalization and democratization reforms in Turkey in order to integrate it into the 
customs union. The 1989 rejection cannot solely be attributed to lack of conformity 
with the EU’s civil-military relations model, which was developed as a major policy 
concern specifically after the post-Cold War resolutions of NATO, the OSCE and the 
declaration of the Copenhagen political criteria.59 It was mainly attributed to 
democracy and human rights conditions in general, without any precise idea of what 
paths the EC/EU’s main decision-making bodies (except the European Parliament) 
envisaged for improving these conditions. Reforms were left to domestic discretion. 
 
Analysis of the discourse of the EC/EU’s main decision-making institutions from the 
Turkish application for membership in 1987 onwards shows the European Council 
and Commission progressively emphasizing the formal institutional aspects of 
domestic reforms. These reveal what the EU means by the democratization of civil-
military relations in Turkish politics. An ever-growing emphasis on legal reforms to 
improve the democratic governance of civil-military relations was set as one of the 
primary conditions for political stability. Therefore, the basis on which Turkish-EU 
relations were evolving changed significantly after 1993. In the 1990s, the Treaty on 
European Union (1993) deepened the political dimension by restructuring the 
                                                 
59 Note that the Copenhagen political criteria date back to the 1993 post-Cold War period, when the 
EU, NATO and the OSCE worked on developing a model of democratic governance of the military by 
civilian institutions. The Barcelona Declaration also dates back to 1995. Consequently, the reasons 
behind the rejection are multifaceted and include the Cyprus issue, relations with Greece, and the 
deepening process of the EU, as well as the democratic criteria mainly voiced by the European 
Parliament. 
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process of European integration under the umbrella of European Economic 
Communities, Justice and Home Affairs, and Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
That same year the EU introduced its project on future enlargement, tracing the basic 
tenets of its institutional identity. This included the defining criteria for inclusion in 
the Union (Maastricht Treaty/Treaty on European Union, 1993). The Copenhagen 
Criteria (1993) reworked the political conditions for membership. They are now 
“stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, respect for 
human rights and the protection of minorities,” and a strategy for enlargement for the 
preparation of regular reports on the reform process in candidate countries.60 All 
these combined constitute the EU’s political conditionality for Turkey’s membership.  
 
The political conditionality is the EU’s most effective tool for inducing domestic 
political change in the membership candidates. The fulfillment of political criteria is 
closely linked with the ability to implement the acquis and to accede to the EU 
(European Commission, 2005). The Agenda 2000 (1997) and the Luxembourg 
(1997) and Nice (2000) European Council Summit Meetings operationalized the 
EU’s enlargement strategy and framed pre-accession strategies for Central and 
Eastern European countries as well as Malta and Cyprus.61 Although Turkey was 
excluded from the new wave of European enlargement and the EU expressed 
reservations concerning its scope of democratization, Turkey has been included in 
                                                 
60 Two additional criteria are the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence 
to the aims of political, economic and monetary union, and adoption of the acquis to create the 
conditions for political and economic integration, including the adjustment of administrative and 
judicial structures to those of the EU.  
 
61 A complementary tool of the EU in influencing Turkish politics has been the EUROMED 
partnership, which is part of the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region. The Barcelona 
Declaration, which institutionalized the political and security pillars of EUROMED, stated that the 
Mediterranean Partners shall “settle their disputes peacefully and refrain from developing their 
military capacity beyond their legitimate defense requirements” as well as shall “develop the rule of 
law and democracy in their political systems,” see also Çelenk (2003).  
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the pre-accession strategy.62 Following the Luxembourg European Council decisions 
(1997), within the framework of its pre-accession strategy, Turkey was given 
concrete guidelines for political reforms. The EU’s political conditionality is 
communicated through the European Commission’s regular reports, European 
Council decisions, and Accession Partnership documents. Additionally, the rising 
power of the European Parliament and influence of EU public opinion on EU 
enlargement decisions (Kreppel, 2002; Taylor, 1996) also played a substantial part in 
shaping political conditionality in relation to the EU’s perspective on good 
governance, democracy and civil-military relations.  
 
In response, successive Turkish governments (1999-2006) undertook major political 
reforms in the period following the declaration of Turkey’s membership candidacy 
and showed their willingness to comply with the EU’s conditionality. From 1999 
onwards and especially during the period of 2002-2006, eight EU harmonization 
packages (Avrupa Birliği uyum paketleri) including major constitutional amendments 
(2001 and 2004) were passed by the Turkish Parliament.63 The following parts of 
this section focus on the civil-military relations aspects of these legal reforms.64 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Scholarly debates over the EU’s policy towards enlargement have identified several factors in 
explaining the EU’s decision to exclude Turkey, to wit: CEECs importance for the EU, economic 
concerns, institutional factors, foreign and security policy concerns, democracy concerns and the 
cultural argument (Müftüler-Baç, 2002a).  
 
63 As of this writing, the ninth reform package is being prepared by Parliament’s EU Harmonization 
Committee, further information is available from http://www.tbmm.gov.tr
 
64 EU harmonization laws concerning the NSC and the issue of accountability and transparency are 
listed in Table 2. Detailed information about these legal reforms can be retrieved from “Political 
Reforms in Turkey” published by the Directorate for Political Affairs of the Secretariat General for 
EU Affairs, available from http://www.abgs.gov.tr. See also the 1982 Constitution (December 2006 
edition) for in-depth details on constitutional amendments within the framework of EU harmonization 
laws. EU Harmonization packages are also available from http://www.belgenet.com/yasa
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Table 2    EU Harmonization Laws on the NSC and the Issue of Accountability and Transparency 1
 
 
 EU Political Conditionality  Legal Reforms 
 
March 24, 2001, Turkey’s National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) set forth the priorities of the reform 
agenda in line with the Accession Partnership 
2001, 2003 
Accession Partnership 
  
 
July 2003, Revised version of the NPAA in line with the Accession Partnership Document (2003) 
 
 
October 17, 2001, Constitutional Amendments including Article 118 on the functioning and the composition of the National 
Security Council aiming at increasing civilian authority and democratic governance. 
 
Reforming the functioning 
and composition of the NSC 
 
August 7, 2003 (Seventh Harmonization Package), Article 4, Article 13, Article 5, and Article 15 of the Law of the National 
Security Council and the General Secretariat of the National Security Council are amended so as to revise the duties, functioning 
and composition of the institution. Articles 14 and 19 of the same law are repealed.  
 
Additionally, the new bylaw on the rules and procedures regarding the Secretariat General is published in the Official Gazette on 
January 8, 2004. On December 10, 2003 a law abrogating the confidentiality of the bylaw and staff of the Secretariat General of 
the National Security Council is passed by Parliament.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Date on which the law enters into force is mentioned in the table (upon publication in the Official Gazette). The approvals by the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
(Parliament) and by the president of the Republic are available at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr. Further details on EU harmonization Laws mentioned in Table 2 are available from 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr in Political Reforms in Turkey published by the Directorate for Political Affairs of the Secretariat General for EU Affairs. See also the 1982 
Constitution (December 2006 edition) for in-depth details on constitutional amendments within the framework of EU harmonization laws. EU Harmonization packages are 
also available from http://www.belgenet.com/yasa  
 
February 19, 2002, April 9, 2002, January 11, 2003, July 19, 2003, First, Second, Fourth and Sixth Harmonization Packages 
amending Article 16 of the Law on the Establishment and Proceedings at State Security Courts to reduce detention periods, 
strengthen provisions to safeguard the rights of prisoners and detainees, and extend the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedures 
in cases under the jurisdiction of these courts. 
 
 
July 19, 2003, Sixth Harmonization Package, amending Article 6 of the Law on the Establishment and Broadcasts of Radio and 
Television Stations, removed the representative of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council from the Board of 
Supervision.  
 
Improvement of 
accountability and 
transparency in defense 
and security matters 
 
August 7, 2003, Seventh Harmonization Package amending Article 11 of the Law on the Establishment and Trial Procedures of 
Military Courts removed the competencies of the trial of civilians by these courts in cases of criminal offenses such as 
discouraging the public from military duty and undermining national resistance, inciting soldiers to mutiny and disobedience. In 
2006, Ninth Harmonization Package, Military Criminal Code is changed in accordance with EcHR (European Court of Human 
Rights) rulings that no civilian will be tried in military courts 
 
Article 12 has been added to the Law on the Audit Court introducing provisions allowing the court to audit accounts and 
transactions upon the request of Parliament in all areas where public means are used. The package provided for the drafting of a 
bylaw to establish the principles and procedures to be observed when auditing state property in the possession of the armed forces. 
  
 
May 7, 2004, Constitutional Amendments (Eighth Harmonization Package) including the abolition of State Security Courts 
(Article 143 annulled), Article 131 of the Constitution on Superior Bodies of Higher Education is amended so as to remove the 
member of the Council of Higher Education selected by the chief of the General Staff. Equally importantly, within the framework 
of the Ninth Harmonization Package in June 2004, abolished the right of the National Security Council to appoint a representative 
to the Supreme Board of Radio and Television.  
 
Article 160 of the Constitution on the Audit Court is amended, with a view to ensure transparency in auditing state property in 
possession of the armed forces, deleting the paragraph stating that “the procedure for auditing state property in possession of the 
armed forces shall be regulated by law in accordance with the principles of secrecy necessitated by national defense.”  
 
 
3.2.1 Turkey’s EU Candidacy: 1999-2002 Legal Reforms 
 
At the Helsinki European Council Summit of December 1999, it was officially 
decided: “Turkey is a candidate destined to join the Union on the basis of the same 
criteria as applied to the other candidate states” (European Council Conclusions, 
1999). The decision significantly accelerated Turkey’s domestic political reforms, 
because the EU officially included Turkey in the new enlargement framework. It 
established further institutional links through financial support and technical 
assistance, and enhanced political dialogue and the establishment of cooperative 
institutions such as EU harmonization committees. These developments increased 
the credibility of the EU’s policy of integration with Turkey.  
 
In response to Turkey’s EU candidacy in 1999, the then coalition government 
composed of the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti), Nationalist Action 
Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) and Motherland Party launched a series of political 
reforms. As a result of Turkey’s national policy objective to become an EU member, 
harmonization laws came to top the government’s policy agenda. Domestic actors, 
such as the government, state elites, civil-society, and individual citizens, are 
important determinants that can either facilitate or hold back Turkey’s process of 
Europeanization in this area. The EU’s guidelines for reforms, positive incentives, 
and the guarantee of closer integration if Turkey complied with the political criteria 
are important mechanisms through which the EU empowered pro-reform actors and 
provided legitimacy to their arguments. Regardless of longstanding institutional 
structures, these actors opted for the passage of reform laws so as to align domestic 
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structures with EU norms and standards. In this context, the period from 1999 to 
2002, legal reforms covered mainly the composition and the functioning of the NSC. 
 
3.2.1.1 Constitutional Amendments and the NSC 
 
The European Commission communications of the EU’s political conditionality 
relating to the NSC appear under the heading of “democracy and the rule of law.” In 
the first Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession issued in December 
1998, the European Commission directly referred to the constitutional provisions on 
the composition and the functioning of the NSC. The report stated 
the lack of civilian control of the army gives cause for concern … the 
existence of this body shows that, despite a basic democratic structure, the 
Turkish constitution allows the Army to play a civil role and to intervene in 
every area of political life … The NSC demonstrates the major role played by 
the army in political life. 
 
The next Regular Report issued in October 1999 emphasized similar concerns, 
remarking that “through the NSC, the military continues to have an important 
influence in many areas of political life.” Therefore, the EU directly mentioned the 
need to reform the functioning and composition of the NSC as a primary step in 
restructuring civil-military relations in Turkey. Equally importantly, the third regular 
report of November 2000 evaluated domestic reform processes in light of the 
political conditionality. It stated that despite several legislative improvements 
concerning democratization process,  
there has been no change in the role played by the NSC in Turkish political 
life. Its conclusions, statements and recommendations continue to strongly 
influence the political process … it appears that at present the views of the 
NSC in practice seriously limit the role played by the government. 
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However, the same report also noted that “the possibility of increasing the number of 
civilian members of the [NSC] is currently under debate within political and military 
circles.”  
 
Following the European Commission’s recommendation that Turkey be made a 
candidate, in December 2000 the European Council decided to provide detailed 
guidelines for the political reforms needed by Turkey and for this purpose prepared 
the first Accession Partnership document. In March 2001, the first version of the 
document was officially agreed upon. In conformity with the pre-accession strategy, 
the Accession Partnership covered short- and medium-term reform objectives in line 
with the Annex of the European Commission’s November 2000 Regular Report. The 
document introduced “alignment” into the lexicon of conditionality. According to the 
document, Turkey was expected to prepare, in response, a national program 
compatible with the conditions set forth by the Accession Partnership. Among 
several other political reforms, alignment of “the constitutional role of the NSC as an 
advisory body to the government in accordance with the practice of EU member 
states” was declared a medium-term priority.65  
 
The Accession Partnership is an important policy tool demonstrating the EU’s 
commitment to integrate Turkey into the Union. This step was a major incentive that 
accelerated the introduction of constitutional amendments on the NSC. The National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis was agreed upon in March 2001.66 It 
addressed the guidelines provided in the Accession Partnership. It set forth a reform 
                                                 
65 The Accession Partnership with Turkey (2001, 2003, and 2006), available from 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr
 
66 The first National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis by 2001 was published in the Official 
Gazette. 
 81
program including the short- and medium-term priorities for closer integration with 
the Union.67 Thus, it contained a comprehensive reform agenda that delivered the 
preparatory harmonization packages.68 These were partially initiated by the above-
mentioned coalition government composed of the Democratic Left Party, Nationalist 
Action Party and Motherland Party. That government started to initiate a number of 
legal reforms (October 2001, February, March and August 2002). For this purpose it 
established several institutions for alignment with EU norms and standards, including 
the Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Parliament’s EU Harmonization Committee, 
and the departments responsible for EU affairs in the various ministries. The 
coalition government envisaged a review of relevant articles of the Constitution and 
other legislation to redefine more clearly legal structures such as the functioning and 
the composition of the NSC. Following governmental initiatives in response to the 
EU’s conditionality for membership, Parliament approved harmonization reforms.69
 
One of the most important aspects of formal institutional change introduced through 
EU harmonization laws concerned the functioning and composition of the NSC, and 
constitutional changes in October 2001 addressed this by amending Article 118. 
First, the number of the civilians was increased. Indeed, the 1982 Constitution 
(Article 118) stipulates that 
                                                 
67 According to the European Commission,  
 
The National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis is part of an ongoing process under 
the pre-accession strategy … Turkey is encouraged to revise the document in order to update 
it to the latest developments and strengthen its planning character, to ensure better 
prioritization of actions including clear timetables and deadlines, as well as the establishment 
of budgets necessary for investments. The priorities of the Accession Partnership should be 
fully taken into account during the revision of the document (European Commission, 2002). 
 
68 They are preparatory in the sense that they incorporate measures to be taken in advance of formal 
negotiations based on the acquis itself. The National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis is 
available from http://www.abgs.gov.tr
 
69 These reforms were approved during the 21st legislative period of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly.  
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The NSC shall be composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General 
Staff, Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers of Justice, National Defense, 
Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Army, Navy and 
Air Forces and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie, under the 
chairmanship of the President of the Republic. Depending on the particulars 
of the agenda, Ministers and other persons concerned may be invited to 
meetings of the Council and their views heard.  
 
Second, the provision on the effect of NSC recommendations on Council of 
Ministers decisions was amended. Accordingly, NSC decisions again acquired an 
advisory character, returning to their status in the 1961 Constitution. 
The NSC shall submit to the Council of Ministers its views on the advisory 
decisions that are taken and ensuring the necessary coordination with regard 
to the formulation, establishment and implementation of national security 
policy of the state. The Council of Ministers shall evaluate decisions of the 
NSC concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of 
the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of 
the country and the peace and security of the society. The agenda of the NSC 
shall be drawn up by the President of the Republic taking into account the 
proposals of the Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff (1982 
Constitution, Article 118). 
 
 
These legal reforms concerning the NSC’s composition and clarification of the status 
of its recommendations were welcomed as positive progress towards Turkey’s 
integration into the EU (European Commission, 2001; European Parliament, 2002). 
However, the EU signaled that the extent to which these steps would “enhance de 
facto civilian control” would have to be monitored. The report (2001) stated that 
as part of the constitutional reform package, the provision of Article 118 
concerning the role and the composition of the NSC has been amended. The 
number of civilian members of the NSC has been increased from five to nine 
while the number of military representative remains at five. In addition the 
new text put an emphasis on the advisory nature of this body, stressing that 
its role is limited to recommendations. The Government is now required to 
“evaluate” them instead of giving “priority considerations”. The extent to 
which the constitutional amendment will enhance de facto civilian control 
over the military will need to be monitored.  
 
Likewise, the Regular Report issued in October 2002 further emphasized the 
importance of the implementation of these amendments. It mentioned that changes in 
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the composition of the NSC did not seem to have altered “the way in which NSC 
operates in practice,” nor the influence of its recommendations. Further elaborated in 
subsequent chapters, the EU’s political conditionality in this respect underlined that 
formal legal-institutional changes needs to be substantiated. However, these 
constitutional reforms passed by Parliament were still fundamental steps for 
restructuring the NSC’s role along the guidelines of the EU. 
 
3.2.2 Opening of Accession Negotiations: Legal Reforms (2002-2004) 
 
As a major incentive in support of Turkey’s continuing alignment with EU norms 
and practices, on December 13, 2002 the Copenhagen European Council concluded 
that “if in December 2004 the European Council, based upon the report and 
recommendation of the European Commission, decides that Turkey sufficiently 
fulfills the criteria”, the Union would “open accession negotiations without delay.” 
The decision can be interpreted as an integral part of the EU’s direct legal-
institutional strategy to push forward the domestic reform process. Therefore, the EU 
recommended that the government “address swiftly the remaining shortcomings in 
the field of the political criteria, not only with regard to legislation but also in 
particular with regard to implementation” so as to ensure the accession negotiations 
would be opened. Meanwhile, the European Council and Turkey agreed on the 
revised version of the Accession Partnership published in the official journal of the 
European Union on June 16, 2003. As an integral part of the political criteria and 
enhanced political dialogue, the adaptation of “the functioning of the NSC in order to 
align civilian control of the military with practice in EU member states” became a 
priority for 2003-2004.  
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The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) government, 
elected on November 3, 2002, welcomed the decisions of the European Council.70 
By the end of 2002, the European Council, European Commission and European 
Parliament’s resolutions on Turkey’s accession negotiations process reinforced the 
credibility of the EU’s enlargement strategy. This provided justification to the 
government’s reformist rhetoric. The newly elected government, Justice and 
Development Party, and main opposition party in Parliament, the Republican 
People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), from 2002 to 2006, passed the most 
important parts of the EU harmonization reforms. During this period, the National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis71 prepared in 2001 was revised and 
agreed upon in July 2003 in line with developments on the reform agenda. The first 
term of the government was marked by significant legal reforms towards 
strengthening democracy and civilian authority. The legal changes introduced during 
this term include the most comprehensive reforms yet towards aligning civil-military 
relations in Turkey to EU standards and practices. The reforms undertaken in this 
period were related to both the NSC and accountability and transparency building in 
security and defense affairs. 
 
3.2.2.1 EU Harmonization Laws and the NSC 
 
Parliament approved the seventh EU harmonization package in July 2003. This was 
significant in terms of the implementation of 2001 constitutional amendments. The 
new legislation brought about fundamental amendments to the law governing the 
                                                 
70 Then Prime Minister Abdullah Gül’s evaluation on European Council decisions in the Parliament’s 
General Assembly on December 17, 2002.   
 
71 See the Official Gazette (July 2003). The National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis is 
also available from the Secretariat for EU Affairs, http://www.abgs.gov.tr
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organization, duties, and functioning of the NSC and its Secretariat General (Law 
No. 2945 dated November 9, 1983). The new law (Article 4) stipulates that 
The NSC, within the framework of the definitions on national security and 
the national security policy of the State as stated in Article 2, take advisory 
decisions on issues pertaining to the establishment and implementation of the 
national security policy of the State, and shall provide its views to ensuring 
necessary coordination; it shall submit these advisory decisions and views to 
the Council of Ministers, and fulfill duties given by laws. The Prime Minister 
may entrust a Deputy Prime Minister with the responsibility of submitting to 
the Council of Ministers the advisory decisions and views of the NSC to be 
evaluated, and of coordinating and following the implementation of these 
advisory decisions should they be approved by the Council of Ministers.72  
 
These new legal texts emphasize the NSC’s “advisory role” and confine its scope to 
national security affairs in line with the state’s security approach. Equally 
importantly, they increased the quantitative representation of civilian members.73  
 
Additionally, reform laws repealed Article 9 on “distribution and steering of the 
decisions” and Article 14 on the competencies of the Secretariat General. These 
overridden articles previously empowered the Secretariat General to follow up, on 
behalf of the president of the Republic and prime minister, the implementation of 
NSC recommendations. Furthermore, provisions authorizing unlimited access of the 
NSC to any civilian agency were repealed. The deleted Article 19 on Information 
and Documents had stated that “the Ministries, public institutions and organizations 
and private legal persons shall submit regularly, or when requested, non-classified 
and classified information and documents needed by the Secretariat General of the 
NSC.” At the same time, the abrogation of the law on “the confidentiality of the staff 
of the Secretariat General of the NSC made it more accountable to the parliament 
and the public” (Narlı, 2006: 165). The harmonization laws also brought an 
                                                 
72 Available from the NSC official web-page, http://www.mgk.gov.tr/kanun.html  
 
73 On January 15, 2003, the law was amended to comply with the 2001 constitutional amendment on 
the composition of the NSC.  
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amendment to Article 13 of the law limiting the competencies of the Secretariat 
General to function as a secretariat of the NSC. The secretariat was transformed into 
a consultative body that is no longer able to conduct national security investigations 
on its own initiative. Furthermore, the amendment to Article 5 lengthening the 
interval between regular meetings of the NSC from one month to two and canceling 
the prerogatives of the chief of the General Staff to convene meetings has 
implications for the institution’s relative influence on governmental policies. Finally, 
an amendment to Articles 15 and 17 revised the appointment procedure of the NSC 
Secretariat General. Previous legal arrangements stipulated that “the Secretary 
General of the Council shall only be appointed from among the high-ranking military 
officials.” According to the new text, the secretary general is appointed upon the 
proposal of the prime minister and approval of the president, allowing a civilian to 
serve in the office. These new legal arrangements were implemented on January 8, 
2004 by publication of the new regulations governing the NSC Secretariat General in 
the Official Gazette.74 The regulations redefining the duties, functioning and 
composition of the NSC demonstrated the government’s determination to implement 
all the legislative initiatives undertaken during 2001-2003. In September 2004 this 
regulation was put into practice, and Ambassador Yigit Alpogan, who had been 
serving in the Foreign Ministry, was appointed as the first civilian Secretary of the 
NSC. This was a major amendment in terms of civilianization.  
 
As a result of these legal-institutional changes triggered by the EU’s political 
conditionality for membership, today the NSC is essentially a consultative body as it 
was originally set up by the 1961 Constitution. The reforms brought significant 
                                                 
74 The new regulation on the Secretariat General of NSC is available from the official web-page of the 
NSC, http://www.mgk.gov.tr/yonetmelik.html   
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limitations to the executive powers of the institution in terms of follow-up on the 
implementation of NSC recommendations, the correlative transformation of the 
Secretariat General into a purely advisory body, and the end to its right to access the 
documents of any civilian public agency or legal person. Therefore, the NSC no 
longer has extensive executive powers, does have a civilian Secretary General, and 
no longer recommends its views on ministries but conveys its views upon request. 
Moreover, the government is no longer obliged to give priority to the Council’s 
advice, but only to assess the views conveyed. 
 
Subsequently, the Regular Report and strategy paper published near the end of 2003 
reaffirmed the December 2002 European Council decisions on the possibility of 
opening accession negotiations with Turkey. Under the heading “National Security 
Council,” it commended the legal reforms adopted by the Turkish government as 
remarkable steps towards complying with the political conditionality in the realm of 
civil-military relations. The composite strategy paper on enlargement stated that the 
functioning and composition of the NSC had been substantially changed and 
progress had been made in “bringing the framework of civil-military relations closer 
to practice in EU member states.” 
 
3.2.2.2 EU Harmonization Laws, Accountability and Transparency Building 
 
The second aspect of the political conditionality for membership is related to the 
issue of accountability and transparency building in defense and security matters. 
From 1999 to the present, and particularly in 2002-2006, reforms introduced by EU 
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harmonization laws also restructured several aspects of the relations between the 
military and legislative, executive and judiciary institutions. 
 
The Legislature and the Military 
A first issue addressed by the EU relates to the establishment of “full parliamentary 
oversight” over defense and security policies, including the defense budget. The 
European Parliament, particularly relating to these issues, has addressed the need for 
“alignment to European standards and practices” (European Parliament, 2003). In 
this respect, earlier reports emphatically state that the “lack of governmental control 
over the army gives causes for concern.” The European Commission (2000) in this 
connection decried how “there seems to be too little accountability to the Parliament 
with regard to defense and security matters.” The 2002 report returned to this point, 
stating that “the Armed Forces enjoy a substantial degree of autonomy in 
establishing the defense budget … [yet] details of the military budget have been 
made public via the press,” which is an important step in transparency. However, 
according to the report, “there are still two extra-budgetary funds available to the 
military in spite of the efforts of the Government to close such funds and make 
expenditures subject to normal budgetary procedures” (European Commission, 
2002).75  
 
Following the EU’s guidelines, Parliament approved a number of harmonization 
reforms during 2003-2004. These reforms improved legal arrangements for the 
transparency of defense budgeting and expenditures. They expanded the mandate of 
the Audit Court to audit military expenses and introduced the new Law on Public 
                                                 
75 The extra-budgetary funds referred to in the Regular Reports are the Defense Industry Support Fund 
and the Turkish Armed Forces Strengthening Foundation. 
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Financial Management and Control. As explained in the history section, it is fair to 
say that the main structures for parliamentary oversight exist in Turkey. However, 
the military was given some prerogatives by the way a 1971 constitutional 
amendment exempted the Turkish Armed Forces budget from Audit Court oversight. 
This privilege was eliminated by the legal amendments introduced through passage 
of the seventh EU harmonization package. The Article 12 added to the Law on the 
Audit Court (No. 832 dated February 2, 1967) states that upon the request of the 
Parliament, the Court “audits the accounts and transactions of all public bodies and 
institutions.”76 Thus, the Audit Court exercises such control on behalf of Parliament 
upon the request of Parliament’s Presidency based on the decision of parliamentary 
committees. The reformed law also includes an innovation that provides transparency 
for auditing the state property in the hands of the Armed Forces, while referring to 
the principle of confidentiality as required by the national security services. The 
transparency of defense expenditures was improved under the seventh harmonization 
package of political reforms. The reformed Law on the Audit Court (Article 12, Law 
No. 832 dated February 2, 1967) provides that  
the principles and procedures for this auditing shall be regulated by a bylaw 
classified “SECRET” which shall be prepared by the Ministry of National 
Defense, in consultation with the General Staff and the Audit Court and be 
approved by the Council of Ministers.77  
 
The Regular Report of 2003 welcomed these legal-institutional developments 
addressing the political conditionality. However, the EU still expressed interest in the 
development of further policies to expand the scope of these legislative changes and 
                                                 
76 EU harmonization laws, seventh harmonization package approved by the Parliament on July 30, 
2003, published in the Official Gazette on August 7, 2003. Also available from 
http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/k4963.html   
 
77 EU harmonization laws, seventh harmonization package approved by the Parliament on July 30, 
2003, published in the Official Gazette on August 7, 2003. 
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implementation of the reforms. Concerning the seventh harmonization package’s 
provisions on financial accountability and transparency matters, the report noted  
In spite of the extension of the remit of the Audit Court to national defense, 
the Armed Forces continue to enjoy a substantial degree of autonomy in 
preparing and establishing the defense budget and public procurement in the 
defense-related area … there are still two extra budgetary funds available to 
the military.  
 
Additionally, in the “Strategy Paper and Report on Continued Enlargement” issued 
in 2003, the Commission added concerns about accountability. In this respect it 
stated that “full parliamentary control over the military expenditures must be ensured 
both in terms of approving the budget and in terms of auditing.” The report states 
that the narrow legalistic approach must be complemented by a simultaneous 
diffusion of norms and change in the attitudes of the political actors operating 
through these institutions in order to ensure effective alignment.  
 
Following the October 2003 report, an amendment to the Law on Public Financial 
Management and Control (Law No. 5018 dated December 10, 2003) was passed that 
December, bringing all extra-budgetary funds into the overall state budget. It 
required more information and documents to be attached to the budget proposal, 
including defense budget proposals. The law (which went into force in January 2005) 
was amended to provide inclusion of hitherto extra-budgetary funds in the budget of 
the Ministry of National Defense. These funds are now subject to direct audit by 
Parliament, and the time period of debate and negotiation is extended. This increases 
accountability to Parliament. Under the law, the Finance Ministry is “the central 
governmental unit in setting standards and monitoring implementation.”78 
Additionally, the budgeting method was changed to require “performance report for 
                                                 
78 Further information on the duties and responsibilities of the Finance Ministry is available in its web-
page, http://www.mfa.gov.tr
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efficiency audit to be submitted to the Parliament and to the related institutions.”79 
This aims to bolster Parliament’s information resources concerning the outcome of 
defense spending. 
 
Constitutional amendments introduced in the first half of 2004 further strengthened 
the legal-institutional structure in terms of accountability and transparency building. 
Following this period, Article 160 on the Audit Court was amended in October 2005 
to delete a paragraph imposing restrictions on the inspection of funds of the Armed 
Forces.80 The defense secrecy clause was also removed from the Constitution. The 
procedure for auditing is done on behalf of Parliament. Under the changes, the Audit 
Court, on Parliament’s behalf, has the right to request that the government reveal, 
explain and justify policy and plans in the defense domain. Therefore, at the behest 
of Parliament, the Audit Court is to inspect all areas where public means are used in 
line with the bylaw establishing the principles governing audits of state property 
provided to the Armed Forces.81 Parliament’s 2005 and 2006 budget sessions 
conformed to the new laws.82  
 
Furthermore, as mentioned in the Accession Partnership documents (2001, 2003), the 
civilian dimension is central in establishing the democratic governance of civil-
military relations in Turkey. In this respect, the authoritarian legacy was eliminated 
not only through constitutional amendments but also by several complementary EU 
                                                 
79 For more detailed analysis, see (Narlı. 2006: 171). 
 
80 The ninth harmonization package passed by Parliament in 2006 implemented constitutional change 
by amending the Law on Audit Court authority to audit military expenditures: “All public 
expenditures without any exceptions and without exempting any institution form being accountable 
shall be subject to judicial control of the Audit Court.” 
 
81 See 1982 Constitution, Article 160 (as amended on October 29, 2005). 
 
82 Available from http://www.tbmm.gov.tr (assembly records – meclis tutanakları). 
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harmonization laws passed between February 2002 and August 2003 to guarantee 
citizens’ democratic right to participate in political processes.83 These legal reforms 
are also referred to as “democratization packages” (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004). 
These packages are an integral part of Turkey’s process of Europeanization. While 
enlarging the scope of certain fundamental rights and liberties such as the freedoms 
of thought, expression, and association, they also consolidated and expanded the 
channels of political participation. Constitutional Amendments in 2001 and in 2004 
significantly widened the scope of fundamental rights and liberties written into the 
1982 Constitution, strengthened their safeguards, reinforced the rule of law, and 
eliminated certain military prerogatives (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004). These reforms 
concern the expansion of political rights. They are significantly related to domestic 
political change concerning accountability and transparency building in civil-military 
relations. These reforms are significant in terms of democratic oversight because 
they legally improve civilian competencies to oversee or participate in the 
formulation of government decisions on defense and security matters, among other 
equally important policy issues.  
 
Therefore, from 2003 to 2006, these harmonization laws addressed the issue of 
improving parliamentary oversight over defense and security affairs and budgets, 
following the guidelines of the political conditionality. Turkey’s policy goal of 
opening accession negotiations with the EU was the major factor pushing the 
initiation of these reforms. 
                                                 
83 See the 1982 Constitution (December 2006 edition) for in-depth details on constitutional 
amendments within the framework of EU harmonization laws. For detailed information about these 
legal reforms, see Political Reforms in Turkey published by the Directorate for Political Affairs of the 
Secretariat General for EU Affairs, available from http://www.abgs.gov.tr. EU harmonization laws are 
also available from http://www.belgenet.com/yasa
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The Executive and the Military 
A second aspect of legal reforms has to do with relations between the military and 
executive institutions. As explained above, legal reforms relating to the NSC resulted 
in a redefinition of the powers of the institution within the executive branch of 
government. The reforms empowered the Council of Ministers in this respect. 
However, the Regular Report published near the end of 2000 stated:  
Civilian control over the military still needs to be improved. Contrary to the 
EU, NATO and OCSE standards, instead of being answerable to the Defense 
Minister, the Chief of the General Staff is still accountable to the Prime 
Minister.  
 
Here the EU refers to the division of powers among the Ministry of National 
Defense, the chief of the General Staff and the prime minister. The EU leaves the 
option of adopting the “best practice” available in member states to the initiative of 
the government and parliamentary committees. However, it refers to EU, NATO and 
OSCE standards to guide Turkish authorities in their reform plans.  
 
The EU’s expectations concerning the status of the chief of the General Staff 
answering directly to the prime minister rather than through the Ministry of National 
Defense have yet to be met. The legal-institutional setting is a hindrance in this case. 
The issue of direct accountability to the prime minister was addressed in the 2000 
report, but the government paid it no heed. The government argued that existing 
arrangements in Turkey provide sufficient grounds for a functioning democracy. In 
other words, according to government authorities, subordinating the chief of the 
General Staff to the Ministry would not suit Turkey’s current needs.84 The main 
reason for the reluctance to adopt this reform is the fear that it would serve to 
politicize the institution of the military. The Ministry of National Defense and the 
                                                 
84 “Genelkurmay AB için çalışma grubu kurdu” (The General Staff established an EU working group), 
Radikal, January 11, 2000. 
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Turkish General Staff work in close cooperation. Yet, for the effective functioning of 
these institutions, the latter is directly responsible to the prime minister. Despite the 
hierarchical supremacy of the prime minister to the national defense minister, in 
practice this specific law does not contradict the principle of military accountability 
to civilian authority (Soysal, 1979: 271-272).  
 
In addition to this, the regular reports voiced concerns about the presence of military 
members in several state institutions. The EU referred to the military representative 
sitting on Higher Education Council (European Commission, 2000). Furthermore, 
the European Commission’s Regular Report (2003) also included concerns about 
military representatives on civilian boards such as the Supreme Council of Radio and 
Television. This latter issue remained unresolved despite the removal of military 
representatives from the Cinema, Video and Music Supervision Board by an 
amendment to Law No. 3257 under July 2003’s sixth harmonization package. 
Following these reports, in May 2004 the 1982 Constitution (Article 131) was 
amended so as to remove the military representative from the Higher Education 
Council. Furthermore, the ninth harmonization package of June 2004 abolished the 
NSC’s right to appoint a representative to the Supreme Council of Radio and 
Television. Therefore, EU harmonization laws wiped away the NSC’s power to 
influence education, art and broadcasting policies. The removal of military 
representatives from these supervisory institutions by EU harmonization package-
related constitutional amendments also reflects the role of the EU’s political 
conditionality in triggering legal-institutional changes.  
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The Judiciary and the Military 
The first aspect of legal reforms in this area bears on the relationship between 
judicial institutions and the military. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, European 
Commission and European Parliament reports on Turkey regularly criticized the 
existence of State Security Courts. The composition of these courts was questioned 
especially within the context of the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law. 
In one early report the EU criticized the discrepancy in the judicial system these 
courts represented, saying 
the judicial system includes emergency courts (the state security courts), 
which are not compatible with a democratic system and run counter to the 
European Convention on Human Rights … This is the only example in 
Europe in which civilians can be tried at least in part by military judges … 
Major efforts need to be made to ensure the real independence of the 
judiciary and to give the judicial system the human and material sources it 
needs to operate in a manner consistent with the rule of law (European 
Commission, 1998). 
 
Following this report, as a step towards civilianization of the State Security Courts, 
in 1999 Article 143 of the 1982 Constitution was amended to exclude military judges 
and public prosecutors from these courts. Subsequent EU reports (1999-2003) voiced 
similar concerns, but noted “the replacement of the military judge by a civilian one in 
State Security Courts” as a positive development. According to the European 
Commission, this represented “a clear improvement in terms of the independence of 
the judiciary.” The Accession Partnership document of March 2001 also addressed 
this issue as a short-term priority, urging Turkey to “improve the functioning and 
efficiency of the judiciary, including the state security court in line with international 
standards.” 
 
The EU harmonization laws approved by Parliament between February 2002 and 
August 2003 introduced several legal changes along these lines. The seventh 
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harmonization package of August 2003 amended the Law on the Establishment and 
Trial Proceedings of Military Courts (No. 353, 1963) with a view to ending military 
jurisdiction over civilians in accordance with the principle of the rule of law.85 It also 
aligned the detention procedures of military courts with other courts. The provision 
on the Council of State (Article 155) was amended on August 13, 1999, expanding 
the power of higher courts to review decisions and judgments handed down by all 
administrative courts. However, military concerns about the independence of the 
administrative courts from the executive were among the hurdles to further reforms 
in this respect.86  
 
After being totally civilianized by the 1999 reforms, the State Security Courts were 
abolished altogether in June 2004 through amendments to the 1982 Constitution 
(Article 143 annulled). Thus, one of the institutions inherited from military 
governments of the past was eliminated from the constitutional order in line with the 
EU’s conditionality. Equally importantly, in June 2006 the Military Criminal Code 
was amended in line with the priorities of the Accession Partnership document issued 
that January. The law now stipulates, “No civilians will be tried in military courts in 
peacetime unless military personnel and civilians commit an offense together.” The 
law also introduced the right to retrial in military courts if there is a European Court 
of Human Rights ruling in favor of military or civilian persons who have been tried 
by these courts. They can seek a retrial. The abolition of the State Security Courts, 
                                                 
85 The harmonization laws bringing several changes to the Law on the Establishment of and 
Proceedings at Military Courts were subsequently approved by Parliament on February 6, 2002 (first 
package, Law No. 4744), March 23, 2002 (second package, Law No. 4748), June 19, 2003 (sixth 
package, Law No. 4903), and July 30, 2003 (seventh package, Law No. 4963). Available from 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr, and http://www.belgenet.com/yasa  
 
86 For further information on the relations between the judiciary and military, see Yazıcı (1997). 
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along with several changes to the law on military courts to end military jurisdiction 
over civilians, are noteworthy in terms of the independence of the judicial system. 
 
 
3.3 Toward Closer Integration 
 
At its year-end 2004 summit, the European Council decided to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. The domestic reform pace of 2001-
2004 was a major factor in the EU’s decision to integrate Turkey more closely with 
the Union. Additionally, the latest reports of the European Parliament recognized 
“the impressive efforts of the Turkish authorities to achieve substantial legislative 
and institutional convergence in Turkey towards European standards.” This 
development is significant as the European Parliament has been noted for its 
generally negative attitude towards Turkey’s membership bid. In light of the reform 
process, the European Parliament (2004) called “upon the European Council to open 
the accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.” 
 
More specifically, the 2001-2004 period was very significant in terms of the 
restructuring of civil-military relations. The provision of a clear EU prospective on 
Turkey’s membership fueled reform-oriented domestic preference convergence. In 
addition to the EU incentives for formal institutional change, domestic political 
responses were also very influential in shaping Turkey’s path of Europeanization in 
this area. Constitutional amendments and supporting legislation, enacted through 
Parliament’s passage of EU harmonization packages, signaled a clear evolution 
towards domestic alignment with EU norms and practices. In this connection, 
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Turkey’s commitment to closer integration with the EU was a major mediating 
factor. Despite several institutional constraints, this commitment led to preference 
convergence among a plurality of domestic political actors relating to Turkey’s legal 
reform process. In this context, political conditionality for membership legitimated 
the pro-EU actors in initiating legislation that reformed longstanding legal-
institutional structures. Changes in the composition and functioning of the NSC 
meant a revision of its executive powers and a legal redefinition of the power of its 
military members. Additionally, reforms related to accountability and transparency 
building were important move towards strengthening civilian authority.  
 
However, the EU still has reservations concerning Turkey’s legal reform process. 
Addressing the issue of democratic governance and civil-military relations, 
subsequent reports from EU institutions and particularly those of the Commission 
(2004-2006) were markedly different in tone from previous ones. Though 
acknowledging that “the government has increasingly asserted its control over the 
military,” a 2004 report struck a cautionary note in saying that “the process of fully 
aligning civil-military relations with EU practice is underway” (European 
Commission, 2004). Therefore, according to the EU, several issues remain to be 
addressed.  
 
First, the EU provided for additional guidelines in terms of legal-institutional reforms 
and their implementation. Recent reports note, “as regards the institutional 
framework, there are legal and administrative structures which are not accountable to 
the civilian structures.”87 According to the revised version of the Accession 
                                                 
87 These formal structures referred to in the reports (2004-2006) are particularly related to the EU’s 
evaluations of the implementation of legal reforms. They concern the consolidation of democratic 
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Partnership document of January 23, 2006, as part of the democracy and rule of law 
condition of enhanced economic and political criteria, Turkey has to  
continue to align civilian control of the military with practice in EU member 
states … Take steps towards bringing about greater accountability and 
transparency in the conduct of security affairs. Establish full parliamentary 
oversight of military and defense policy and all related expenditure, including 
by external audit. Abolish any remaining competencies of military courts to 
try civilians.  
 
The EU has emphasized the importance of further increasing overall institutional 
capacity for the implementation of reforms and coordination of EU funds, since 
domestic institutions are the most effective bodies in implementing these reforms 
(European Commission, 2005).  
 
Second, as will be seen in the following chapters, the EU (2004-2006) further 
stressed the processes of policy alignment and the informal aspects of domestic 
institutional change as integral parts of the conditionality for opening and continuing 
accession negotiations. Subsequent reports stated, “Further efforts are needed to raise 
awareness among elected members of the Parliament and to continue to build up 
relevant expertise among civilians” (European Commission, 2005). Therefore, a 
significant shift in the EU’s emphasis is on the centrality of the civilian dimension of 
the reforms, demonstrating that all the political reforms associated with the political 
conditionality for membership are intertwined.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
governance to establish full parliamentary democratic oversight in defense and security affairs, the 
abolition of any remaining competencies of military courts to try civilians, the Internal Service Law of 
the Armed Forces (which seems to provide for an extensive interpretation of the duties and 
responsibilities of the institution according to the EU), and the division of power between the Ministry 
of National Defense, prime minister and chief of the General Staff. Additional legal reforms in this 
sphere are related to reorganization of the Ministry of National Defense so as to further integrate its 
departments’ military and civilian apparatuses and thus facilitate coordination and cooperation on 
defense and security issues.  
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Again, in the EU-Turkey Association Council (2006), the EU communicated its 
common stance. The primary emphasis is on the consolidation of legislative changes. 
The deepening of political reforms is seen as meaning implementation of the reform 
processes and making them irrevocable. In this respect, it stated that the 
improvement of domestic institutional capacity to digest legal reforms would be 
supported by EU financial and technical aid. Concerning reforms in civil-military 
relations introduced from 2001 to 2005, EU-Turkey Association Council resolutions 
emphasized that it is essential that “Turkey consolidate reforms adopted in previous 
years and remains committed to further reforms in this area.”  
 
On Turkey’s side, the EU’s positive incentives, such as the granting of membership 
candidacy and the expression of the political will to start accession talks with 
Turkey, were significant for the establishment of a certain modus vivendi between the 
government and other political actors in the realm of legal reforms relating to civil-
military relations. This is not to argue that state and political elites unanimously 
accepted all the reforms emanating from Turkey’s EU membership candidacy, but 
that the EU empowered those reformist sections (or at least allayed Euroskeptic 
tendencies) of the state and political elites through its policy of inclusion towards 
Turkey. The Republican goal of being recognized as an integral part of the European 
order is the main source of legitimacy for the legislation of harmonization laws 
introduced so far for improving the democratic governance of civil-military relations. 
Parliament’s passage of most of the legal reforms (2001-2006) demonstrates to a 
significant extent the preference convergence among domestic actors, including the 
military, towards overcoming discrepancies in Turkey’s process of Europeanization. 
From 1999 to the present, the Parliament has passed nine EU harmonization 
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packages with a considerable consensus established between the government and the 
opposition.88  
 
In this connection, the Turkish General Staff has established an EU working group 
for the purpose of coordinating legal-institutional harmonization reforms.89 
According to the Turkish General Staff, structures to guarantee the democratic 
governance of civil-military relations already exist in Turkey.90 In 2005, then Chief 
of the General Staff Hilmi Özkök stated  
There are some demands (from the EU). Some are suitable, others are not. 
Some will become suitable in the long run. The Turkish Armed Forces is 
under civilian authority. Our duties are set forth in the Constitution and the 
laws. We comply with them …what matters is the control of the civilian 
authority.91  
 
This statement suggests various concerns raised by senior officers such as whether 
the political reforms would weaken the functioning of the NSC.92 In this connection, 
the NSC’s first civilian secretary general, Yiğit Alpogan, mentioned that there are 
structures similar to the NSC in EU member states as well.93 The position of the 
military was also reflected in a 2004 statement made by General Yaşar Büyükanıt, 
who was then deputy chief of the General Staff: 
                                                 
88 General Assembly Records (1999-2006), available from the Parliament, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr
 
89 “Genelkurmay AB için çalışma grubu kurdu” (The General Staff established an EU working group), 
Radikal, January 11, 2000. 
 
90 “Genelkurmay AB için çalışma grubu kurdu” (Turkish General Staff established an EU working 
group), Radikal, January 11, 2000. 
 
91 “Özkök: Zaman içinde uygun” (Suitable in the long run), Milliyet, November 5, 2005 (“Zaten bazı 
talepler var. Bazıları uygun bazıları değil. Bazıları belki zaman içinde uygun hale gelebilir. TSK siyasi 
kontrolün altındadır. Görevimiz Anayasa ve yasalarda bellidir. Onların dışına çıkmayız. Çıkıldıysa 
onun gereği yapılır … Önemli olan biçim değil özdür. O da siyasi otoritenin kontrolüdür.”) 
 
92 “TSK Objects to the Seventh Package,” Turkish Daily News, July 19, 2003. 
  
93 “Orgeneral Kılınç: 7. Uyum Paketi MGK’yı işlevsiz bıraktı” (Seventh harmonization package 
leaves the NSC without purpose), Milliyet, August 25, 2003. 
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During deliberations on the seventh reform package, we conveyed our views 
to the government. Some were accepted, others were not. Now that 
Parliament has passed them into law, it is our duty to comply with them. We 
only hope that our concerns and worries prove groundless.94  
 
Additionally, several concerns on making the chief of the General Staff responsible 
to the Ministry of National Defense have been voiced as well, such as the question of 
whether such legal reforms carry the risk of politicizing the Turkish Armed Forces 
and making it ineffectual, in view of Turkey’s past experiences.  
 
Addressing the remaining point of concerns voiced by the EU, General Büyükanıt 
said in 2006 that the current practices are in line with democracy and the supremacy 
of civilian authority.95 Accordingly, the legal arrangements firstly stipulate that the 
promotion of national security is the responsibility of the Council of Ministers, which 
is accountable to Parliament, and for this reason, according to Article 117/4 of the 
Constitution, the chief of the General Staff is responsible to the prime minister.96 
Second, the role and the responsibilities of the military, including the issues of 
accountability and transparency, are clearly defined in the Constitution and related 
current laws.97 In this respect, during the preparation of annual budgets, the related 
state institutions oversee military expenditures and the process is clearly explained in 
applicable regulations.98 Finally, the General Staff underlines that the Armed Forces’ 
main responsibility as defined by law is protecting the Republic and safeguarding the 
                                                 
94 Cited in (Heper, 2005a: 38). See also “Alpogan, AB üyesi iki ülkede Türkiye’dekine benzeyen 
yapıda MGK olduğunu söyledi” (Alpogan said in two EU countries there are similar structures to 
NSC in Turkey), Milliyet, December 1, 2004. 
 
95  The speech of General Yaşar Büyükanıt in the opening of the 2006-2007 academic year of Military 
Academies on October 2, 2006. 
 
96 See also the speech of General Yaşar Büyükanıt in the opening of the 2006-2007 academic year of 
Military Academies on October 2, 2006. 
 
97 See also the speech of Deputy Chief of the General Staff İlker Başbuğ on July 8, 2004. 
 
98 The speech of General Yaşar Büyükanıt in the opening of the 2006-2007 academic year of Military 
Academies on October 2, 2006. 
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secular democratic regime, and that fulfilling these functions with due respect to the 
rule of law does not constitute involvement in politics.99 In this connection, former 
Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Özkök once said, “Turkey should reform its legal 
system to conform to the EU criteria without ignoring the republican characteristics 
of its state.”100
 
In conclusion, Turkey’s EU accession process has resulted in comprehensive legal 
reforms in the area of civil-military relations. Despite institutional constraints, 
domestic actors approved the legal reforms in order to integrate Turkey closer to the 
EU. However, from 2003 onwards the EU reports have demonstrated a clear shift 
from formal, legal aspects of institutional reforms to more substantial aspects, such 
as policy change and the internalization of political reforms. The formal aspects of 
institutional change explored so far are expected to “spillover” into policy processes 
and informal institutional structures. The following chapters undertake the analysis 
of these two aspects of change triggered by Turkey’s EU accession process. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 See “Org. Büyükanıt: Cumhuriyeti korumak siyaset değil görev” (Protecting the Republic isn’t 
politics, it’s a duty), Milliyet, August 29, 2006, and “Orgeneral İlker Başbuğ: İrticai tehdit kaygı verici 
boyutlarda” (Reactionary threat is at worrying dimensions), Radikal, September 26, 2006. See also the 
retirement speech of the Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Özkök on August 28, 2006. 
 
100 Cited in (Heper, 2005a: 39-40). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
EUROPEANIZATION AND POLICY CHANGE: DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
 
 
This chapter analyzes the impact of the EU’s political conditionality on policy 
change in the area of civil-military relations in Turkey. The first section explores the 
evolution of policy structures related to civil-military relations from a historical 
perspective. The second section focuses on policy Europeanization. These policies 
include approximation of domestic policy formulation as well as alignment of 
foreign policy. The underlying reason for this structure is that, first, the EU’s 
conditionality for membership proposes the approximation of domestic policymaking 
with the “best practice” in member states.101 This includes strengthening civilian 
policy competencies and finding civilian solutions to domestic policy problems. 
Second, political conditionality covers foreign policy alignment along the EU’s 
common policies and policy guidelines. These include promotion of peaceful 
relations with neighboring countries, alignment with the European Security and 
Defense Policy, and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem. These issues are 
                                                 
101 In terms of domestic policy issues, the EU proposes the approximation of policy formulation in the 
area of civil-military relations with the “best practice” in the member states, because internal security 
and defense requirements differ from one country to another. The common ground is the assertion of 
civilian initiative in the formulation of these domestic policies. However, relating to foreign policy 
issues, the EU specifies alignment with its common foreign and security policies in the area in which 
both Turkey and the EU have comparable concerns.  
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components of Turkey’s national security policy, an area where the EU sees 
considerable military influence. The overall aim of the chapter is to test whether the 
civilian authority in the formulation of these policies has been further strengthened 
during Turkey’s EU membership process (1999-2006). 
 
 
4.1 The Evolution of Policymaking Patterns: From “Intervention” Towards 
“Non-Intervention”  
 
Viewed historically, an evolution of the military’s policy styles can be seen from 
direct intervention in politics towards non-intervention. A ruling style as the “product 
of Turkey’s specific cultural, social and institutional context” has been influential in 
the evolution of patterns of civil-military relations (Narlı, 2000: 119). Three main 
legacies are influential in shaping the policies of the military. The first is the 
Ottoman legacy, against which the military has developed a “mentality of 
modernization and Westernization,” as well as the “Young Turks tradition” from 
which military reformism in politics is inherited (Harris, 1988; Turfan, 2000). The 
second is the legacy of victory in the Turkish War of Independence, which provided 
legitimacy to the military in the eyes of the Turkish people as the founders of modern 
Turkey (Knoonings and Kruijt, 2002; Güney, 2002a: 163). The third is the legacy of 
Kemalist policies, which provided the military with a normative basis centered on the 
principles of secularism, democracy and integrity of the Turkish Republic (Hale, 
1988: 160).  
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During the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of a modern 
Turkish nation-state, the function ascribed to the military was that of being the 
driving force of policies of modernization conceived as Westernization (Heper, 
2005a; Hale, 1996).102 The army had a central role throughout the Ottoman Empire, 
and particularly the 19th century onwards. It was one of the main state loci supporting 
and initiating modernizing reforms in order to establish a modern independent 
nation-state modeled on its European counterparts for the sake of international 
recognition (Harris, 1988; Hale, 1996). The Republic of Turkey was founded upon 
the norms and principles of the Kemalist elites, who won the national struggle of 
independence against foreign invaders as well as the old regime. The military’s 
support for Kemalist policies strengthened its role in the polity. Therefore, the 
Kemalist heritage forms the foundation of the mentality of the Turkish Armed Forces 
and remains influential in military policies. Kemalist policies aimed at the political 
modernization of relations between the state and society by extending reforms to the 
civilian sphere (Mardin, 2002). Kemalist thought provided the foundation for a 
project of political modernity aimed at creating a nation-state in which the ideals of 
an imperial, Islamic state were replaced by the principle of secularism and the people 
were unified under Turkish national identity. The reforms initiated during this period 
laid the basis for policies meant to sustain Republican principles.103  
 
                                                 
102 The modernization process in the empire first started in these institutions, such as developing 
military-bureaucratic professionalism with regard to conjunctural changes as well as technological 
developments (Heper and Evin, 1988). 
 
103 As an integral part of reform policies, the six principles of the Republic were republicanism, 
nationalism, étatism, secularism, populism and reformism. For a chronology and detailed information 
of reforms initiated in the early Republican period (1920-1946), see Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Speech 
(October 15-20, 1927), İnönü (2006 ed.), Tunaya (2002), and Özerdim (1974). 
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During Turkey’s modernization process, the principle of secular democracy and the 
conception of nation and state as indivisible elements of the Republic came to 
constitute the main norms to be upheld (Mardin, 2002). Democracy was seen as an 
integral part of Westernization, one whose institutions would be established to 
progressively mediate national sovereignty and ensure civilian rule (Rustow, 1988). 
To this end, Atatürk and İnönü highlighted the importance of separating civilian and 
military institutional functions for the purpose of strengthening military 
professionalism and effectiveness in all defense- and security-related functions 
(Heper and Güney, 2000: 195; Karaosmanoğlu, 1993). The transition to multiparty 
politics in 1945 was a demonstration of the state elites’ commitment to a functioning 
democracy on the model of European states. İnönü, as the chairman of the 
Republican People’s Party, characterized multiparty politics as the opposition’s 
“freedom to debate and challenge any of the principles of the ruling party”, excepting 
“the Kemalist tenets of republicanism and secularism” (Karpat, 1988: 138). 
 
However, during this period, the Republic faced several challenges such as the lack 
of a strong democratic tradition on the model of the West.104 This was a result of the 
longstanding Ottoman mode of governance, as well as the strong influence of Islamic 
tradition as a potential challenge to secularism (Güney, 2002a). Additionally, the 
integration of the center and the periphery presented a challenge for establishing a 
centralized, modern state (Mardin, 2002). These challenges were among the sources 
of several policy problems faced throughout Republican history. The democracy 
conception of the military evolved from this period onwards into a “rational 
                                                 
104 This conception of democracy started to evolve in the late Ottoman era (Heper, 1985). The 
parliamentary model of democracy has its roots in the empire’s first (1876) and second constitutional 
eras (1908). In Western Europe (both on the continent and in Britain), by contrast, parliamentary 
structures had already evolved by the 16th century (Poggi, 1978). 
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democracy” understanding (Heper, 2002a: 139). Under this conception, “political 
actors primarily seek what is best for the country through intelligent and patriotic 
debate for the purpose of deciding upon the best policy option” in which 
responsibilities to the Republic take precedence over responding to particular social 
groups or individual interests – although the former does not necessarily exclude the 
latter (Heper and Güney, 2000: 636).  
 
As explored in the previous chapter, Turkey underwent three military interventions, 
which had important consequences for the evolution of the military’s policy styles. 
Interventions can be considered policy strategies employed by the military to fulfill 
its constitutional functions (Güney, 2002a). The interventions, by reformulating the 
content of national security policy, were central in underlining civilian institutions’ 
lack of initiative in terms of the follow-up and implementation of national policies. 
Thus, viewed from a liberal-democratic perspective, direct military interventions are 
infringements on governmental policies (Kooning and Kruijt, 2000; Cafario, 1998).  
 
By 1983 the Turkish experience demonstrated that there is civilian initiative in 
policymaking in defense and security related matters as well, especially following 
the 1983 election of the Motherland Party (Evin, 1994; Karaosmanoğlu, 2000). 
Despite the military’s continued influence through the NSC, a competent government 
was able to develop economic and social policies and to extend its area of 
competence from domestic and foreign policy to defense and security policy-related 
matters as well, including overview of the defense budget (Evin, 1994; Karabelias, 
1999). In terms of domestic policy issues, the military held back from involving itself 
in areas that fell under the competencies of civilian institutions (Hale, 1996: 248). 
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Civil-military relations appeared to have normalized by the mid-1990s. The military 
attitude towards democracy, such as the political responsiveness of political elites to 
various social groups, softened (Heper and Güney, 2000: 139). However, the early 
1990s was also an era marked by the rise of ethnic nationalism and political Islam, 
both of which gradually came to be considered major challenges to the integrity of 
the nation and the secular-democratic order of the Republic (Özbudun, 2000; Aydın 
and Keyman, 2004). These developments dramatically affected Turkish political and 
social life. The rise of radical religiously oriented political parties and social 
movements, of Kurdish separatism and PKK terrorism, and of nationalism in the 
form of exclusionism in several sectors of Turkish society were factors that raised 
concerns within the military (Güney, 2002a; Karaosmanoğlu, 2000).  
 
At the February 28, 1997 meeting of the NSC, concerns were communicated to the 
Council of Ministers about rising threats to the secular-democratic order, while 
emphasizing that Article 24 of the Constitution had been violated.105 NSC measures 
resulted in the resignation of the coalition government made up of the Welfare Party 
(Refah Partisi) and the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi). Whether what came to 
be known as the February 28 process can be described as a “postmodern coup,” one 
marking a shift in style of military interventions in governmental policies, is still 
being debated (Güney, 2002a; Moskos and Burk, 1994). The military’s reactions to 
the political events that led to the February 28 process can be considered an 
illustration of just such a shift. In a break with the past, the challenges to the secular-
democratic order of the Turkish Republic were handled without recourse to a direct 
                                                 
105 Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution reads: “No one can exploit or misuse religion, religious feelings 
or things considered religious in whatever form or amount with the aim of making the basic social, 
economic, political or legal order of the state dependent on religious rules for political or personal 
interest or to exert influence.”  
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military coup (Heper and Güney, 2004). The military acted through the NSC by 
persuading governmental actors and gathering support from a significant chunk of 
Turkish society (Bölügiray, 1999: 122).106 Following this period, the military, 
instead of acquiring further institutional competencies as in previous interventions, 
showed its willingness to withdraw from the political arena (Heper, 2005a).  
 
Historically speaking, in Turkey’s case, the policy competencies of the military can 
be seen as the result of the lack of a strong democratic tradition. The problem reveals 
itself in petty party politics, high levels of corruption, and the inability of civilians to 
solve political and economic crises (Güney and Karatekelioğlu, 2005: 443). 
Obviously, it would be unreliable to study Republican history only as the sum of 
policy decisions made by the military. On the contrary, through the existence of a 
parliamentary system, free and fair elections, and the major institutions of the 
Western model of democracy, civilians have been active in the formulation of all 
governmental policies (Hale, 1996). Throughout the Republican experience, civilians 
have acquired considerable power in conducting domestic and foreign policies to the 
extent that they do not conflict with the basic tenets of the Republic. Yet depending 
on the policy issue in question, it may be observed that the military is influential to 
varying degrees, specifically relating to Turkey’s security and defense concerns. The 
next section briefly explores these policy issues in which the military has been 
influential. 
 
 
 
                                                 
106 For a detailed analysis of the February 28, 1997 process, see also Heper and Güney (2004). 
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4.2 Policy Issues: Definition of National Security 
 
Besides a country’s geopolitical location, domestic and international factors are also 
influential in shaping national security and defense policies. The decisions of the 
NSC are made according to the definition of national security.107 The Law on the 
NSC and its Secretariat General (December 9, 1983, No. 2945, Article 2a) defines 
national security as  
the protection and maintenance of the state’s constitutional order, national 
presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interests on an 
international level, and contractual law against any kind of internal and 
foreign threat 108  
 
In Article 2b of the same law, the state’s national security policy is defined as  
the policy covering the principles of the course of internal, external and 
defense actions determined by the Council of Ministers within the views set 
by the NSC with the aim of ensuring national security and achieving national 
objectives. 
 
 
Analysis of the resolutions of the NSC is an important resource for grasping the 
evolution of the content and scope of national security policy. National security 
policy documents are formulated in line with the main parameters of national 
security matters discussed by the NSC.109 Its resolutions are important to the extent 
they have an impact on policymaking. First, NSC resolutions cover a number of 
                                                 
107 Press releases of NSC meetings are available from http://www.mgk.gov.tr (MGK Toplantılarının 
Basın Bildirileri).  
 
108 “The elements of ‘constitutional order, national presence, integrity, national interests and 
contractual law’ defined under national security are among national values of vital importance to the 
State,” see Ministry of National Defense (2000: 12), available from http://www.msb.gov.tr. See for 
further information on the Law: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/kanun.html
 
109 On October 31, 1997 the NSC approved the national security policy document. The document 
includes the threat of separatist and reactionary activities, the threat of political Islam for Turkey, and 
the rise of extreme forms or tendencies within Turkish nationalism. In terms of the country’s foreign 
policy priorities, it covers the strengthening of relations with the Turkic republics, Turkish-Greek 
relations, the perceived threat from Greece and measures to prevent conflict, the goal of Turkey’s 
achieving full EU membership EU, the negative attitude of some governments toward Turkey’s EU 
bid, and the need for increased economic efforts – including privatization – to integrate Turkey with 
the globalizing world.  
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domestic policy issues. Threats to the secular-democratic order, the rise of ethnic 
forms of nationalism and the situation in Turkey’s southeast have been on the NSC’s 
agenda since the 1970s.110 Second, the Cyprus issue and relations with Greece have 
been on the foreign policy agenda for quite a long time, especially since the 1974 
Cyprus crisis (NSC, 1974 and 1987). Foreign policy issues related to relations 
between Turkey and the EC/EU, and NATO, are also set forth as policy objectives. 
Additionally, Turkey’s relations with neighboring countries in the Eastern region 
have also been important items on the national security policy agenda (NSC, 1961-
1990). 
 
From the early Republican era on, Turkey has followed a policy of neutrality and 
peaceful relations with neighboring countries. However, the international 
conjunctures have been influential in shaping Turkey’s policies since then (Hale, 
2003). During the Cold War era, Turkey became a NATO ally, and set the 
foundation of its EC/EU membership objectives. Starting in the 1960s and extending 
to the present, the EC/EU has provided additional impetus for Turkey’s 
modernization and Westernization policies. It is argued in this dissertation that from 
the 1990s onwards policies of modernization have combined with policies of 
Europeanization since the declaration of the Copenhagen criteria for membership and 
particularly since Turkey gained candidate status. This is demonstrated by how 
Turkey’s Western orientation and its aspiration to become an EU member took the 
form of policies of EU harmonization within the framework of the pre-accession 
strategy.  
                                                 
110 Press releases (1970-1998), available from the web page of the NSC: http://www.mgk.gov.tr  
 113
4.3 Turkey’s Compliance with EU Conditionality: Towards Strengthening 
Civilian Authority in Policymaking  
 
This section analyzes policy change along the guidelines of the EU’s political 
conditionality. In Turkey’s case, EU-triggered policy change has occurred through 
the provision of particular policy models, the insistence on specific policy standards, 
and public rhetoric. These include the strengthening of civilian authority in the 
formulation of foreign, security and defense policies. Therefore, policy 
harmonization regarding civil-military relations consists of issues of high politics 
such as those relating to national security policy, an area where the EU sees a direct 
influence from the military. These aspects of change are explored below under the 
sections on domestic policy approximation and foreign policy alignment.  
 
4.3.1 Approximation of Domestic Policy Formulation 
 
Turkey’s civilian authority has increasingly been seen to assert its control over the 
policies of the military. Especially from 2001 to 2006, the passage of major political 
reforms – also referred to as democratization reforms – opened the way for further 
strengthening of civilians’ role in domestic policymaking processes. The following 
parts of this section aim to demonstrate this process of domestic policy change 
through analyzing government and military responses to EU policy guidelines for 
domestic politics. 
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4.3.1.1 EU Policy Guidelines for Domestic Politics 
 
Historically speaking, the EC/EU expressed its opinion on a number of domestic 
policy issues well before the first regular report published at the end of 1998. These 
mainly included concerns about military interventions, as policy strategies to respond 
to domestic problems, from the viewpoint that the policies followed by elected 
representatives were inadequate to meet the country’s needs.111 Meanwhile, both the 
European Parliament (1991, 1992) and European Commission (1989) communicated 
their concerns about the negative consequences for political stability of weak societal 
channels of political participation. In these reports, Turkey’s democracy, rule of law 
and respect for human rights were deemed inadequate.  
 
Following this period, there are three major domestic policy guidelines that can be 
deduced from the official EU reports (1998-2006). (1) Strengthening of civilian 
institutions. These include democratization reforms to increase civilian competencies 
in domestic policymaking. (2) Translating these reforms into policy practices. (3) 
Formulating civilian solutions for domestic policy problems related to national 
security. According to the EU, these policies should be formulated with due respect 
for democracy, human rights and the rule of law.  
  
The first aspect of the political conditionality for the approximation of domestic 
policy structures concerns the adoption and implementation of legal-institutional 
                                                 
111 Following the 1980 coup, the EC decided to freeze the Association Agreement and blocked the 
fourth financial protocol. This signified that during the military regime, policy decisions were not 
legitimate from the perspective of the EC. Relations gradually stabilized after the restoration of a 
civilian government by 1983 and the Turkish application for EU membership in 1987. See the 
introduction to the 1998 European Commission Regular Report, which provides an overview of 
Turkish-EU relations. 
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reforms. Starting with the inclusion of Turkey in the pre-accession strategy, the EU 
progressively provided official guidelines for legal harmonization and institutional 
adaptation. The military dimension of the reform process has been covered above, in 
Chapter 3, under the sections on the NSC and the issue of accountability and 
transparency. Additionally, by the end of 1999, subsequent Turkish governments had 
initiated a series of political reforms towards improving democratic institutions with 
civilian dimensions. These reforms focused on enhancing channels of political 
participation and improving parliamentary oversight over security and defense 
policies. These reform laws passed by Parliament in 2001-2006 are an integral part 
of Turkey’s policies of integration with the European Union. EU harmonization laws 
mediated variables of Europeanization and change in domestic policy processes.  
 
The second aspect of the EU’s political conditionality relates to the implementation 
of legal reforms in the realm of civil-military relations, or the spillover of legal 
changes into policymaking processes. The EU expressed on various platforms that it 
would monitor the extent to which political reforms in Turkey “enhance de facto 
civilian control over the military” (European Commission, 2001). The EU mentioned 
that the military is employing several direct and indirect strategies to exercise 
influence on government policy. In this respect, the military’s influence on 
formulating, coordinating and implementing national security policy was 
emphasized. Additionally, the European Commission said that military members of 
the NSC 
also played an active role in the debate about reforms to comply with the EU 
political criteria. They have been particularly active on issues such as cultural 
rights, education and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish (European 
Commission, 2002).  
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Furthermore, the European Commission (2005) questioned the broad definition of 
national security in Article 2a of the Law on the NSC. It contended that the law 
defines “national security in such broad terms, that it could, if necessary, be 
interpreted as covering almost all policy areas.” In this respect, EU institutions 
stressed the importance of strengthening the hand of civilian institutions in security 
and defense policymaking (European Commission, 2005; European Parliament, 
2004). Similarly, the Accession Partnership document (2006) stated, “it should be 
ensured that civilian authorities fully exercise their supervisory functions, in 
particular as regards the formulation of the national security strategy and its 
implementation.” The EU particularly emphasized the implementation of legal 
reforms towards improving democracy in policymaking processes and further 
civilianization of policy designs within the scope of the national security policy. In 
this connection, the expansion of civilians’ political rights would improve the 
democratic governance of civil-military relations.  
 
The third aspect of the EU’s policy guidelines is related to the improvement of 
domestic institutional capacities toward strengthening democracy and the civilian 
authority in coming up with “civilian solutions” to domestic policy problems 
(European Commission, 1999; European Parliament, 2001). Accordingly, the EU 
proposed several guidelines for the resolution of domestic policy problems back in 
the Agenda 2000 on enlargement, as adopted on July 15, 1997: 
Turkey has a government and Parliament resulting from multi-party 
democracy, democratic elections and an administration capable of framing 
and applying legislation compatible with the acquis communautaire. Despite 
political recognition of the need for improvement and certain recent 
legislative changes, Turkey’s record in upholding the rights of the individuals 
and freedom of expression falls well short of standards in EU.112
                                                 
112 EU views of the situation in southeast Turkey were restated at the April 1997 Turkey-EU 
Association Council. Moreover, the 1998 report raises concerns of excessively broad interpretation of 
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Additionally, the Commission (1998) stated that “Turkey should have no doubt that 
the Union upholds the territorial integrity of Turkey and all countries in the region, 
and condemns terrorism.” It added, however, that “in combating terrorism in the 
southeast, Turkey needs to exercise restraint, to make greater efforts to uphold the 
rule of law and human rights and to find a civil not a military solution” (European 
Commission, 1998).113 The Commission stated that Turkey should  
intensify efforts to develop a comprehensive approach to reduce regional 
disparities, and in particular to improve the situation in the southeast, with a 
view to enhancing economic, social and cultural opportunities for all citizens.  
 
One can infer from these reports that the EU associates these political problems with 
the relative weakness of policy programs designed to reduce sources of inequality 
among citizens, which in turn threaten to deteriorate into illegal activities such as 
terrorism. Furthermore, the Accession Partnership documents (2001, 2003, and 2006) 
emphasized the short- and medium-term need to develop policies aimed at the 
improvement of fundamental rights and liberties, political and civil rights, and the 
rule of law. The improvement of democratic institutions was characterized as a 
component of Turkey’s accession prerequisite as well as a step towards the 
resolution of several internal political problems – to the extent that these would 
provide for the improvement of democratic pluralism, freedom of expression. The 
                                                                                                                                          
the Anti-Terror Law, which concerns crimes against the state, and its national and territorial integrity. 
The law was also criticized for muzzling public criticism of the armed forces. It was argued that to 
some extent the law contradicts the principle of freedom of expression, so long as it is non-violent. 
Thus, the law was seen as restricting political participation despite the 1995 constitutional 
amendments, which aimed at strengthening the fundamental rights of citizens of the Republic. See the 
Regular Report of the European Commission, 1998. 
 
113 The report (1998) mentions that “a civil, non-military solution must be found to the situation in the 
southeastern Turkey, particularly since many of the violations of civil and political rights observed in 
the country seems to be connected in one way or another with this issue,” such as the impact of the 
then state of emergency on daily life for all citizens in these provinces, with consequences for the 
restrictions of the political rights of citizens in general. The European Commission back in 1998 
proposed in this connection that a civilian solution might include “the recognition of certain Kurdish 
cultural identity and greater tolerance of the ways of expressing that identity, provided that it does not 
advocate separatism or terrorism.” 
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EU’s policy approach was that in addition to strengthening the political, civil, 
economic and social rights enjoyed by all Turkey’s citizens, the expansion of cultural 
rights would help resolve potential internal security problems. The EU also stated 
that freedom of expression should be guaranteed, so long as it is both non-violent and 
does not support acts of terrorism. The EU emphasized that it would support 
democratization efforts through providing technical and financial assistance. 
 
In sum, the assertion of civilian initiatives in policymaking concerning matters of 
national security and defense is the most important component of the political 
conditionality in the area of civil-military relations. The main mechanism through 
which policy Europeanization occurs is the process of approximation of policies at 
the national level with the policy guidelines provided by the EU.114
 
4.3.1.2 Government Policies 
 
Government policies towards strengthening the civilian authority constitute a central 
plank of improving democratic governance of civil-military relations within the 
context of Turkey’s Europeanization process. As an integral part of Turkey’s policy 
of integration with EU, subsequent governments addressed all three aspects of the 
EU’s political conditionality discussed above.  
 
Under the 1999-2002 coalition government of the Democratic Left Party, Nationalist 
Action Party and Motherland Party, a series of democratization reforms was passed 
                                                 
114 Common policy issues are also discussed on several platforms such as the Joint Parliamentary 
Commission and the Turkey-EU Association Council (i.e. which met in April 2002) in which 
Turkey’s progress in meeting the Copenhagen political criteria – in particular in the area of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms – is discussed. Additionally, there have also been exchanges of 
views on the Cyprus issue, the peaceful settlement of border disputes, and the fight against terrorism. 
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by Parliament. These reforms addressed the expansion of citizens’ rights and liberties 
provided by the Constitution. Turkey’s candidacy process, which started in 
December 1999, legitimated the government’s reformist policies. EU policy rhetoric 
empowered the arguments of reform-oriented elites.115 Despite objections from the 
Nationalist Action Party, abolition of the death penalty and changes to the law on 
learning and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish were approved by 
Parliament.116 In the words of then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, “Turkey has no 
alternative besides the EU.” The coalition government under the prime minister 
affirmed that Turkey was committed to following policies of integration with the 
EU.117 The National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis adopted in March 
2001 contained most of the policy priorities, particularly in connection to 
strengthening democracy, the rule of law and the improvement of fundamental rights 
and liberties, as defined in the Accession Partnership (2001).  
 
Following the November 2002 general elections, which toppled the coalition in an 
election upset, the new government of the Justice and Development Party reasserted 
Turkey’s commitment to democratization along with its EU membership process.118 
In this period, the European Council’s decision to give a date to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey not later than 2004 reinforced the credibility of its EU 
membership hopes. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the ruling party leader who would later 
become prime minister, stated on December 14, 2002 that 
                                                 
115 Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, “EU seeks to see Turkish democratic reforms on ground,” Turkish Daily 
News, September 21, 2001. 
 
116 “The Battle Lines in Turkey,” The Economist, January 13, 2001. 
 
117 For a detailed analysis of the 1999-2002 period, see Cem (2005).  
 
118 “Gül: AB reformlarında kararlıyız” (Gül: We’re determined on EU reforms), Hürriyet, May 20, 
2003, and “Murat Sungar: AB’den Başka seçenek yok” (Murat Sungar: There is no option besides the 
EU), Hürriyet, May 8, 2003. Murat Sungar was then secretary general for EU affairs. 
 120
Turkey has devoted considerable efforts on the way toward EU membership. 
Impressive constitutional reforms have been done. Turkey will continue to 
take decisive steps concerning EU membership. The majority in Turkey 
wants to reach the level of contemporary civilization, while preserving their 
own values. The Copenhagen summit decision provides Turkey with an 
opportunity to acquire more democracy.119  
 
Therefore, the government conceived of Turkey’s EU membership process as a 
valuable contribution to the strengthening of democratic structures in Turkey. In this 
period, sweeping reforms, such as the seventh EU harmonization package, were 
approved by Parliament. Additionally, the revised version of the National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis was agreed upon in July 2003, stating 
that 
Accession to the European Union is the principal project that will carry 
Turkey to its goal of prosperity. Turkey’s aim of integration with the 
European Union is a social reform project that will affect both the present 
and the future of every citizen … Every political, legal, economic or social 
reform on the path to membership, whilst increasing the living standards of 
the individual, also increases international economic influence, democratic 
respectability, and the security of the country, in line with international 
standards.  
  
The political reforms aimed at strengthening democracy and civilian authority are 
part of the government’s policies.120 These cover increased legal protection in the 
areas of freedom of thought, expression and communication, prevention of torture, 
freedom of individual security, and freedom of association. Political reforms are 
major mechanisms in the approximation of domestic policy structures in line with the 
                                                 
119 Erdoğan was initially unable to take the premiership due to a political ban which was overturned in 
early 2003, and he became prime minister that March (current President of the Republic Abdullah Gül 
served as prime minister from November 2002 until then). Erdoğan’s speeches (2002-2007) are 
available at the Justice and Development party website, http://www.akparti.org.tr (archives). 
(“Türkiye AB yolunda çok ciddi bir gayret sarfetti. AB üyesi ülkeleri bile şoke edecek Anayasa 
değişiklikleri yapıldı. Türkiye AB üyeliği konusunda karalı adımlar atmaya devam edecektir. 
Türkiye’nin çoğunluğu kendi değerlerini koruyarak çağdaşlaşmak istiyor. Türkiye, Kopenhag 
Zirvesi’nden çıkan kararla daha çok demokrasi elde etme olanağıyla karşı karşıyadır.”) 
 
120 Detailed information about these legal reforms can be retrieved from “Political Reforms in Turkey” 
published by the Directorate for Political Affairs of the Secretariat General for EU Affairs, available at 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr. See also the 1982 Constitution (December 2006 edition) for in-depth details 
on constitutional amendments within the framework of EU harmonization laws. Also available at 
http://www.belgenet.com/yasa
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priorities of Accession Partnership documents. These reforms complement legal-
institutional change regarding the military as listed in Chapter 3, Table 2.  
 
The reform policies adopted at the governmental level are a demonstration of the 
broad-based political will for EU membership in Turkey.121 There has been 
considerable support from major civil society groups.122 The 2004 European 
Commission report also affirmed that there has been a strong consensus between the 
ruling party (the Justice and Development Party) and the main opposition (the 
Republican People’s Party) on the policy of pursuing EU accession, meaning that 
many EU-related reforms have been adopted by a large majority.123  
 
In this connection, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated, “Turkey will become a civilized 
country to the extent these reforms are internalized.”124 Here, the prime minister’s 
policy rhetoric is in conformity with the EU’s regular reports, which emphasize the 
substantiation of legal reforms by institutional practices. The prime minister also 
repeatedly emphasized that the Copenhagen criteria were being adopted so as to 
improve the quality of life of Turkish citizens and not necessarily solely for the EU 
to accept Turkey as a member state.125 According to him, these criteria could also be 
referred to as the “Ankara criteria.” Meanwhile, then Foreign Minister (and future 
                                                 
121 Cited from the Secretariat General For EU Affairs (June 2004). 
 
122 “Sivil Girişim: Şimdi Sıra AB’de” (Civil Initiative: Now it’s the EU’s turn), Hürriyet, October 7, 
2002. 
 
123 “Baykal: AB için her adım atılmalı” (Baykal: All steps should be taken for the EU), Hürriyet, May 
20, 2003. 
 
124 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan speech on December 17, 2002. 
 
125 “Türkiye’ye müzakere tarihi verilmeyişi çifte standartın ta kendisidir!” Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s 
speech on December 9, 2002, and “Dünya Habercileri İstanbul Buluşması” Prime Minister’s speech 
on November 3, 2006. 
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president) Abdullah Gül, as a demonstration of the continuance of pre-existing 
Turkish foreign policy under their government, stated that Turkey would continue 
with great decisiveness the political and economic reforms.126 He argued that these 
reforms were in the interest of the people.127  
 
To follow up the implementation of legal reforms and coordination of EU affairs, 
administrative units were established, such as the General Secretariat for EU Affairs, 
and EU units in public institutions. The Interior and Justice Ministries distributed 
circulars to ensure effective implementation of the legal reforms.128 Ali Babacan, 
then minister of state responsible for the economy and chief EU negotiator, stated 
that all administrative units should cooperate in the EU harmonization process and 
increase institutional capacities to adopt the EU acquis.129 The government’s strong 
commitment to implement Turkey’s policies of integration with the EU was also 
demonstrated by Gül and Babacan’s declaration on “Turkey’s program for 
harmonization with the EU acquis.” The declaration was made in response to a 
slowdown in the negotiation processes in late 2006 due to problems arising from the 
Cyprus issue. At an April 2007 press briefing, the foreign minister declared that the 
government had prepared a road map for the reforms needed by Turkey. He said the 
road map was the result of cooperation with 130 civil society groups and 200 public 
                                                 
126 “Türkiye’nin yolu bellidir, bu yolda ilerlemek kendi halkımızın çıkarına olduğu için ilerliyoruz,” 
speech of then Prime Minister Abdullah Gül on December 14, 2002. 
 
127 “Türkiye’nin yolu bellidir, bu yolda ilerlemek kendi halkımızın çıkarına olduğu için ilerliyoruz,” 
speech of then Prime Minister Abdullah Gül on December 14, 2002. 
  
128 Cited from the Foreign Ministry Secretariat General for EU Affairs Directorate for Political 
Affairs. June 2004. Political Reforms in Turkey. Available from http://www.abgs.gov.tr
 
129 “Hayırlı Yolculuklar,” Radikal, October 13, 2005. 
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institutions, including the chief of the General Staff.130 Following the declaration, 
Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that it was in the interest of the Turkish people that 
the reform process, along the lines of the EU’s conditionality for membership, go 
forward whether the EU accepts Turkey or not.131  
 
The reform process demonstrates a clear shift in government policies in terms of 
prioritizing Turkey’s democratization process on the way toward integration with the 
EU. Domestic actors’ cost/benefit analysis of compliance with EU policy design has 
been a determining factor of change. Projected benefits of EU membership won over 
the domestic costs of compliance. In this context, the EU’s conditionality empowered 
the arguments of reform-oriented sectors of political society by altering opportunity 
structures and expectations, and provided a legitimate basis for new domestic policy 
preferences.  
 
However, several aspects of the reform policies are still widely contested in 
Turkey.132 Although European integration provides for additional opportunity 
structures through political reforms, domestic political actors are still constrained by 
the prevailing policy structures in which they operate. For instance, the government, 
opposition party and civil society organizations have not yet reached agreement on 
changes to controversial Article 301 of the Penal Code so as to improve legal 
                                                 
130 “AB’ye Uyum Programı’yla Günlük Hayat Değişecek” (With the EU reform program, daily life 
will change), Milliyet, April 18, 2007. 
 
131 “AB’ye ister alsınlar ister almasınlar yolumuza devam edeceğiz” (Whether they let us in or not, we 
will continue), Milliyet, April 23, 2007.  
 
132 For further analysis of political cleavages regarding Turkey’s EU membership, see Avcı (2003). 
 
 124
protection for freedom of expression.133 Additionally, in 2002-2006, there were 
several instances of disagreement between the opposition Republican People’s Party 
and ruling Justice and Development Party over whether some of the reforms would 
weaken Turkey’s fight against terrorism, increase the potential threat of political 
Islam to the secular-democratic regime, or harm Turkey’s national security interests 
in the region.134 However, according to the government, democracy and security are 
complementary issues. In 2004 then Foreign Minister Gül argued that “freedom and 
democracy cannot be experienced if there is no security. Democracy and the fight 
against terrorism are not mutually exclusive, they are complementary.”135 Therefore, 
according to the government, the improvement of democratic institutions could 
possibly solve domestic policy problems and facilitate Turkey’s EU membership bid.  
 
 
4.3.1.3 Military Policies 
 
Turkey’s policy objective of integration with the EC/EU is one of the major reasons 
for changes in the policy styles of the military, such as their relations with the 
civilian authority and their perspectives on policy solutions to domestic political 
problems. To begin with, by 1999, mounting a direct military coup had become a less 
feasible option for the military. Supporting the argument, when asked in an interview 
                                                 
133 “Erdoğan: 301 için somut öneri gelirse, biz gereğini yaparız” (If there is a concrete proposition for 
301, we will do what is necessary), ABHaber, October 5, 2006. 
 
134 “CHP Genel Başkanı Baykal, Milliyet’in Sorularını Yanıtladı” (CHP leader Baykal Speaks to 
Milliyet), Milliyet daily newspaper, May 24, 2007, and “CHP Genelsekreter Yardımcısı Hacaloğlu: 
AB Projesi, AKP’nin Tek Başına Taşıyamayacağı Kadar Büyük ve Önemli bir Projedir” (The EU 
project is a great, important project which cannot be undertaken by the JDP single-handedly), June 8, 
2006. 
 
135 “Gül: Geriye gidiş yaşanmaz,” Radikal, April 19, 2004. (“Güvenliğin olmadığı yerde özgürlük ve 
demokrasinin tadını tadamazsınız. Demokrasi ve terörle mücadele, birbirleriyle zıt değil, birbirini 
tamamlayıcı şeyler.”) 
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how he sees the need for change in Turkey to gain EU membership, General Çevik 
Bir stated, “The military officers say, ‘There will be no interventions’ – isn’t that a 
change?”136  
 
In the years since Turkey was made an EU membership candidate, the military has 
given considerable support to the government’s policies of harmonizing domestic 
structures with EU structures. The military sees EU membership as an extension of 
Turkey’s policies of modernization and Westernization. The Turkish General Staff 
has declared that EU membership is an instrument that will help realize the national 
objectives set by Atatürk, namely “to reach the level of contemporary 
civilization.”137 However, the institution adds that the EU’s bid to become a global 
power would also benefit from Turkey’s membership.138 Speaking to a Greek 
newspaper, former Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Özkök said: 
The Turkish Armed Forces fully supports the reforms undertaken by Turkey 
within the framework of the Copenhagen criteria on the way towards 
Turkey’s EU membership … The Turkish military believes that Turkey’s EU 
membership will strengthen the social state, economic development and 
quality of life.139 Democracy is the only thing Turkey needs. I believe that 
our country, through democracy, will grow stronger in the region, and 
democratization efforts will continue.140  
 
                                                 
136 Ferai Tınç, “Artık Darbe Yok” (No more military coups), Hürriyet, November 1-3, 1999. 
 
137 “Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Basını Bilgilendirme Toplantısı” (Press briefing by the Turkish General 
Staff), November 2, 2004. 
 
138 “Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Basını Bilgilendirme Toplantısı” (Press briefing by the Turkish General 
Staff), November 2, 2004. 
 
139 “Özkök’ün sözleri 8. uyum paketi sayılır” (The words of Özkök count as the eight harmonization 
package). Retrieved June 29, 2006 from http://www.tumgazeteler.com/fc/ln.cgi?cat=33&a=192750 
(“TSK Türkiye’nin AB üyeliği yolunda Kopenhag kriterleri çerçevesinde gerçekleştirilen reformlara 
tam destek vermektedir … Türk ordusu, Türkiye’nin AB üyeliğinin sosyal devletin güçlenmesini, 
ekonomik kalkınmayı, yaşam seviyesinin ve kalitesinin artmasını sağlayacağı inancındadır”) 
 
140 “Tek ihtiyaç demokrasi” (The only need is democracy), Milliyet, August 25, 2006. 
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Therefore, according to the military, Turkey’s policies of EU integration will in the 
long run bring benefits such as socioeconomic development, improved democracy, 
and a strengthening of Turkey’s security in the region. 
 
However, the military did raise several concerns, principally on proposed reforms 
such as the Law on Foreign Education and the Learning of Different Languages and 
Dialects by Turkish Citizens, and the Law on the Establishment of Radio and 
Television Enterprises, arguing that these could weaken national unity.141 Equally 
importantly, the military approved of democratization packages to the extent that 
they conformed to the principle of secularism set forth in the Constitution. The 
military’s reservations came from concerns of the possible weakening of Turkey in 
its “struggle against the ‘lingering’ twin threats of political Islam and Kurdish 
separatism” (Heper, 2005a: 38). In April 2002, then Chief of the General Staff 
Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu said this about Turkish-EU relations: 
The armed forces do not discuss the issue of whether Turkey should enter the 
EU. Membership in the EU will ensure many benefits for Turkey. Turkey 
wants to increase its welfare, and this could be much easier in the EU. The 
Turkish people and bureaucracy will gain discipline and dynamism, and have 
to comply with some rules. However, what we say is that the critical position 
of Turkey, the geostrategic position of Turkey that always creates problems, 
should be taken into consideration as membership efforts are made. Do not 
ignore the secular character and unitary structure of Turkey. These are the 
main principles of the Republic of Turkey. Numerous freedoms will be 
available if Turkey becomes a member of the EU, but these should not 
violate democracy and human rights.142  
 
Therefore, the military supports the political reforms adopted by the government 
because it views these reforms as steps towards integrating Turkey closer to the EU. 
But it also expresses several sensitivities concerning the preservation of national 
                                                 
141 “Copenhagen criteria and the attitude of the TSK,” Turkish Daily News, June 24, 2000. 
 
142 “Gen. Kıvrıkoğlu blasts Erdoğan,” Turkish Daily News, April 25, 2002. 
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unity along a secular-democratic identity. Later evaluations made by the chief of the 
General Staff reflect similar concerns. Firstly, the military argued,  
secularism is the driving force behind the development of Turkish 
democracy. Yet any attempt at transforming the Republic into a moderate 
Islamic state will be opposed by the nation. The success of democratization 
in the region is dependent on domestic political initiatives.143  
 
The commitment of the Justice and Development Party government to the principle 
of secularism continues to be questioned in Turkey. However, the military’s stand 
can be argued to have softened compared to past experiences, when such reservations 
were often accompanied by the closure of political parties. According to former 
Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Özkök, “the nation is the guarantee of 
secularism.”144  
 
Additionally, the military is committed to the constitutional principle that “the 
Turkish State, with its territory and nationhood, is an indivisible entity” and “the 
people of Turkey who founded the Turkish Republic are called the Turkish 
nation.”145 In an April 2005 speech, Özkök expressed the military’s concerns that the 
PKK exploits the Kurdish issue in order to reach its separatist goals:  
The terror organization, which aims to damage the unitary structure of the 
Republic of Turkey, in addition to its armed struggle, has started to look for 
other ways to reach its aim … they have exploited the favorable atmosphere 
created by the democratic steps taken by our country in the process of EU 
accession and carried the issue which they call “the Kurdish question” to the 
EU platform. As a result of these initiatives, the organization tries to impose 
its demands for cultural rights via the EU ... and gradually increases its 
political demands.146  
                                                 
143 The speech given by the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Hilmi Özkök at the 
Turkish War Colleges on April 20, 2005. 
 
144 “Laikliğin garantisi ulustur” (The nation is the guarantee of secularism), Milliyet, August 29, 2006. 
 
145 The speech given by the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Hilmi Özkök at the 
Turkish War Colleges on April 20, 2005. 
 
146 The speech given by the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Hilmi Özkök at the 
Turkish War Colleges on April 20, 2005. 
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The military has had reservations about several policies relating to the expansion of 
group rights, arguing that these could give rise to the disintegration of Turkey along 
lines of ethnic differences.147 However, the military also started to emphasize the 
need to differentiate between the Kurdish issue and PKK terrorism. It refers to the 
need to enhance civilian, humanitarian solutions to protect the people in the region 
from political violence and terrorism.148 Indeed, Deputy Chief of the General Staff 
İlker Başbuğ stated that it is crucial to differentiate between the people in the region 
and PKK terrorists.149 He emphasized the need for spelling out the reasons behind 
participation in the terrorist organization supporting ethnic nationalism and 
advocating separatism.150 However, he added that that as long as terrorist activities 
continue in the region, security forces will continue to take measures to combat 
terrorism, by force if necessary.151 Equally importantly, the military designed 
socioeconomic development projects to improve the situation in the southeast.152 
                                                 
147 “Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Basını Bilgilendirme Toplantısı” (Press briefing by the Turkish General 
Staff), November 2, 2004. 
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152  “Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Basın Toplantısı” (Press Briefing by the Turkish General Staff), 
February 27, 2004. See also “2000 Yılı İç Güvenlik Harekatı Değerlendirmesi” (Evaluation of Year 
2000 Internal Security Operation), report issued by the Turkish General Staff on December 7, 2000. 
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This conforms to EU policy guidelines to solve the problem. In several press 
briefings, the Turkish General Staff spoke about socioeconomic measures meant to 
improve the situation in Turkey’s east and southeast.153 Additionally, at a May 2002 
NSC meeting, the council decided to lift the state of emergency from the southeast 
regions.154 These developments demonstrate a shift in policy styles. Turkey’s EU 
membership process is one of the factors that mediated this change.  
 
A final issue is the EU’s concerns about the military’s influence in the conduct of 
national security policy. In a February 2003 press release, the Turkish General Staff 
declared that  
the Turkish Armed Forces has always refrained from action that would 
influence the “will” of Parliament, but when deemed necessary conveys its 
views on legitimate platforms.155  
 
Procedurally, in accordance with the 2001 and 2003 reforms, the government is 
entitled to consider NSC recommendations to the extent it deems essential for 
Turkey’s security and defense. Therefore, the military is consulted on matters of 
security and defense, but the final authority resides in civilian authority. These issues 
are open to public information and debate through press releases and briefings. The 
military’s major sensitivity on this issue is summed up in a recent speech at the War 
Academies. Chief of the General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt stated, “protection of the 
Republic cannot be considered involvement in politics, it is a legal responsibility,” 
                                                 
153 “Bölücü Terörle Mücadelede İçinde Bulunulan Sürecin Değerlendirilmesi Toplantısı” (Assessment 
Meeting on the Fight Against Separatist Terror), press briefing by the Turkish General Staff on July 
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154 In May 2002, the NSC recommended lifting the state of emergency in the southeastern provinces 
by the end of the year.  
 
155 Press release by the Turkish General Staff.  
Retrieved October 26, 2006 from http://www.tsk.mil.tr/basac/2003/a04.htm  
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and that the military’s reservations are confined to the essentials of national 
security.156 The national security policy document, which the NSC agreed to in 
October 2005, among several issues relating to national security such as the fight 
against terrorism and the preservation of the secular-democratic regime, covers the 
centrality of safeguarding national interests during the process of EU accession 
negotiations, referring in particular to the Cyprus issue.157 The government’s position 
is that civil authority rules and all institutions should confine themselves to the limits 
of their constitutional functions.158  
 
These developments demonstrate that in their public rhetoric, both the military and 
government increasingly refer to the EU’s concerns about the military’s influence on 
policy, and state that the civilian authority has the final word concerning all policy 
decisions. In this respect, it is fair to say that military and government policies are 
becoming aligned with the EU’s political conditionality. Furthermore, in almost all 
of the policy cases studied above, the military has complied with the government’s 
decisions. 
 
4.3.2 Foreign Policy Alignment 
 
Foreign policy alignment is an integral part of the EU’s enlargement strategy. The 
EU, in line with the pre-accession strategy, has expressed at various times how 
important it is that Turkey “continues to align its foreign policy objectives with the 
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EU’s common foreign and security policy structures” (European Commission, 2004). 
This section analyzes the process of foreign policy alignment by demonstrating the 
extent to which the civilian authority (that is, the government) has asserted control in 
the formulation of these foreign policy matters.  
 
There are three main foreign policy issues that the EU refers to within the framework 
of Turkey’s closer integration. The first is improving regional peace, cooperation, 
and stability through the promotion of peaceful relations with neighboring countries 
(European Council, 2001). The second concerns the establishment of enhanced 
political dialogue between Turkey and the EU relating to the European Security and 
Defense Policy (European Commission, 2001). Finally, peaceful settlement of the 
Cyprus issue is stated as a policy priority in the Accession Partnership documents 
(2001, 2003, and 2006). These issues are addressed while taking into consideration 
Turkey’s geopolitical location. Foreign policy matters listed in EU reports such as 
relations with neighboring countries, the European Security and Defense Policy, and 
the centrality of the Cyprus issue also appear as top priorities on the policy agenda of 
the government and the NSC.159 The EU, in this connection, specifies the importance 
of the assertion of civilian control in the formulation of these policies. 
 
4.3.2.1 Promoting Peaceful Relations with Neighboring Countries 
 
Turkey’s uneasy relations with Greece in the Aegean and with several countries in 
the Middle Eastern region such as Syria, Iran, and Iraq have influenced EU 
considerations about the extent to which Turkey’s security problems will be brought 
                                                 
159 Foreign policy issues within the framework of Turkish-EU relations are available from, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr. Press releases of NSC meetings (1997-2007) are available from 
http://www.mgk.gov.tr   
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under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) umbrella in case of full 
membership (Müftüler-Baç, 2000a). By the end of 1999, Turkish governments had 
started to deepen policy alignment with the CFSP. In this respect, the promotion of 
peaceful relations with neighboring countries, while preserving national security 
interests, was a priority policy issue. Turkey has been committed to relatively 
compatible goals throughout Republican history (Sander, 1998). Furthermore, there 
is the long-declared national goal of Turkey’s inclusion in the Western community of 
developed democracies. These led to the evolution of foreign policies meant to 
maintain multidimensional relations with major global actors and a foreign policy 
emphasis on international cooperation (Hale, 2003a: 110).  
 
In the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, political circumstances changed. The 
restructuring of NATO160, and the deepening of European political integration 
following the 1993 Treaty on European Union, have deeply impacted Turkey’s 
geopolitics. The assertion of Turkey’s new role in Western security and defense 
structure became a main policy question due to the country’s geostrategic location 
(Müftüler-Baç, 2001). However, Europe’s deepening political integration and 
enlargement policies have also brought new challenges for Turkey. These challenges 
sprang from Turkey’s quest for EU membership, which necessitated improving 
democratic institutions while responding to potential domestic and foreign security 
challenges defined in national security policy. Among several domestic political 
reasons, the lack of a clear European perspective on Turkey’s prospective 
membership has been a major factor constraining reformist domestic actors (Uğur, 
1999; Tocci, 2004). In 1997, the exclusion of Turkey from the new wave of 
                                                 
160 For detailed information on the restructuring of NATO, see Williams (2002:45). 
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enlargement while, by contrast, Central Eastern European countries and especially 
Cyprus were admitted, led to questioning of the role attributed to Turkey in European 
foreign and security policy structures (Bilgin, 2003). A series of political dialogues 
between Turkey and the EU resulted in the 1999 Helsinki decision to grant Turkey 
membership candidacy. This has been an important factor pushing the foreign policy 
alignment favored by Turkey’s political elites. As explored in the previous section, in 
the 1990s an ever-growing emphasis on respect for human rights as a norm for 
international recognition also gradually become an integral part of Turkey’s policies 
in the context of EU integration (Hale, 2003b). For the purpose of enforcing human 
rights practices in the country, successive Turkish governments have ratified several 
important international agreements.161  
 
In this connection, military authorities have often expressed their support for 
Turkey’s EU membership, arguing that “it will pave the way for Turkey’s inclusion 
into the world of developed democracies” and make an important contribution to 
security prospects for both Turkey and Europe (Kuloğlu and Şahin, 2006: 101). 
Recently, the Justice and Development Party government affirmed its commitment to 
implement political reforms and evaluate foreign policy issues relating to national 
security and defense within the framework of new legal arrangements.162 In the post-
Cold War process of adapting to the emerging security environment, Turkey’s policy 
objectives of developing peaceful relations with neighboring countries towards 
                                                 
161 Several international treaties so far ratified are available from the web page of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs: http://www.mfa.gov.tr  
 
162 Uğur Dündar, interview with the prime minister on October 16, 2006, CNN-Türk TV. See also 
“Gül: AB konusunda dönülmez yoldayız” (Gül: No turning back from our EU path), Hürriyet, May 
23, 2003. 
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becoming an integral part of the process of European integration have grown in 
importance. The National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (2003) states 
In international relations, Turkey’s EU candidacy advances its position in 
strategic, security and political terms. Turkey shall continue to develop its 
relations with its neighbors and adjacent regions in accordance with peace 
loving foreign policy objective.  
 
 
During its EU membership process, Turkey has continued to develop its relations 
with Central Asia, the Turkic republics and Russia within the framework of 
sustaining peaceful relations with these countries.163 Additionally, relations with 
Greece and Middle Eastern countries have also improved. The remainder of this 
section focuses on these two foreign policy issues.  
 
Turkish-Greek Rapprochement  
Historically, the main bones of contention between the two Aegean countries have 
been sovereignty rights over the Aegean Sea including the continental shelf, 
territorial waters, sovereignty over the islands and airspace, Greek minority rights in 
Turkey as well as Turkish minority rights in Greece, and the Cyprus issue.164 
Following Turkey’s EU gaining membership candidacy in 1999, Commission reports 
have mentioned that Turkey is already in a process of alignment with the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy in essential respects. But these reports also state that it is 
essential for Turkey to resolve its conflicts with Greece (European Commission, 
2000). Accession Partnership documents (2001, 2003) concerning Turkey mentioned 
as a medium-term priority peaceful resolution of conflicts between Turkey and 
Greece.  
                                                 
163 Details of bilateral relations between these countries are available at the official website of the 
Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr (Department of Bilateral Relations). 
 
164 For an insightful study of contemporary Greek politics, see Allison and Nikolaydis (1999).  
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Since 1999, relations between Greece and Turkey have shown substantial 
improvement. The Greek position towards Turkish membership has clearly 
undergone a transformation, as shown by the way it agreed within the framework of 
the European Council granting Turkey membership candidacy status and the start of 
accession negotiations. Turkey’s membership candidacy as well as the opening of 
accession negotiations in 2005 contributed to confidence building between Greece 
and Turkey. Turkish governments from 1999 to the present have argued that 
sustained economic, political and cultural cooperation between Greece and Turkey is 
vital for strengthening the geopolitical position of both countries. These 
governmental objectives are also stated in the National Programme for the Adoption 
of the Acquis (2003): “Turkey will continue to undertake initiatives and efforts for 
the settlement of bilateral problems with Greece through dialogue.” Then Foreign 
Minister Ismail Cem (of the Democratic Left Party), during his official visits to his 
then Greek counterpart George Papandreou, demonstrated the Turkish government’s 
policy objective of improving its relations with Greece. He stressed the importance 
of foreign policy measures to prevent a hostile environment in the southern 
Mediterranean (Cem, 2005). Cem (2005: 222) stated that the foreign policy 
document on Greece had been prepared by the Foreign Ministry and was then agreed 
on by the NSC. In this respect, he underlined civilian initiatives. Meanwhile, rising 
economic relations under the Black Sea Economic Cooperation contributed 
positively to the rapprochement of Greece and Turkey and other countries in the 
Black Sea region: Armenia, Bulgaria, Russia, Romania, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine.165 
Economic and political cooperation agreements are also positive developments for 
promoting regional cooperation between the two countries in line with the EU model 
                                                 
165 Further information is available from the web page of Black Sea Economic Cooperation: 
http://www.bsec-organization.org  
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of regional integration. Later, in 2006, then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül (of the 
Justice and Development Party) spoke of his government’s commitment to Turkey’s 
conventional role in supporting economic and political cooperation and stability in 
the region, including the enhancement of political and cultural dialogue with 
Greece.166 Additionally, civil society initiatives have helped to build mutual dialogue 
between the two neighbors (Rumelili, 2005).  
 
The military acted in accordance with these foreign policy decisions of the 
government. In November 2006, Chief of the General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt visited 
Greece upon the invitation of his Greek counterpart Admiral Panagiotis Chinofotis, 
the first such visit by the head of the Turkish military in 40 years. According to the 
Turkish General Staff, the aim of the visit “was to exchange views on matters of 
common interest and explore ways to enhance mutual confidence and understanding” 
within the framework of Confidence Building Measures.167 In line with decisions 
made at the meeting to create “a committee of Chiefs of Defense level of the Balkan 
states, which will meet periodically in order to promote regional security and also 
discuss military issues of common interest,” in April 2007 General Büyükanıt 
participated in a meeting of this committee held in Thessalonica, Greece.168 He 
stated that the military is ready to cooperate on security and defense matters with 
                                                 
166 “Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında 8 koldan işbirliği” (Enhanced cooperation between Greece and 
Turkey), Zaman, June 11, 2006, and “Gül ve Bakoyanni yeni güven artırıcı önlemleri görüştü” (Gül 
and Bakoyanni meeting on new confidence building measures), Hürriyet, September 19, 2006. 
 
167 “Barış için ortak tabur önerisi,” Milliyet, November 4, 2006.  
Details of the official visit of General Yaşar Büyükanıt on November 4, 2006 are available from 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/release/2006/pr05.htm (Retrieved February 24, 2007) 
 
168 “Atina’ya ‘Ege’ de silahsız uçmaya hazırız mesajı” (Message to Athens: We’re ready to fly over 
the Aegean unarmed), Milliyet, April 18, 2007, and “Yeni bir devlet kurulamaz” (No new state can be 
founded), Milliyet, April 23, 2007. 
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Greece, and added that civilian initiatives are also very important in promoting 
enhanced political and economic cooperation between the two countries.169  
 
These recent developments demonstrate that the establishment of common structures 
for cooperation on defense and security is being launched at the military level, as a 
supplement to governmental and civil society initiatives for Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement. Therefore, the military acted in line with civilian initiatives for 
peaceful resolution of the conflicts between Turkey and Greece. The policies of 
rapprochement between the two countries are evidently part of Turkey’s foreign 
policy for complying with the EU’s political conditionality. 
 
Bridging the East-West Divide 
A second aspect of foreign policy change that can be studied within the framework 
of the EU’s condition that peaceful relations with neighboring countries be promoted 
relates to relations with Middle Eastern countries. In its section on common foreign 
and security policy, the European Commission’s Regular Report (2004) stated,  
Turkey is an important actor in promoting stability and security in its region 
(Balkans, Caucasus, Mediterranean, Middle East) and has taken a number of 
relevant initiatives … Turkey continues to support the road map for the 
Middle East peace process. It has taken an active stance in contributing to the 
efforts to achieve peace and stability in the Middle East … Bilateral relations 
between Iran and Syria developed well including in the area of cooperation 
against terror … The Turkish Government announced in November its 
decision not to send troops to Iraq. Turkey has an important role as the 
principal base for humanitarian assistance from the international community 
to Iraq … Turkey should continue to promote security and stability in its 
region … the efforts of Turkey to improve and deepen its relations with the 
neighboring countries are welcome.  
 
 
                                                 
169 “Atina’ya ‘Ege’ de silahsız uçmaya hazırız mesajı” (Message to Athens: We’re ready to fly over 
the Aegean unarmed), Milliyet, April 18, 2007, and “Yeni bir devlet kurulamaz” (No new state can be 
founded), Milliyet, April 23, 2007. 
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Indeed, Turkey participates in the Middle East peace process and in the Alliance of 
Civilizations (Medeniyetler Ittifakı) project.170 Policies adopted during the Justice 
and Development Party government underlined the importance of deepening cultural 
dialogue and understanding between Muslim communities and the West in view of 
the negative consequences of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Prime 
Minister Erdoğan stated that Turkey intended to play a mediating role in enhancing 
cultural dialogue and understanding between the East and the West.171 Meanwhile, 
several visits to Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia were made at the governmental level.172 
The former Chief of the General Staff, Hilmi Özkök, broadly praised the 
government’s foreign policy approach in the Middle East in relation to Turkey’s 
changing security environment.173 However, he added that Turkey is a secular 
democracy and that “secularism is the main driving source of the development of 
Turkish democracy.”174 Thus, the present government has taken policy decisions to 
improve Turkey’s relations in the Middle East. However, the military has several 
times brought up how Turkey is the only secular, majority-Muslim democracy in the 
region. Therefore, the military subscribes the government’s Middle East policies to 
the extent they are in line with the secular-democratic principles of the Republic of 
Turkey. 
 
                                                 
170 “Medeniyetler İttifakı dünya basınında geniş yer buldu” (The Alliance of Civilizations had been 
widely covered in world press), Zaman, November 14, 2006. 
 
171 “Dünya Habercileri İstanbul Buluşması” (Istanbul Meeting of the World Press), Prime Minister’s 
speech on November 3, 2006. 
 
172 Available from http://www.akparti.org.tr   
 
173 “The speech given by the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Hilmi Özkök at the 
Turkish War Colleges,” April 20, 2005. 
 
174 “The speech given by the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Hilmi Özkök at the 
Turkish War Colleges,” April 20, 2005. See also “Luncheon Remarks by General İlker Başbuğ, 
Deputy Chief of Turkish General Staff.” 
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Furthermore, in the run-up to the March 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, responding to 
strong public opposition, Parliament voted against the deployment of Turkish troops 
in Iraq, while officially declaring that the Turkish government gives primary 
importance to the preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity.175 Earlier that year, then 
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül stated 
The policy of the government is a state policy. Therefore, there is no 
difference among the policy of the government, the military, the President of 
the Republic or any other section. The government takes decisions and 
everyone implements them. Turkey has a single policy concerning Iraq.176  
 
 
The Turkish General Staff executed the decision of the government. General Yaşar 
Büyükanıt (2007) told a recent press briefing that the General Staff favors a military 
operation in northern Iraq. Yet, he added that Parliament has the final word, so they 
will act in accordance with the decision of the civilian authority.177 Although beyond 
the scope of this study, the current war in Iraq is a very sensitive issue in terms of 
Turkey’s defense and security interests, not only because of the PKK’s presence in 
northern Iraq but also because Iraq is Turkey’s immediate neighbor (Tocci, 2004). 
Therefore, since relations with Iraq rank as one of Turkey’s major political issues, 
the EU’s impact remains very limited.  
 
To conclude this section, the foreign policies explored above can be evaluated as part 
of Turkey’s commitment to preserve peace and stability in its relations with 
neighboring countries in line with the EU’s conditionality. Therefore, Turkey’s EU 
                                                 
175 Fikret Bila, “Ankara’nın iki kuşkusu,” (Ankara’s two suspicions) Milliyet, March 2, 2003. 
 
176 Then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül’s declaration on January 12, 2003 (“Türkiye’nin Irak’a dönük 
tek bir politikası vardır. Bu politikayı da hükümet yürütmektedir. Bizim politikamız da Irak’ın siyasi 
ve toprak bütünlüğünü muhafaza etmektir”) 
 
177 “Meclis Yetki versin, Kuzey Irak’a gireriz,” (If Parliament gives us authority, we will conduct a 
military operation in northern Iraq) Vatan, April 13, 2007.  
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membership process is one of the factors that has led to foreign policy change. In this 
connection, the military’s policy influence has arguably remained limited to the 
essentials of national security and defense, while it has affirmed that the final 
decisions rest with the civilian authority. In terms of the European Council’s decision 
to open accession negotiations with Turkey by October 2005 (European Council, 
2004), these developments were cited as positive ones.  
 
4.3.2.2 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)  
 
Turkey is a member of NATO and has been an associate member of the EC since 
1963. Thus, it has been an integral part of Western European Union (WEU) decision-
making structures. At the December 1999 European Council meeting in Helsinki, the 
EU decided to strengthen the effectiveness and capabilities of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy pillar.178 For this purpose, the European Council agreed  
to advance ESDP, stating its determination to develop an autonomous 
capacity to take decisions and where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to 
launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international 
crises.  
 
                                                 
178 The ESDP is part of the CFSP pillar, institutionalized by the Treaty on the EU in 1993. Previous to 
its institutionalization, the Western European Union was established as the political and security locus 
of the EC. Yet, cooperation on foreign and security policy has been particularly difficult since a 
prerequisite was the convergence of national preferences of each of the member states on issues 
directly related to national sovereignty, defense-security and objectives. Therefore, the EC decided to 
postpone this issue until political integration on these matters of “high politics” become more feasible. 
In this period, the WEU continued to be an integral part of NATO. During this period, in response to 
the changing international security environment, the idea of Combined Joint Task Forces based on 
“separable but not separate” operational structures evolved. Accordingly, the EU member states, in 
view of the diverging opinions between NATO and EU on several foreign and security matters, could 
enable the WEU to utilize NATO forces and equipment for objectives defined in EU’s CFSP. The 
1999 meeting between the EU and US in Bonn asserted the need for the enhancement of a European 
capacity to respond to international crises. The evolution of a European Security and Defense Identity 
was mainly based on the evolution of these policy ideas and structures. Thus, following the 
establishment of the CFSP (mainly an intergovernmental structure, where mostly unanimous voting 
determines common policy decisions) by the EU, the member states decided to build the ESDP, which 
would also include European military capabilities (i.e. a European army) in order to undertake 
operations independent from NATO’s direction, but that would use the cooperation of non-EU NATO 
members when required. For more details, see Mütütler-Baç (2000: 221-223), Oğuzlu (2004a), Bağcı 
Yıldız (2004). 
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A Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a military staff were 
created in March 2000 within the framework of European security and defense 
management. Thus, the EU members agreed to build, by 2003, a military force 
capable of performing autonomous operations. In June 2000 at the Santa Feira 
summit, and in December 2002 at the Nice summit, EU member states agreed to set 
forth the foundations of the ESDP. The new arrangements would allow non-EU 
NATO members to contribute to military crisis management to allow the ESDP to 
benefit from the “force-planning expertise at the military level” of the Alliance.  
 
Civilian and military authorities strongly objected to the fact that Turkey would be 
excluded from direct ESDP decision-making mechanisms, since according to the 
resolutions only EU member states would participate in final decision-making.179 A 
representative from the Turkish authorities expressed Turkey’s position: 
In the case of autonomous EU operations that do not require NATO assets, 
once Turkey states that the operation lies within the geographic proximity to 
its territory or affects its vital interests, the EU must assure Turkey of 
participation in the decision-making process and the operation. Turkey 
sought an automatic invitation to be made by the ESDP for the operations to 
be staged in Turkey’s close proximity, such as the Balkans, where Turkey 
does not have any bilateral dispute but has a close interest.180
 
The issue came up on the agenda of the NSC.181 The then chief of the General Staff 
stated, “We have been observing the formation of the military union of the EU and 
                                                 
179 İlter Türkmen, “Ordu ve Avrupa Birliği” (The military and the European Union), Hürriyet, 
December 28-30, 1999. Foreign Ministry (press releases), July 18, 2000. See the Foreign Ministry 
web page: http://www.mfa.gov.tr for more details of the government’s concerns about this issue.  
 
180 Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, “Turkey and EU fail to Bridge the Gap on ESDP,” Turkish Daily News, 
November 13, 2000.  
 
181 National Security Council resolution (2000-2001) press releases available from 
 http://www.mgk.gov.tr  
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we also desire to participate in it.”182 According to the military, Turkey has 
demonstrated its peacekeeping capabilities in line with security operations led by 
NATO and the UN, when participating in joint peace operations within the 
framework of international military missions in Bosnia, Somalia, and Afghanistan. 
These are cited as part of policy alignment in defense matters.183 Furthermore, the 
military has stressed Turkey’s regional importance and its contribution to EU 
security and defense structures, such as the mediator role that Turkey could play in 
the region due to its geopolitical and strategic centrality.184  
 
NATO-EU-Turkish relations are particularly important in this context. Turkey has 
the power, through NATO’s Security Council, to veto decisions relating to the ESDP 
that would require the cooperation of the Alliance. In 2000 the European 
Commission proposed the establishment of structured political dialogue with Turkey 
in terms of reaching a common position on this issue. Troika meetings between the 
EU presidency and Turkey, and EU-Turkey Association Council Meetings, are the 
main components of this dialogue. In December 2001, a compromise agreement was 
reached that made it possible for EU countries to have access to NATO assets while 
“Turkey’s security concerns would be addressed without undermining European 
security forces’ independent decision-making” and granting Turkey’s access to the 
Convention on the Future of Europe (Laeken European Council, 2001). The 
inclusion of Turkey into the ESDP structure, though it did not fully satisfy Turkey’s 
                                                 
182 “The speech given by the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Hilmi Özkök at the 
Turkish War Colleges,” April 20, 2005. 
 
183 2004-2007 speeches and press releases from the Turkish General Staff, available from 
 http://www.tsk.mil.tr  
 
184 “Orgeneral Büyükanıt’ın Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Devir-Teslim Töreni Konuşması,” the speech of 
General Büyükanıt on August 28, 2006. 
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policy position, can be seen as an important step toward solving the security 
concerns on this issue.  
 
Yet Turkey’s request for full membership in the EU, compounded with several 
political and economic hurdles in its accession process, renders the consolidation of 
European security identity formation even more complicated (Çayhan, 2003b; 
Kirişçi, 2004). Indeed, the centrality of Turkey’s role in the EU’s security and 
foreign policies has been voiced within the Union. Its role towards strengthening 
European security and defense capabilities has been particularly underlined.185 The 
exclusion of Turkey from this structure is thought to be disadvantageous compared to 
the security challenges that its membership could possibly bring. First, the EU’s need 
for NATO expertise includes Turkey’s military knowledge and capabilities as well as 
its consent through the Security Council. Second, Turkey’s location remains 
important in terms of linking trade roads from Central Asia to include Caspian oil 
and gas routes in the framework of the Blue Stream Project (Mavi Akım Projesi) in 
the region. Additionally, the potential role it could play in the mediating 
longstanding territorial disputes in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions 
and finding a peaceful solution to these disputes must be considered. Third, in terms 
of geostrategic location and military infrastructure, Turkey remains an important 
partner for the EU’s security structures (Karaosmaoğlu, 2004: 161). Finally, the 2001 
terrorist attacks were a revelation of the scope of the threat posed by international 
terrorism and crime, among which was noted rising fundamentalist activities. 
Turkey’s ratification of international conventions (i.e. the Washington Agreement) 
                                                 
185 “Solana’s visit has not ended discussions over ESDI” (referring to the predecessor of the ESDP), 
Turkish Daily News, June 2, 2000. 
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on international cooperation in fighting terrorism is also considered a major step of 
policy alignment in European Commission and Parliament reports (2002).  
 
Therefore, post-Cold War developments serve to “intensify the security value of 
Turkey, which could be a model of liberal market economy and secular democracy, 
to an Islamic world beset by Islamic radicalism, repression and economic failure” 
(Kirişçi, 2004: 8). In this context, Turkey’s role in the ESDP can be conceived as of 
promoting stability, peace and security in the region. As explored so far, the 
government policies that are evolving towards further emphasizing democracy and 
economic cooperation as part of foreign policy objectives could strengthen Turkey’s 
hand in terms of ESDP formulation. In this connection, the military’s policies are in 
line with the government’s policy decisions. However, without Turkey’s full 
membership in the EU, the defense and security policy alignment process could well 
remain limited. 
 
4.3.2.3 The Cyprus Issue 
 
One very important issue that remains highly contested within the framework of 
Turkey’s EU membership is Cyprus policy.186 Since the Greek Cypriot community 
applied for EU membership in 1990, Cyprus has been one of the top foreign and 
security policy issues of both Turkey and Greece as well as the EU.187 For quite 
                                                 
186 For in-depth analysis of the history of Cyprus, see Dodd (2006, 2002). For a chronology of events, 
see http://www.euractiv.com/eng/enlargement/turkey-accession-cyprus/article-135940. 
 
187 Recognition of the sovereignty rights of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots remains a 
central problem hindering resolution of the issue. Turkey’s official position is that no recognition of 
the southern Cyprus is achievable before the recognition of the political rights of the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus (Kuzey Kıbrıs Türkiye Cumhuriyeti) representing the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey’s 
foreign policy framework is available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr
 
 145
some time successive governments and the military, in their policy rhetoric, have 
stressed the centrality of resolution of the Cyprus issue within the framework of 
Turkey’s security concerns.188 Turkey’s national security policy underlines that the 
best policy option to resolve the problem is recognition of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus. Turkish concerns revolve around the centrality of the geostrategic 
location of the island and the protection of the rights of its Turkish Cypriot 
community. Greece’s concerns center on the potential threat of Turkey’s domination 
over the island as well as on unification of the island under Greek Cypriot rule 
(Müftüler-Baç, 1999: 560). Additionally, the military buildup, within the framework 
of policies of deterrence, in both the northern and southern parts of Cyprus is also a 
serious security concern. The geostrategic location of Cyprus, the importance of the 
Greek position within the EU in terms of its veto power in the European Council on 
issues such as enlargement, and Cyprus’ admission to the EU in 2004 have all led 
efforts to resolve the policy problem to an impasse (Suvarierol, 2003; Tocci, 2004).  
 
In relation to the EU’s policy, there is a reluctance to continue the prolonged dispute 
within its enlargement zone to the extent that it challenges the supranational 
institution’s security identity (Müftüler-Baç, 2002b). The goal of peaceful settlement 
of the Cyprus dispute has appeared in all of the relevant EU official reports to date. 
This includes the impact, already felt, of the issue on Turkey’s current accession 
negotiations process. The Accession Partnership document (2003) states as a short-
term priority that the European Council should  
in the context of the political dialogue, strongly support efforts to find a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, through the continuation of 
the United Nations Secretary General’s mission of good offices and of 
negotiations on the basis of its proposals. 
                                                 
188 Press releases from NSC meetings (1974-2007), available from http://www.mgk.gov.tr
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Despite military’s reservations regarding the substance of UN plans,189 it can be seen 
that in 2003-2006 there has been a clear shift in Turkey’s foreign policy rhetoric 
from prioritizing security towards underlining the need to find a democratic 
settlement to the Cyprus issue. The National Programme for the Adoption of the 
Acquis (2003) clearly states that 
as part of the enhanced political dialogue, Turkey will continue to support the 
efforts of the United Nations Secretary General in his good offices mission 
aimed at a mutually acceptable settlement, with a view to establishing a new 
partnership in Cyprus, based on the sovereign equality of the two parties and 
the realities of the Island. Turkey supports the steps taken by the Turkish 
Cypriot side, which will foster an environment of confidence and pave the 
way for a comprehensive solution.  
 
Accordingly, finding a peaceful settlement of the conflict that benefits both Cypriot 
communities will have priority over security and defense considerations. This has 
been also evident in view of the Turkish government’s support in 2004 of the 
negotiation process over the fifth and latest version of the peace plan developed by 
then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the April 24, 2004 referendum on the 
plan in Cyprus.190 This is not to argue that the opposition party (Republican People’s 
Party) and the government are in full agreement on the plan, but that there has been a 
substantial change in Cyprus policy during this period (Gülmez, 2007). The 
argument here is that the most important factor for Turkey’s policy change was its 
policy objective to start accession negotiations with the EU.  
 
However, resolving the Cyprus problem goes beyond being a mere issue of conflict 
among Greece, Turkey and the EU. It also involves the establishment of peaceful 
coexistence through democratic means, between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek 
                                                 
189 “Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök’ün Konuşması” (The speech of the Chief of the 
General Staff, General Hilmi Özkök), April 13, 2004. 
 
190 See also “Dünya Habercileri İstanbul Buluşması” (Istanbul Meeting of the World Press) Prime 
Minister’s speech on November 3, 2006.   
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Cypriots living on Cyprus (Müftüler-Baç, 1999). Starting in 1999, as resolved at the 
Helsinki European Council summit, negotiations between the two governments of 
Cyprus accelerated. Yet both of Cyprus’ communities found it difficult to agree on a 
series of plans developed by the UN.191 On the one hand were the Turkish side’s 
requests for mutual recognition, equal sovereignty rights and the establishment of a 
federal (or con-federal) model of governance in Cyprus (Dodd, 2005). On the other 
hand, the Greek Cypriots remained reluctant to consider the Turkish Cypriots as 
having equal sovereignty rights over Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot community wants 
unification of Cyprus under the Greek government (Thsonas, 2001).  
 
The Turkish Cypriots and a majority of pro-EU state and political elites in Turkey 
supported the comprehensive settlement plan proposed by then UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan.192 However, the Greek Cypriot community rejected the plan in 
the April 2004 referendum, even though it seemed to their advantage. So the issue 
remained unresolved. Neither a federal solution nor a system for sharing of sovereign 
and constitutional rights between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots could be 
achieved. As one observer argued, political manipulation of the feelings of insecurity 
of the island’s two populations during “Yes” and “No” campaigns before the 
referendum fomented a deep distrust (Christophorou, 2005). This came from 
concerns over whether Turkey would implement the plan, whether the island would 
become a Turkish protectorate, and whether there would be a secure future after 
partition of the island (Christophorou, 2005).  
 
                                                 
191 For detailed analysis of UN plans, see Clement Dodd (2005). 
See also http://www.un.org, and http://www.euractiv.com/eng/enlargement/turkey-accession-
cyprus/article-135940
 
192 “Cyprus Reunification Fails,” BBC news, April 24, 2004. 
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The support provided by the reformist section of the political and state elites for 
democratic settlement of the Cyprus issue can be considered part of foreign policy 
change within the framework of Turkey’s Europeanization process. During the 
search for a viable solution to the Cyprus issue, democratic concerns seem to have 
prevailed over security ones. However, it can be argued that the Greek Cypriot 
community’s rejection of the UN plan has rendered the issue more complicated then 
ever. After the plan’s rejection, the Turkish government was able to show that it had 
given its full support to settling the dispute through peaceful, democratic means.193  
 
During this period, the military acted in accordance with the government’s policy on 
Cyprus. However, after the referendum results, it clearly expressed its views. As then 
Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Özkök (2005) said,  
the Turkish Armed Forces has always supported a just and lasting solution to 
the Cyprus issue … There have been two consequences of the April 24 
referendums; no longer can anyone accuse either Turkey or the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus of causing an impasse on the Cyprus issue … 
Turkey could recognize a new order emerging from a negotiation process to 
be held among parties with equal political status on the island, one which 
would not be a continuation of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus. This new order 
must not harm the rights of Turkey arising from the Treaties of Guarantee 
and Alliance.194  
 
Therefore, the Turkish authorities, including the military, expressed their criticisms 
of the EU’s one-sided policies with regard to resolution of the problem. Specifically 
they criticized consideration of the issue in the context of Turkey’s accession 
process, and the weakness of channels for the EU’s political dialogue with the 
                                                 
193 “Kıbrıs konusu BM zemininden AB zeminine çekilemez,” Zaman, November 14, 2006. 
 
194 “The speech given by the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Hilmi Özkök at the 
Turkish War Colleges,” April 20, 2005. 
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Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.195 According to the Turkish government, the 
EU’s admission of the Greek Cypriot government, which does not represent the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, has made efforts to settle the issue peacefully 
even more thorny. The government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has 
voiced similar criticisms. In an interview with Berliner Zeitung, President Mehmet 
Ali Talat said, “We want a federal state composed of two regions and two people. 
And, we want for there to be political equality between the two sides. For us this is 
indispensable. The decision in a united Cypriot state shall reflect equality.”196  
 
The change in Cyprus policy along the guidelines set forth in the Accession 
Partnership contributed to the European Council’s decision to open Turkey’s 
accession negotiation talks by the end of 2005. However, it is clear that a peaceful 
resolution of the situation in Cyprus, to the benefit of both Cypriot communities, has 
become one of the preconditions to guarantee prospective Turkish membership. 
Indeed, the pace of Turkey’s accession negotiations seems to depend on finding such 
a resolution On December 11, 2006 the European Council decided to partially 
suspend accession negotiations with Turkey on the grounds that it had failed to 
implement its obligation under the Association Agreement to remove trade barriers 
to the Greek Cypriots. Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn stated that the Turkish 
Parliament “must ratify the Customs Union Additional Protocol in order for the 
accession negotiations to proceed.”197  
 
                                                 
195 “AB Komisyonu Türkiye 2003 İlerleme Raporunu Açıkladı,” speech of then Foreign Minister 
Abdullah Gül on November 5, 2003, and “KKTC’nin 20. Kuruluş Yıldönümü Kutlamaları,” Prime 
Minister Erdoğan’s speech at the 20th Anniversary of TRNC on November 15, 2003. 
 
196 “Yeni bir ortaklığa ihtiyacımız var” (We need a new partnership), ABHaber, August 6, 2006. 
 
197 Available form http://www.euractiv.com/eng/enlargement/turkey-accession-cyprus/article-135940
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The current government has expressed its objections, while questioning the 
legitimacy of the order that resolution of Cyprus is a precondition for Turkey’s EU 
membership.198 Prime Minister Erdoğan stated, “Nobody shall expect us to open the 
airports and ports unless the isolation of Northern Cyprus is relieved.”199 The 
Turkish government has offered several policy propositions to the EU ranging from 
the importance of lifting EU restrictions on the isolation of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus, extending all the way to its recognition. It has also proposed that 
the Greek Cypriots open their ports and airports to Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, 
Onur Öymen (2006), deputy leader of the Republican People’s Party, said that the 
Greek Cypriots’ EU membership violates international law, and this membership has 
become a tool to impede Turkey’s accession process. Thus, he concluded, it is 
difficult for Turkey to make any concession before the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus is recognized as politically equal or Turkey becomes a member of the EU.200  
 
According to the government, a lasting solution is solely dependent on a plan that 
would take into consideration the demands of the Turkish Cypriots.201 These are set 
as Turkey’s conditions for considering lifting the barriers to trade with Greek Cyprus 
so as to implement the acquis and make it possible to recognize Southern Cyprus 
within the framework of the Customs Union Agreement and other negotiation 
frameworks within the EU. In 2006, then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül agreed that 
                                                 
198 “Erdoğan’dan AB’ye ilk yanıt” (First response to EU from Erdoğan), ABHaber, December 12, 
2006. See also “AK Parti TBMM Grup Toplantısı” (AK Party Parliamentary Group Meeting) on 
December 12, 2006. 
 
199 “Erdoğan links ports issue with lifting of Turkish Cypriot isolation,” Turkish Daily News, March 
22, 2006. See also “TSK sivil iradenin dışına çıkamaz,” (TAF cannot act beyond civil authority’s will) 
Hürriyet, October 2, 2006. 
 
200 “Türkiye AB için vakit geçirmeden ‘B planı’ geliştirmeli,” (Turkey has to develop a B plan for EU 
before it is too late) ABHaber, December 26, 2006. 
 
201 “AK Parti TBMM grup toplantısı” (AK Party Parliamentary Group Meeting), December 12, 2006. 
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no option besides recognition of the political equality of the two Cypriot 
communities is acceptable.202 In sum, the Turkish government expects the EU to 
pursue economic and foreign policies towards relieving the isolation of the North and 
to support a plan for international recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus. Meanwhile, the military is in line with the position of the government in 
light of recent developments. The military has also stated that withdrawing the 
Turkish troops from the island is not possible until a peaceful resolution is achieved 
to the satisfaction of all the parties involved.203
 
It can be argued that by accepting Cyprus’ membership in May 2004, well before the 
conflict was resolved to the advantage of the both Cypriot communities, the EU has 
impeded foreign policy Europeanization in Turkey, and weakened the EU’s 
normative power to promote a lasting solution to the Cyprus issue (Suvarierol, 2003; 
Oğuzlu, 2004a). Unless Turkish-EU confidence builds in terms of Turkey’s full 
membership, resolution of the Cyprus problem will remain a controversial issue. 
Additionally, it must be noted that finding a stable solution to the Cyprus issue 
involves the peaceful coexistence of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, which 
depends on restoring confidence between the two communities.  
 
In conclusion, in the Turkish case, foreign policy alignment varies across policy 
issues. Europeanization of policies depends on the degree of challenge and pressure 
posed by the “fit/misfit” between domestic policy designs and EU imposed/proposed 
ones. Certain policy problems that have priority from the perspective of the EU may 
                                                 
202 “Kıbrıs konusu BM zemininden AB zeminine çekilemez,” (Cyprus issue cannot be brought from 
the Un platform to the EU) Zaman, November 14, 2006. 
 
203 Press declarations from the Turkish General Staff (2003-2007),  
available from http://www.tsk.mil.tr  
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or may not have the same importance attached to them at the national level, or 
perspectives on solutions to policy problems may differ. Therefore, Turkey’s ability 
to adopt EU policies is dependent on prevailing policy structures. Yet, domestic 
actors are capable of framing Europeanization of Turkey’s foreign policy as long as 
there is political will for full membership. In this case, compliance is highly 
dependent on the credibility of membership. Therefore, domestic institutional 
settings and foreign policy legacies matter along with EU policy incentives and 
rhetoric during the process of foreign policy alignment. However, one general 
conclusion that can be drawn from the study of foreign policy alignment is that 
particularly in 2002-2006, the military acted in accordance with the policy decisions 
of the government. This indicates a clear shift towards further strengthening civilian 
authority in the formulation of foreign security and defense policies, as has been 
stipulated in the EU’s political conditions for membership. 
 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 2 analyzed legal-institutional and policy aspects of the impact 
of the EU’s political conditionality on domestic political change in the area of civil-
military relations. EU reports in 2003-2006 have progressively emphasized the 
military’s “informal mechanism of influence” in Turkish political life. The next 
chapter complements the study by undertaking an analysis of informal aspects of 
institutional change. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
EUROPEANIZATION AND INFORMAL INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE: THE IMPACT OF EU NORMS AND RHETORIC ON 
THE MILITARY’S ATTITUDE 
 
 
This chapter aims to complete the study of Turkey’s Europeanization in the area of 
civil-military relations by analyzing the impact of the diffusion of EU norms and 
discourses on informal institutional change. This final aspect of Europeanization is 
tested through studying the military’s attitude in the context of Turkey’s membership 
process. The first section discusses factors that have influenced the formation of the 
military’s attitude. The underlying argument is that the credibility of the EU’s 
rhetoric on Turkey’s EU membership is a key factor that can positively sway 
domestic attitudes, and facilitates the internalization of EU norms triggering informal 
institutional change. This is demonstrated in the final sections of the chapter through 
the study of two consecutive periods, as follows: (1) Rising expectations about 
Turkey’s EU membership (1999-2004), and (2) The post-2004 period: ruptures in 
mutual understanding and dialogue. An implicit aim of the chapter is to test whether 
the military’s public rhetoric is line with that of the civilian authority. 
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5.1 EU Rhetoric on Turkey’s Membership: An Influential Factor on Military 
Attitude Formation  
 
There are several factors influencing the military’s attitude formation regarding 
issues arising from Turkey’s integration with the EU. One critical factor is the 
credibility of the EU’s rhetoric on Turkey’s EU membership. Turkish-EU relations 
with reference to the EU’s political conditionality are increasingly becoming an 
integral part of the rhetorical tool of domestic actors in Turkey. This chapter argues 
that the existence of ambivalent rhetoric in the EU regarding Turkey’s membership is 
a major factor stalling full compliance with the remaining points of concern of EU 
political conditionality, points associated with the informal aspects of institutional 
change. A related factor influencing the military’s attitude formation is the attitude of 
civilians – i.e., the government and the public – towards Turkey’s EU membership, a 
factor itself also partially shaped by the EU’s credibility. 
 
Providing this, there are complementary factors facilitating or hindering the informal 
aspects of institutional change. First, there are norms and values associated with the 
military’s role within Turkish polity. These are the preservation of the founding 
principles of the Republic, and the continuity of Turkey’s Western orientation, 
including Turkey’s European vocation. These originate from a conception of 
modernization as Westernization of which democracy and a “commitment to 
Europe” are integral parts. In this connection, the role attributed to the military by 
Turkish society is an integral part of the military’s attitude formation. In terms of the 
evolution of civil-military relations, Turkey’s political history is marked by 
overwhelming support for the military by large sectors of Turkish society. According 
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to opinion polls measuring attitudes toward domestic political institutions, support 
for the Turkish Armed Forces is relatively high.204 This is a result of public concerns 
about the credibility of political elites in responding to domestic political demands in 
view of high levels of political corruption. Civilian elites, when faced with 
challenges to the Republican order, have relied on the military’s capabilities and 
given it legal authority to solve political crises rather than taking responsibility for 
themselves. Turkey’s security environment also plays an important role in raising the 
level of public support for the military.  
 
A second factor is the domestic and international developments associated with 
changing conceptions of security and defense. Until the mid-1980s, there has been a 
set of ideals, which the officers came to nurture, entailing 
staying out of politics because it is harmful to professional integrity, but 
intervening in politics whenever it is necessary for the protection of the 
secular and democratic regime; safeguarding the democratic regime and 
contributing to the process of democratization (because democratization is 
part and parcel of Westernization), but refraining from acting as an 
instrument of the political government; joining the Western community of 
nations to become an integral part of it, but maintaining a guard against the 
West.205  
 
The increase in economic and political liberalization from the mid-1980s onward in 
Turkey’s domestic and international political environment has also affected the 
military’s attitude formation. Some scholars argue that this period is marked by a 
reformulation of the relations between civilian and military institutions towards 
assigning a more moderate role to the military in Turkish polity (Evin, 1994; Hale, 
                                                 
204 According to the European Commission evaluations of Autumn 2004 Standard Eurobarometer 
results, the most trusted institution both in Europe (69%) and Turkey (89%) is the military, while trust 
in the government in Turkey is only 80%, while in EU countries it is just 34%. See also Taha Akyol, 
“Orduya Güvenmek” (Trusting the Military), Miliyet, October 4, 2006. 
 
205 This also reflects awareness of “realist” international politics in foreign policy orientations while at 
the same time aspiring to become a part of the European society of states based on “constructivist” 
assumptions (Karaosmanoğlu, 1993: 32). 
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1996). In the early 1990s, former Chief of the General Staff General Necip Torumtay 
said that 
there is no conflict between the military and civilian officials. The Turkish 
Armed Forces commanders know very well that the civilian authority always 
has the final word. The Army knows where it stands … Of course, in 
meetings with civilian officials differences of opinion will arise. But this is 
only to be expected.206 … Our Army is under the authority of the political 
will but outside politics … Keeping the Army absolutely outside politics is 
one of the important factors both for its own discipline and for the protection 
of our national security and stability.207  
 
From this period onwards, in contrast to the period of 1961-1980, the military’s 
rhetoric has been restricted to issues of high politics, such as political issues which 
touch upon the fundamental definition, identity, security and defense of the nation-
state.  
 
In the 1990s, additional factors influencing domestic politics were Turkey’s 1987 
application for EC membership and the opening of its membership process by the 
European Council in December 1999. The following sections analyze the informal 
institutional aspects of EU-triggered domestic political change and question the 
prospects for deepening Europeanization in Turkey in the area of civil-military 
relations. In these sections the formal speeches of senior officers are of particular 
relevance to the extent that they reflect the official position of the military.208 The 
public statements of the military reflect the attitude of the institution.  
                                                 
206 Cited in Karaosmanoğlu (1993: 33). 
 
207 Cited in Torumtay (1994: 131-132) (“Ordumuz, siyasi iradenin emrinde ve fakat siyasetin 
dışındadır. Ordunun mutlak surette siyasetin dışında tutulması, gerek kendi disiplininin ve gerek milli 
güvenliğimizin ve istikrarımızın korunmasında önemli etmenlerden birisidir.”)  
 
208 The analysis of rhetoric undertaken in this chapter and elsewhere in this thesis is primarily based 
on senior officers’ public declarations (i.e. participating in National Security Council meetings as 
well). The institution of the military is at significant levels a cohesive and homogenous professional 
body. Officers receive the same secular education based on the founding principles of the Republic 
and demonstrate a similar sense of professionalism (Karaosmanoğlu, 1993: 21). Therefore, there is 
less of an issue of representativeness compared to other institutions.  
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In sum, there are several factors influencing the scope and frequency of public 
statements made by high-ranking military officers in the context of Turkey’s EU 
membership process, i.e., institutional definitions associated with the military’s role 
such as national security and defense, the levels of societal identification with the EU 
such as public opinion about the membership process, and most importantly the EU’s 
rhetoric on Turkey’s membership. In this connection, the military’s evaluations of 
Turkey-EU relations are influenced not only by European Council decisions and 
European Commission official reports but also by the recommendations of the 
European Parliament as well as the public speeches and declarations of EU leaders 
and the attitude of member states towards Turkey’s membership. The analysis of the 
military’s attitude in the context of Turkey’s Europeanization process undertaken in 
the following sections is specifically concerned with the main conjunctures in 
Turkish-EU relations.  
 
 
5.2 Rising Expectations on Turkey’s Membership (1999-2004) 
 
As early as 1960, the prospect of EC membership was brought up publicly in Turkey. 
Membership had been primarily conceived in political terms as the realization of the 
founding principles of the Turkish Republic and national objectives to be recognized 
as a Western nation (Müftüler-Baç, 1997). By the 1990s the Copenhagen political 
criteria and Turkey’s membership process became an additional impetus for 
modernization policies. In 2003, then Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Özkök said in 
this connection,  
the Turkish Armed Forces has always acted as the driving force of 
modernization in Turkey. Turkey’s accession to the European Union will 
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mediate the realization of this objective … Turkey’s EU membership should 
be accomplished with conditions equal to those of other members and with 
our national and geographical unity protected.209  
 
 
From 1999 to 2006, Turkey’s EU membership process was an important factor 
accelerating the diffusion of EU norms within the Turkish political system. Political 
reforms and policy alignment along with Turkey’s project of EU membership 
explored in previous chapters led to a major restructuring of the relations between 
civilian and military institutions. Then deputy Chief of the General Staff Yaşar 
Büyükanıt asserted the military’s commitment to Turkey’s EU membership by 
stating that the 
Turkish Armed Forces cannot be against Turkey’s EU membership because 
membership in the European Union is a necessary condition, in geopolitical 
and geostrategic terms, for the fulfillment of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s 
objectives of modernization oriented to Turkish society. Turkey’s European 
Union project overlaps with social, political, economic and security 
objectives … Turkey is an integral part of Europe and will join the EU.210  
 
The military’s prevailing attitude, with regard to the continuity of Turkey’s 
Westernization process as a national objective and a security concern, is an important 
mediating factor for its approval (or disapproval) of government policies in the 
context of Turkey’s Europeanization. Despite several reservations, elaborated on 
later in this chapter, the military has increasingly referred to the “consolidation of 
democracy” and “deepening of democracy” and expressed a positive attitude towards 
                                                 
209 “AB’ye karşı değiliz ama onurumuzla girelim” (We’re not against the EU), Hürriyet, May 29, 
2003. (“TSK daima modernleşmenin öncüsü olmuştur. AB’ye girmek de, o amacı gerçekleştirmenin 
en etkili aracı olacaktır. Türk ordusu zaten 50 yıldır NATO yoluyla Avrupa’nın içindedir, bu nedenle, 
TSK’nın Türkiye’nin AB’ye girişine karşı olduğu iddiası büyük bir haksızlıktır. TSK AB’ye karşı 
değil, aksine AB’ye uyumun deneyimli vasıtasıdır. Ancak dikkat çekmek istediğimiz husus AB’ye her 
şeye rağmen değil, onurla, eşit şartlarda, milli ve coğrafya bütünlüğümüzü koruyarak girmektir.”) 
 
210 “Orgeneral Büyükanıt: Ordu AB’ye Karşı Değil” (General Büyükanıt: The military isn’t against 
the EU,” Hürriyet, May 29, 2003. (“TSK Avrupa Birliği karşıtı olamaz. Çünkü Avrupa Birliği 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün Türk toplumuna gösterdiği çağdaşlaşma hedefinin, jeopolitik ve 
jeostratejik bir zorunluluğudur. Bu zorunluluk aynı zamanda; Türkiye’nin sosyal, politik, ekonomik 
ve güvenlik hedefleri ile de tam olarak örtüşmektedir. Türkiye Avrupa’nın bir parçasıdır ve Avrupa 
Birliği’ne girecektir.”)  
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Turkey’s prospects of membership in the EU (Heper, 2004: 23).211 However, during 
this period the military’s attitude towards issues arising from Turkey’s membership 
has been greatly shaped by the EU’s rhetoric on Turkey.  
 
At the December 1997 European Council summit in Luxembourg, a decision was 
made to exclude Turkey from the forthcoming enlargement. At the same time it was 
decided that the EU would open the way for the accession of Central and Eastern 
European countries, along with Cyprus and Malta. The EU’s position on enlargement 
was reaffirmed three years later at the Council’s Nice summit. During the 2000 
summit, the institutional structure of the EU was revised so as to include all the 
candidate countries, with the exception of Turkey. Accession negotiations with 
Turkey were not on the agenda because it had been assumed that the economic and 
political conditions had not yet been satisfied. Turkey’s political reactions were 
highly critical, both at the governmental and state level, including the military (Çalış, 
2006; Güney, 2002b). The coalition government under Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz 
declared that the government would gradually suspend bilateral relations until the EU 
provided a clear perspective on Turkey’s membership.212 The military’s concerns 
were reflected in the NSC meeting of December 1997. They “criticized the EU for 
keeping Turkey outside and adopting an attitude that almost ignored and even 
complicated Turkey’s legitimate security concerns.”213 Preceding the Luxembourg 
European Council meeting, high-ranking officials voiced their resentment of 
                                                 
211 Heper (2002: 138-146) in his article “The Consolidation of Democracy versus Democratization in 
Turkey,” defines and compares these two aspects of the process of democratization fundamental to 
our understanding of democracy in Turkish politics. 
 
212 “Rest Kargaşası” (Ultimatum Conflict), Hürriyet, December 19, 1997. See also Cem (2005: 60-
67). 
 
213 Demir, Metehan. “Military warns Europe that excluding Turkey from Europe will cost too much,” 
Turkish Daily News, November 13, 1997.  
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Europe’s attitude toward Turkey’s membership. As one senior officer said, “The 
objective of Turkey’s full membership in the EU should be maintained, yet the 
negative attitudes of some member states should not be disregarded.”214  
 
Attitudes towards Turkey’s prospective membership vary across the EU. The 
political reality is that Turkey has legally been a candidate for membership since 
1999. Moreover, at the December 2001 European Council meeting in Laeken, the EU 
decided to include Turkey in the Convention on the European Constitution. From the 
perspective of the European Commission, these moves demonstrate the political will 
to integrate Turkey into the EU (Verheugen, 2007). The EU’s decisions provided 
positive incentives to Turkey toward compliance with the political conditions such as 
strengthening democratic structures in the country. Then Chief of the General Staff 
Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu stated, “EU membership is to the benefit of the Turkish people 
and state; therefore, the army supports the decision.”215 A subsequent important 
development occurred at the Copenhagen European Council summit (December 
2002), where in view of Turkey’s progress towards complying with the political 
criteria, it was concluded that the EU would give Turkey a date for the opening of 
accession negotiations by the end of 2004. The then commissioner responsible for 
enlargement, Günter Verheugen, declared that the EU would prepare an action plan 
to prepare Turkey for accession negotiations.216 The European Commission (2002) 
communicated the necessity of sustaining the current reform process and addressing 
                                                 
214 Ferai Tınç (interview with General Çevik Bir), “Avrupa’sız bir Türkiye Düşünülemez” (Turkey 
without Europe is unthinkable), Hürriyet, November 3, 1999.  
 
215 “Kıvrıkoğlu: AB kararını destekliyoruz” (We support the EU decision), Milliyet, December 18, 
1999. (“Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, Türk halkının ve devletinin yararına olan her şeyi en fazla 
destekleyecek kuruluştur. O bakımdan biz, AB üyeliğini Türkiye’nin uzun vadede, gelecekte 
gerçekten yararına olacak bir teşebbüs olarak görüyoruz, bunu tüm kalbimizle destekliyoruz.”) 
 
216 “AB’den eylem planı” (Action plan from the EU). Hürriyet, November 21, 2002. 
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all remaining institutional reforms set forth in the Accession Partnership and the 
National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis. Following the EU’s decisions, 
the high command of the Turkish Armed Forces and the majority of the officers 
overtly approved “Turkey’s bid for membership, as this will mean the final 
achievement of Turkey’s modernization process started by Atatürk” (Konijnenbelt, 
2006: 171). 
 
However, following the European Council’s decision, Turkey’s accession 
negotiations were widely debated in the EU. Gradually some sectors of the EU 
public, opposed to Turkey’s membership, came to question the legitimacy of the 
European Council’s decisions. The debates mostly revolved around whether Turkey 
belongs in Europe in terms of its political and cultural structures. The president of the 
European Convention on the future of Europe, former French President Valery 
Giscard d’Estaing, said several times that “Turkey cannot belong to the EU,” citing 
economic, demographic and cultural factors to support his claim.217 Furthermore, 
during this period, the language of the May 2003 European Parliament report was 
very critical of Turkey’s political system, including the 1982 Constitution, while 
questioning whether Kemalist values are compatible with Turkey’s EU membership 
process. Additionally, the report contained some severe criticisms of the role of the 
army in Turkish political life. The European Parliament report (2003) stated that “the 
army maintains a central position in the Turkish state and society” and “notes with 
regret that the army’s excessive role slows down Turkey’s development towards a 
democratic and pluralist system.” The report is not binding for the candidate 
countries, yet it still has an impact on the decisions of the European Commission.  
                                                 
217 “Giscard D’Estaing: ‘Türkiye AB’ye ait olamaz’ ” (Giscard D’Estaing: ‘Turkey cannot belong to 
Europe’), BBC Turkish.com, November 25, 2004. 
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EU’s criticisms raised skeptical attitudes in Turkish society with regard to 
membership. These are issues of high politics related to Turkey’s national 
sovereignty. Issues associated with political unification, or convergence on matters 
of high politics, are sources of fierce dispute within the member states (Hix, 1999). 
This is due to tensions rising when national structures and the EU prove 
incompatible, or when national preferences diverge on issues relating to policy 
priorities in which the members are reluctant to share their sovereign powers 
(Newman, 1996). The legitimacy of the EU’s conditions matters to the extent to 
which the rules applying to candidate countries are also shared by the member states, 
whether they are clearly defined and coherently applied in the EU, because “ ‘double 
standards’ fail to exert the same compliance pull” (Schimmelfennig, Engert and 
Knobel, 2003: 500). 
 
The EU’s stance towards Turkey’s accession has increasingly become a subject of 
debate in domestic politics due to rising concerns in the Union regarding Turkey’s 
membership. These include the compatibility of collective norms and values 
associated with the nation-state. According to the Turkish General Staff, owing to 
several factors arising from Turkey’s region, the safeguarding of Turkey’s national 
security interests is very important. Thus, the claim is that “countries that have 
concerns regarding Turkey’s geography, administrative structure, economy, religion, 
history etc., with reference to the protection of their own security interests, need a 
peaceful and secure Turkey.”218  
 
                                                 
218 “Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Basını Bilgilendirme Toplantısı” (Press briefing by the Turkish General 
Staff), November 2, 2004 (“Türkiye’yi coğrafyası, yönetim yapısı, ekonomisi, dini, tarihi vb. 
nedenlerle sorgulayan ülkelerin en çok da kendi güvenliklerini korumak için huzurlu ve güvenlikli bir 
Türkiye’ye tahminlerinden daha fazla ihtiyaçları vardır.”)  
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Additionally, former Land Forces Commander Aytaç Yalman argued that  
the Turkish Armed Forces has played a pioneering role in the integration of 
Turkey to the West, and therefore, nobody should think that the Turkish 
Armed Forces could be against the EU and democracy.219 … Atatürkism 
[one of the major principles upon which the Turkish Republic is based] is a 
progressive worldview; it is neither in contradiction with contemporary 
requisites nor a pro-status quo worldview … if there is democracy in Turkey 
this is due to the Turkish Armed Forces, which is the guarantee of not only 
the Republic but also of democracy. The army is an institution that opens the 
way for democratization.220  
 
 
The military has affirmed at various times that it supports Turkey’s EU membership 
and related governmental policies, since the fundamental values of the Republic, 
which are shared by the majority of Turkish people as well as the military, are 
consonant with EU norms and values. Supporting this argument, on New Year’s Eve 
2004, then Chief of the General Staff Özkök stated, “We see membership in the EU 
as an important tool that will help realize the objective set by Atatürk, which is to 
‘take Turkey beyond the level of modern civilizations’.”221 In this connection, the 
military pointed to ways to enhance mutual dialogue to ensure understanding and 
stability in Turkey-EU relations. 
 
                                                 
219 Cited in Heper (2005a: 39). 
 
220 “Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanı’ndan önemli mesajlar” (Important messages from the Land Forces 
commander), September 29, 2003 (“Kemalizm, diğer bir deyişle Atatürkçülük; bu modernitenin 
zirvesidir ve birçok talihsiz açıklamada olduğu gibi statükocu değil, ilerici ve atılımcı fikirler ile 
çağdaşlığı hedeflemektedir. Ancak bu özelliğimiz kimi ortamlarda Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin görevi ve 
devletin bekası ile Avrupa Birliği sürecinin işletilmesi arasında bir tercih faktörü olarak sunulmakta, 
bazı ülkeler ve uluslararası kuruluşlar, Türk silahlı kuvvetlerinin pasifize edilmesine yönelik olarak, 
bu fikri benimseyenlere adeta akıl hocalığı yapmaktadırlar”), and Fikret Bila, ‘TSK 
demokratikleşmenin önünde engel değildir’ ” (The TAF is not an obstacle to democratization), 
Milliyet, August 31, 2003. (“Tükiye’de demokrasi varsa, yalnızca Cumhuriyet’in değil, demokrasinin 
de teminatı olan TSK sayesindedir. Ordu, demokratikleşmenin de önünü açan bir kurumdur.”) 
 
221 “Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Sayın Hilmi Özkök’ün Yeni Yıl Mesajı” (New Year’s message 
of Chief of the General Staff, General Hilmi Özkök), December 31, 2004 (“Avrupa Birliği üyeliği’nin 
ulu önder Atatürk’ün bizlere vermiş olduğu ‘Türkiye’yi çağdaş uygarlığın ilerisine taşıma hedefi’ için 
önemli bir araç olarak görmekteyiz.”) 
 164
However, the military’s positive attitude toward Turkey’s EU membership and 
political reforms does include several concerns, such as the centrality of the 
preservation of fundamental national interests and values while meeting the political 
conditions for membership. In this connection, Özkök, emphasizing at various times 
the “difficult geography where Turkey is located” as compared to its European 
counterparts, said that  
the Turkish Armed Forces is saddled with new and difficult tasks as a 
consequence of the reactionary and separatist movements that continue to 
become even more critical as time goes by … new democratic values and 
changing concepts of sovereignty make it necessary that we come up with 
new ideas and doctrines for the better fulfillment by the Turkish Armed 
Forces of arduous tasks in question.222  
 
Although expressing a positive attitude towards domestic adaptation to transforming 
international circumstances, the military has expressed a number of concerns about 
the EU’s credibility. Whether all member states would support Turkey’s full 
membership on the condition that the membership criteria were met was the main 
concern. Furthermore, whether EU policies fail to grasp Turkey’s geopolitical 
conditions as well as its historical specificity has been questioned. As the Turkish 
General Staff stated in a press briefing: 
We believe in the importance of firmly upholding our national interests 
during the process of accession negotiations with the EU. It should not be 
forgotten that just as the EU will bring us benefits, Turkey’s membership 
would mediate the EU to become a global power.223
 
On the one hand, as the public statements of the military clearly show, a high value is 
placed on full EU membership in order to strengthen political and cultural ties with 
Europe. On the other hand, there is a tendency to respond to some of the concerns 
                                                 
222 Cited in Heper (2005a: 41). 
 
223 “Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Basını Bilgilendirme Toplantısı” (Press briefing by the Turkish General 
Staff), November 2, 2004 (“Sayın Cumhurbaşkanımızın da daha önce ifade ettikleri gibi Avrupa 
Birliği ile müzakere sürecinde ulusal çıkarlarımızın tam bir kararlılıkla korunmasının önemine 
inanmaktayız. Avrupa Birliği’nin bize sağlayacağı yararlar kadar, Türkiye’nin üyeliğinin Avrupa 
Birliği’ni küresel bir güç olmaya taşıyacağı unutulmamalıdır.”) 
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raised by EU member states by reminding them of Turkey’s geopolitical importance. 
In so doing, the military seeks to remind Europe that Turkey’s national security 
interests, which include preserving the founding principles of the Republic, are also 
important for European security. The military underlines that secularism, as defined 
in the Constitution, is a major driving force of democracy in Turkey, considering the 
region in which it is located. 
 
A clear shift from the formal aspects of institutional change to more substantial 
aspects of transformation can be seen in the rhetoric of the EU. Particularly starting 
in 2003, in the regular reports issued by the European Commission and European 
Parliament, and in the public speeches of EU leaders, the informal aspects of 
institutional change have been stressed more and more. This covers the deepening of 
the political reform process so as to achieve Turkey’s closer integration with the 
Union. The 2004 Communication from the Commission to the European Council and 
European Parliament on Turkey’s progress towards accession states that  
Turkey is at present going through a process of radical change, including a 
rapid evolution of mentalities. It is in the interest of all that the current 
transformation process continues. Turkey would be an important model of a 
country with a majority of Muslim population adhering to such fundamental 
principles as liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law. 
 
From a European perspective, the irreversibility of Turkey’s membership process is 
dependent on the internalization of political reforms. These would empower pro-
reform and pro-EU attitudes reflected in the rhetoric of the domestic political actors. 
Allesandro Missir di Lusignano, the desk officer for Turkey in the Directorate 
General Enlargement of the European Commission, said, “The irreversibility of the 
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reform process will need to be confirmed over a longer period of time.”224 Therefore, 
one can observe the importance that the EU attaches to the internalization of political 
reforms so as to deepen the implementation and follow-up of reform policies. The 
EU’s position is that if Turkey fully achieves the implementation of the political 
reforms it will become an EU member.  
 
In this connection, one of the main components of the conditionality regarding civil-
military relations is that Turkey must deal with the “informal mechanisms” of the 
military’s influence so as to further assert civilian initiative in Turkish politics 
(European Commission, 2005). Near the end of 2003, the European Commission  
expressed the EU’s concerns about the “informal mechanisms” through which the 
military is considered to wield influence in political processes. Previously, European 
Parliament recommendations had referred to collective norms and values attributed 
to the military by Turkish society that might constraint the assertion of civilian 
supremacy in political matters and hinder Turkey’s overall process of 
Europeanization (European Parliament, 2003). In this connection, the public rhetoric 
was cited as an important mediator of political influence. As the European 
Commission noted: 
Apart from the NSC, the armed forces in Turkey exercise influence through a 
series of informal mechanisms. On various occasion military members of the 
NSC expressed their opinions about political, social and foreign policy 
matters in public speeches, statements to the media and declarations 
(European Commission, 2003). 
 
According to the EU, the public declarations of the members of the armed forces are 
signs of their involvement in domestic and foreign policy processes.  
                                                 
224 See the speech given by Allesandro Missir di Lusignano (2004: 6, 8), the desk officer for Turkey in 
the Directorate General Enlargement of the European Commission. 
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These concerns raised in the 2003 reports came up again in the 2004 Regular Report 
of the European Commission. Concerning military matters, according to the report, 
the overall reforms of the previous year, including the functioning of the NSC and 
accountability and transparency-building efforts, further shifted the balance of civil-
military relations towards civilians and encouraged debate in this area (European 
Commission, 2004). The report confirmed the need to sustain a general positive 
attitude in Turkey toward EU membership. However, the EU’s official reports also 
stressed that “civilian control over the military institution” needs to be asserted in the 
long run (European Parliament, 2004). Apart from formal, legal-institutional reforms 
and processes of policy alignment in the context of European integration, it can be 
gathered from the official reports that the EU continues to be concerned about the 
informal aspects of institutional change (European Commission, 2004). The 2005 
and 2006 reports also mention this issue as an area of remaining concern. 
 
In response to the EU’s reports, the military has frequently asserted that it is not 
involved in politics. From 2004 onwards, high-ranking officers increasingly made it 
clear in their public rhetoric that, in their view, the military is not interested in getting 
involved in daily political and social matters. In April 2004, then Chief of the 
General Staff Hilmi Özkök told a press conference  
recently we feel that there is an expectation from the media and the public 
that the Turkish Armed Forces should take a stand on every important matter 
… we respect this opinion, yet the Turkish Armed Forces should neither be 
expected to express its attitude on every subject nor to share everything with 
the public.225  
                                                 
225  “Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök’ün Konuşması” (The speech given by the Chief of 
the General Staff, General Hilmi Özkök), April 13, 2004. (“Son zamanlarda medyada ve halkımızda 
şöyle bir beklenti olduğunu hissediyoruz. ‘TSK her zaman önemli konularda evet veya hayır diyerek 
kesin tavır koymalıdır, hatta koymak zorundadır ve bunu da kamu ile paylaşmalıdır.’ Elbette, bu 
düşünceye saygılıyız. Ancak, TSK’nın her konuda tavır koyan taraf olması veya her şeyi kamuoyu ile 
paylaşması da beklenmemelidir.”) The speech of General Özkök covers the situation in Cyprus and 
current debates over the role of the Turkish Armed Forces. 
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In a press briefing that November, it was explained that media briefings are ways to 
inform the public about the agenda of the Turkish General Staff and are restricted to 
issues relating to security and defense.226 These matters are part of the responsibility 
of the Turkish Armed Forces, said the briefing. These speeches are made with due 
respect to the legal framework and with consideration of transparency issues in line 
with the EU’s conditionality on informing the public and sharing information, the 
General Staff said. Accordingly, as stated by the Turkish General Staff at a press 
conference:  
As you all know in the report [of the European Commission] there is a 
statement on the influence that the Turkish Armed Forces continue to 
exercise through informal mechanisms. The briefings are cited in this 
connection … informing the press and the public is a method supporting the 
principles of sharing information and informing the public that are also 
advocated by the European Union. This method aims at informing the press 
on issues concerning the security of both the country and the region.227  
 
 
Therefore, the military considers these briefings part of its efforts to increase 
transparency in the conduct of defense and security affairs. This is particularly 
relevant for raising public knowledge of security and defense matters affecting the 
country. It can be argued that these public briefings integrate the wider political 
society in the formulation of defense and security policy. In relation to the duty of 
the military, General Hilmi Özkök said that the Turkish Armed Forces stand for “the 
safeguarding and protection of the national and territorial integrity of the Turkish 
                                                 
226 “Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Basını Bilgilendirme Toplantısı” (Press briefing by the Turkish General 
Staff), November 2, 2004. 
 
227 “Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Basını Bilgilendirme Toplantısı” (Press briefing by the Turkish General 
Staff), November 2, 2004 (“Hepinizin bildiği gibi raporda TSK’nın resmi olmayan yolları kullanarak 
etkisini sürdürdüğüne ilişkin cümle yer almaktadır. Yapılan brifinglerde bu kapsamda 
gösterilmektedir ... TSK’nın basını ve kamuoyunu bilgilendirmeye devam etmesi, Avrupa Birliği’nin 
de savunduğu kamuoyunu bilgilendirme ve bilginin paylaşımını destekleyen bir yöntemdir. Bu 
yöntemle basının ülke ve bölge güvenliğiyle ilgili konularda TSK’dan bilgi almasına önem verilirken, 
doğruluğu tartışmalı kaynaklar üzerinden yanlış ve spekülatif bilgi alınmasının önüne geçmek de 
hedeflenmektedir.”) 
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Republic as well as the main tenets of the Republic, namely, the democratic, secular 
and social state governed by the rule of law.”228 Accordingly, the public statements 
reflected the military’s attitude towards several internal or external issues that are 
considered part of its professional domain.  
 
As explored in previous chapters, the European Council’s decision was reaffirmed on 
December 17, 2004 when the EU finally decided to open accession negotiations with 
Turkey by October 3, 2005. The decision stated, “Turkey sufficiently fulfills the 
Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotiations.” The December 3, 2004 
European Parliament report was also supportive of the Commission’s 2004 
resolution. According to the Directorate General for Enlargement’s desk officer 
responsible for Turkey, affirming the political will of the EU, 
the decision to open accession negotiations should also be seen in the wider 
context of peace, stability and prosperity. Turkey is an important regional 
actor … As a result of its combined population, location, economic and 
military potential, it has the capacity to affect regional and international 
stability. A prosperous, stable Turkey is conducive to stability in the area, 
while an economically weak, unstable Turkey wracked by religious, ethnic 
and political turmoil would be a source of instability in all neighboring 
regions. In a world increasingly marked by the emerging divide between the 
Moslem world and what can loosely be defined as the West, it is worth 
reminding that Turkey is endowed with unique characteristics: the 
combination of a secular, democratic state with a prevalently Muslim 
population.229
  
The European Council (2004) also added that the EU’s institutions would continue to 
monitor whether far-reaching reforms undertaken by Turkey’s government would be 
sustained in the long run. This relates to the relative importance attached by the EU 
                                                 
228 “Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök’ün Konuşması” (The speech given by the Chief of 
the General Staff, General Hilmi Özkök), April 13, 2004 (“TSK’nın bugüne kadar daima taraf olduğu 
ve bundan sonra da taraf olmaya devam edeceği konu; Cumhuriyetin demokratik, laik, sosyal bir 
hukuk devleti niteliğiyle, Türkiye Cunhuriyeti’nin ulusu ve toprağıyla bölünmez bütünlüğünün 
sonsuza kadar korunması ve kollanmasıdır.”) 
 
229 The speech given by Allesandro Missir di Lusignano (2004: 26), desk officer for Turkey in the 
Directorate General Enlargement of the European Commission. 
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both to the full embrace of the legal reforms and to the will of domestic political 
actors to implement these reforms. Accordingly, the extent to which domestic actors 
assimilate the EU’s norms and values forms a constitutive part of the process of legal 
harmonization. As the European Commission declared,  
the changes to the Turkish political and legal system over the past years are 
part of a longer process and it will take time before the sprit of the reforms is 
fully reflected in the attitude of executive and judicial bodies, at all levels and 
throughout the country (2004). 
 
In this respect, the attitude of domestic political actors, including the military, 
regarding the implementation and sustained development of the reform process is 
emphasized. The EU’s decision to launch accession negotiations provided a major 
impetus for the deepening of political reforms in Turkey, in view of how compliance 
effectively leads to further integration. 
 
As argued so far, the EU’s normative discourse concerning the strengthening of 
democracy is part of transformations in international politics in which norms of 
recognition associated with appropriate state behavior and international image 
become prevalent. In view of the current global changes, then Chief of the General 
Staff Hilmi Özkök, in an April 20, 2005 speech at the Turkish War Colleges, touched 
upon “the relations of Turkey with global actors and effects of the changing security 
strategies on Turkey.” In his speech, he emphasized that Turkey needs to grasp 
recent developments in order to adapt to rising security and defense restructuring 
needs within the current global context marked by the fall of the Soviet Union and 
the September 11, 2001 attacks, which are significantly reshaping today’s world. 
Özkök stressed that Turkey’s foreign policy’s focus on becoming a member of the 
EU should be considered a positive factor in terms of security and stability in the 
region: 
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Every country has different needs, conditions, values, histories, societal 
concerns and dynamics … The EU is a great commercial, economic and 
military partner of Turkey. This has been the case for many years. As a 
nation which regards Western values as coinciding with our own, we have 
always wanted to be with them and act in line with similar values from the 
beginning. We have, for a long time, aspired to the economic and political 
union that the West has set up in a long process. Turkey’s interest lies in 
being a full member of the EU. It is quite inappropriate to consider 
membership as a favor the EU would do for us. Both the EU and Turkey 
would benefit from this unification.230
 
 
5.3 The Post-2004 Period: Ruptures in Mutual Understanding and Dialogue 
 
Following the 2004 report of the European Commission and the decision of the 
European Council, the issue of enlargement in general and Turkey’s membership 
process in particular has increasingly attracted debate within the European Union. 
During this period (2004-2006), Turkey’s eligibility for membership has drawn 
rising controversy within the Union.231 On the one hand, several political actors 
within the EU consider Turkey’s accession a necessity for the Union’s strategic 
concerns, including policies towards enhancing dialogue between cultures.232 On the 
other hand, Turkey’s possible impact on the Union, such as the capacity of EU 
structures to absorb Turkey, has been called in question (European Parliament, 
2004). Moreover, Turkey’s accession is debated in terms of its population size, 
                                                 
230 “The speech given by the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Hilmi Özkök at the 
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231 “Türkiye ile müzakereler çıkmaz sokağa doğru” (Negotiations with Turkey towards an impasse), 
ABHaber, November 5, 2006.  
More details available from http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/ey-turkey-relations/article-
129678.  
 
232 “Schröder: Türkiye’nin AB’ye tam katılımından başka bir çözüm yok” (Schröder: There is no 
solution besides Turkey’s full accession), ABHaber, November 5, 2006. See also “Belçika’dan 
Türkiye’ye AB Desteği” (Support for Turkey’s EU membership from Belgium), ABHaber, May 23 
2003. 
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economy, democratic credentials, security, and geographical location as well as its 
cultural and religious traits.  
 
Currently, the Christian Democrats in the European Parliament (267 seats) are 
skeptical or even opposed to Turkey’s EU membership. However, the Socialist 
Group (201 seats), and the Liberal Democrats (89 seats), have expressed themselves 
in favor of Turkey’s inclusion in the EU, on the condition that it complies fully with 
the political criteria.233 They believe Turkey’s accession would contribute to the 
“accomplishment of democracy and plural diversity in Europe.” At the same time, 
public opinion polls show low levels of support in several EU member states, 
including France, Austria and Germany, for Turkey’s full membership.234 However, 
according to Eurobarometer polls, support for Turkish accession is considerably 
higher in Southern European countries such as Italy, Portugal and Spain, as well as in 
the United Kingdom.  
 
The EU presidency is also a very important factor, since most of the debates on 
Turkey’s status in the EU took place during the Austria Presidency (January-July 
2006).235 At the governmental level, the Germany Presidency of the EU (January-
June 2007), the Christian Democrat party government, proposed a “privileged 
                                                 
233 “AB, Türkiye konusunda ikiye bölündü” (Two splits in the EU on Turkey’s membership), 
Hürriyet, October 7, 2007. Information on political groups in the European Parliament is available at 
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234 European Commission, Member States Eurobarometer (1999-2006),  
Available from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm  
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partnership” for Turkey.236 In line with this proposal, several other governments, 
such as the French under Jacques Chirac’s presidency, have also offered to consider 
such an arrangement with Turkey in response to their electorates.237 Finally, the 
president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barosso, declared that the 
process of EU enlargement should be paused at least for a period of time, until the 
EU overcomes its constitutional problems.238 Barosso also referred to the European 
public’s concerns about enlargement in general and Turkey’s accession in particular 
and, in this connection, the need to strengthen transnational civil society dialogue. 
His argument was based on the prevailing idea that without the introduction of new 
reforms to EU institutions, the process of European integration would face serious 
difficulties. However, Barosso expressed a strongly favorable opinion on the 
continuance of the process of accession negotiations with Turkey.239  
 
In spite of these issues and their reverberations in European public opinion, the 
European Council (2004) and European Parliament (2004) had proposed to 
strengthen political and cultural dialogue with Turkey. It was hoped that this would 
ameliorate doubts and problems in the public. However, during this period, cleavages 
between the pro-EU enlargement faction who want to include Turkey and those who 
                                                 
236 Beril Dedeoğlu, “Privileged partnership, discriminative partnership,” Today’s Zaman, March 21, 
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237 “Chirac’ın Türkiye Karnesi” (Chirac weighs in on Turkey), ABHaber, April 16, 2007. See also 
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238 “Times: AB’ye Eylül Darbesi” (September break for the EU), ABHaber, November 6, 2006. 
 
239 “Sonucuna katlanırsınız” (You will suffer the consequences), Milliyet, May 24, 2007. 
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are skeptical about the benefits that Turkey’s membership would bring to the Union 
have grown more visible.240 As noted above, apart from remaining concerns raised 
by the European Commission and Parliament reports, on EU platforms Turkey’s 
eligibility for membership is not only considered in terms of processes of 
democratization, but also in light of socioeconomic aspects, cultural compatibility 
and institutional burdens that Turkey’s membership could bring to the EU. The 
European Parliament’s September 2006 evaluations, including several sharp 
criticisms of discrepancies in Turkey’s fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria over 
the protection of non-Muslim minorities, also led to public debate. In this connection, 
under the ninth EU harmonization package, several provisions of the Law on 
Foundations were revised by Parliament in September-October 2006.241  
 
Furthermore, the negative attitude toward Turkey reflected in the statements of some 
member states’ leaders called into question the extent to which compliance with 
political criteria was a top priority of the EU’s conditionality for Turkey’s 
membership. In France, the two candidates in the spring 2007 presidential race had 
divergent opinions on Turkey. Socialist leader Segolene Royal proposed leaving the 
decision to referendums. But the former interior minister, conservative Nicolas 
Sarkozy, who eventually bested Royal, was outspoken in his opposition to Turkey’s 
membership. He stated that once he became president, he would develop policies to 
exclude Turkey from enlargement because this is what the French public wants.242 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s skepticism about Turkey joining the EU has 
                                                 
240 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer (2004-2006), available from 
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242 “Fransız adayların Türkiye’nin AB üyeliğine Bakışı” (French candidates’ perspectives on Turkey’s 
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had considerable repercussions in Turkish society in view of the two nations’ 
longstanding economic and political ties.243 France and Germany are among the 
founders of European economic and political integration. Thus, the attitude of their 
leaders is seen as a major factor influencing the EU’s enlargement decisions as well. 
These statements, even if balanced out by more pro-Turkey stances, such as those of 
recently retired British Prime Minister Tony Blair and former Italian Premier Silvio 
Berlusconi, indicate that public opinion in the EU is divided over whether to grant 
Turkey membership status or not.244  
 
Equally important, particularly during 2006, relations between Turkey and the EU 
became tense due to several political reasons, such as the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s 
failure to fully comply with the Association Agreement.245 The European Council’s 
December 2006 decision to suspend several chapters of accession negotiations was 
seen by the Justice and Development Party government as showing the EU’s 
ambivalence towards Turkey’s full membership.246 As a result, the credibility of EU 
membership is increasingly being questioned in Turkey. This is a major impediment 
to deepening Turkey’s process of Europeanization. 
 
It is argued in this dissertation that these debates over Turkey’s eligibility for EU 
membership have done much harm to the fulfillment of the EU’s political conditions 
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regarding informal aspects of institutional change, such as the deepening of political 
reforms. On Turkey’s side of the spectrum, significant legislative reforms, such as 
the sixth and seventh harmonization packages, were undertaken as a result of a 
consensus between the ruling Justice and Development Party, the main opposition 
Republican People’s Party, several sectors of civil society, and the military. The 
shared opinion was that the opening of the process of accession negotiations would 
deepen political reforms. “The Turkish state elites see themselves as ‘Western’ and 
regard the ‘West’ as their primary in-group in international relations” 
(Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2003: 508; Kubicek, 1999: 159). Accordingly, 
Turkey is defined as a secular democracy aligned with the West. This identification 
has its echoes in the National Programme for Adoption of the Acquis issued in July 
2003, which states:  
Accession to the European Union is a national target, which is supported by 
and reflects the common purpose of a vast majority of the people. This aim, 
which is also an integral part of Turkey’s strategic vision, fully corresponds 
to the founding philosophy of the Republic and Atatürk’s vision for the 
nation’s integration with contemporary civilization.247
 
 
However, the debates among EU member states on Turkey’s accession have 
weakened the belief that compliance with the political conditions would result in full 
membership. During 2004-2006, at the governmental level, Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan and then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, as well as leaders of the 
main opposition Republican People’s Party, all expressed their worries. They argued 
that Turkey’s membership process would make a positive contribution to democracy, 
                                                 
247 Turkey’s National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (Avrupa Birliği Müktesabatının 
Üstlenilmesine İlişkin Türkiye Ulusal Programı), published in July 2003 in the Official Gazette. Also 
available from http://www.abgs.gov.tr
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pluralism and cultural diversity in the EU.248 Additionally, the Secretariat General 
for EU Affairs published reports on the political reforms which were achieved in 
Turkey towards closer integration with the EU.249 The reports were supported by 
additional efforts to persuade the EU about the contributions that Turkish 
membership would bring to the Union. The government of the Justice and 
Development Party (2004) prepared a report entitled “The Impact of Turkey’s 
Membership on the EU.”250 It argued that Turkey’s membership would not be a 
burden to the European Union but in fact would effectively contribute to the EU’s 
economy, security and democracy. Finally, some Turkish civil society groups, such 
as TÜSİAD, İKV and TESEV, prepared reports and bulletins on the effect of 
Turkey’s membership on both Turkey and the EU.251  
 
The military’s attitude towards the EU’s rhetoric on Turkey’s membership was in 
step with that of the civilian elites. The former Chief of the General Staff Hilmi 
Özkök said that  
opposition to Turkey’s EU membership has emerged in some European 
countries since December 17 [2004], including decisions taken by the 
parliaments of certain nations to hold a referendum on Turkey’s membership. 
Similarly, in certain countries, groups opposing Turkey’s EU membership are 
working on bills envisioning a “privileged partnership.” Furthermore, some 
circles have voiced negative and prejudiced assessments regarding Turkey’s 
possible contributions to the Union.252  
                                                 
248 “Erdoğan: AB Kriterleri taviz değil” (EU criteria are not concessions), Hürriyet, May 29, 2003, 
and the Prime Minister Erdoğan’s speech on December 10, 2004. See also Onur Öymen’s (RPP) 
speech on October 12, 2004.   
 
249 “Political reforms in Turkey,” available from http://www.abgs.gov.tr  
 
250 “Türkiye’nin Üyeliğinin AB’ye Etkileri” (The Impact of Turkey’s Membership on the EU), 
December 12, 2004. Available from http://www.akparti.org.tr  
 
251 “Sivil Girişim: Şimdi Sıra AB’de” (Civilian Initiatives: Now it’s the EU’s turn), Hürriyet, October 
7, 2002. The reports are available from http://www.tüsiad.org, http://www.ikv.org.tr, and 
http://www.tesev.gov.tr  
 
252 “The speech given by the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Hilmi Özkök at the 
Turkish War Colleges,” April 20, 2005. 
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Clearly, the military was very concerned about the prevailing negative attitude in the 
EU towards Turkey’s prospective membership. In this connection, the military 
reiterated that the benefits Turkey’s EU membership would bring to the European 
economy as well as to European common foreign and security policy structures 
should not be overlooked. 
 
Support for EU membership in Turkey itself is another important factor shaping the 
military’s attitude. In recent years, societal support for EU membership among the 
Turkish people has been relatively high.253 Nevertheless, according to available 
surveys, identification with European norms and values varies across domestic 
political actors depending on their political stands as well as their areas of 
identification with the EU, such as democratic values, religious values, etc.254 
However, in terms of specific issues relating to political or economic reforms, the 
rates vary across areas of convergence with EU structures. Surveys indicate low 
levels of knowledge and information about European integration and its impact on 
domestic political structures.  
 
Since 2004, the expression of dissent in EU member states towards Turkey’s 
membership has been negatively received in Turkish society (Çarkoğlu, 2004; 
Yılmaz, 2003; Çayhan, 2003). On the one hand, the diffusion of EU norms through 
legal-institutional changes and reform policies has resulted in rising societal 
                                                 
253 See European Commission, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (2002, November 2003, Autumn 
2004, Autumn 2005, and 2006), available from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm. 
See also “Bir gün mutlaka AB” (EU membership: certainly one day), Milliyet, retrieved from 
http://www.milliyet.con/2005/10/01/siyaset/axsiy01.html  
 
254 See European Commission. Autumn 2004. Eurobarometer 62 “Public Opinion in the European 
Union: National Report Executive Summary Turkey,” available from http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int. For 
instance, in a survey conducted by Yılmaz (November 2003), 86% of Republican People’s Party 
supporters favor Turkey’s EU membership, compared to 71% of Justice and Development Party 
supporters. See also Çarkoğlu (2004). 
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expectations that Turkey’s economy and democracy would benefit greatly from 
prospective membership.255 On the other hand, the existence of negative public 
opinion about Turkey in several member states has led to rising concerns in the 
Turkish public as to whether the EU is a credible anchor for the realization of the 
nation’s political and economic reforms.256 Surveys also show that there is concern 
that Turkey has given up or now shares national sovereignty with the EU even 
though its EU membership is far from guaranteed. This empowers Eurosceptic 
attitudes within political society.257 Consequently, cleavages between Eurosceptic 
and pro-EU domestic actors have become much wider and more visible (Avcı, 2003; 
Çarkoğlu, 2004).  
 
However, having a pro-EU or anti-EU membership stand doesn’t necessarily mean 
the adoption of an either fully supportive or qualified stance on the processes of 
political and economic reforms. Among the membership candidates, divisions 
between EU supporters and those having skeptical attitudes toward EU membership 
prevail as well, but support for European integration varies considerably across 
economic and political lines (Schimelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2003). As cited by 
the European Commission (2004) in evaluating Eurobarometer results, “there are 
meaningful differences in the importance the countries attach to different problems” 
within the framework of the process of Europeanization.258  
 
                                                 
255 “Genç Türkiye 2002: Ekonomik Yaşam, Tüketim Davranışları, Sosyal Yaşam, Siyasete Bakış, 
Avrupa Birliği” (Young Turkey 2002: Economic Life, Consumption Behaviors, Social Life, Political 
Views, European Union), Milliyet, July 19, 2002. 
 
256 For detailed analysis of survey findings, see Çarkoğlu (2004).  
 
257 For detailed analysis of survey findings, see Çarkoğlu (2003), and McLaren (2002). 
 
258 See also European Commission, “Member States Public Opinion Analysis”, Eurobarometer 
available from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm
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Public opinion, as an influential factor on the military’s attitude, is very important in 
terms of deepening Europeanization. The evolution of informal aspects of domestic 
institutional structures within the context of Turkey’s EU membership embeds such 
ideas as commitment to Western and European identity, democracy and the values of 
liberal political principles. Yet, the ambivalent attitude in some quarters of the EU 
towards Turkey’s membership has led to a backlash in Turkish society. First, this has 
impeded further integration with the EU in terms of norms and values. Second, this 
has weakened the arguments of pro-EU sectors of society.  
 
However, from EU’s point of view the military’s attitude influences public opinion 
formation in Turkey. During Turkey’s EU accession negations, from October 3, 2005 
onward, the EU’s official reports and declarations have continued to express concern 
about the influence of the military in Turkish polity:  
Since 2002, Turkey has made good progress in reforming civil-military 
relations. It is essential that Turkey consolidates reforms adopted in previous 
years and remains committed to further reforms in this area … In particular, 
statements made by the military should only concern military, defense and 
security matters and should only be made under the authority of the 
government, while the civilian authorities should fully exercise their 
supervisory functions, in particular as regards the formulation of the national 
security strategy and its implementation, including with regard the relations 
with neighboring countries (European Commission, 2005).  
 
While the EU has acknowledged the improvement of transparency and public 
openness of NSC meetings through press releases, it is critical of the public 
statements made by members of the armed forces. The EU sees these statements as 
having great influence in the conduct of domestic and foreign political affairs and 
public opinion formation. However, it has particularly focused on the question of 
whether the military’s public pronouncements are made under the supervision of the 
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civilian authority or rather autonomously. Indeed, the EU encourages the 
strengthening of civilian initiatives in this respect.  
 
Against the European Commission’s rather diplomatic evaluations of Turkey’s 
current political reform process, Hans Jörg Kretschmer, former ambassador at the 
Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, in September 2006 argued,  
the Armed Forces … are exempt from the control of the civilian authority … 
the establishment of civil control over the armed forces is a key factor … the 
armed forces look from a very broad perspective at the concept of national 
security, and make declarations in almost all areas of public life … these 
declarations have a great influence on the public, considering that the armed 
forces is the most respected and stable institution in the eyes of the people259  
 
These statements led to critical reactions in the Turkish public in view of the ongoing 
EU harmonization process. In addition to these arguments on the role of the military 
in Turkey, the Dutch chief of the General Staff, Dick L. Berlijn, told an ASAM 
conference in September 2006 that  
the EU thinks that the Turkish military should be prepared for a different role 
in politics. The role of the chief of the General Staff in Turkey should be less 
visible; in all EU countries, civilians have the last word, and we expect the 
same to happen in Turkey.260
 
The fact that this statement came from a military officer has particularly thrown into 
question the EU’s standards on informal institutional change in the area of civil-
military relations. These statements negatively affected Turkey’s perspective on the 
EU.  
 
A final EU criticism related to the informal aspects of institutional change concerns 
the interpretation of the functions of the Turkish Armed Forces. The 2005 report 
referred to the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, which the Commission 
                                                 
259 “Kretschmer hedefti” (Kretschmer was the target), Radikal, October 3, 2006. 
 
260 “Kretschmer hedefti” (Kretshmer was the target), Radikal, October 3, 2006. 
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said grants “the military a wide margin of maneuver” (European Commission, 2005). 
However, the Turkish General Staff had stated,  
in almost all countries there are laws similar to Article 35, which stipulates 
that ‘the duty of the Armed Forces is to protect the Turkish land and the 
Republic of Turkey as defined by the Constitution” … No nation would be 
open to discussing arrangements that would harm their defense 
mechanisms.261
 
Accordingly, the Turkish General Staff has mentioned that in the constitutions of 
some EU member states there are even more sweeping articles defining the functions 
and responsibilities of the armed forces.262 Therefore, the military has questioned 
whether the EU has a double standard towards Turkey’s accession process. 
 
It is difficult to demonstrate empirically whether the public statements of the military 
are made under the supervision of the civilian authority or not. Similarly, the extent 
to which these statements have a direct influence on forming government policies or 
public opinion requires further empirical test. In this connection, the Turkish 
government states that the civilian authority rules Turkey. In response to the EU’s 
remaining points of concerns, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from 2003 
onwards has expressed several times that in line with the Copenhagen political 
criteria a new process has started in Turkey where a political, civil will has the 
                                                 
261 “Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Basını Bilgilendirme Toplantısı” (Press briefing by the Turkish General 
Staff), November 2, 2004 (“‘Silahlı Kuvvetlerin vazifesi Türk yurdunu ve Anayasa ile tayin edilmiş 
olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’ni korumak ve kollamaktır’ şeklindeki 35 inci maddesinin hemen her 
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Anayasalarında ve Silahlı Kuvvetlerle ilgili özel kanunlarında Silahlı Kuvvetlere bu çerçevede görev 
ve sorumluluk yükleyen çok daha kapsamlı maddeler bulunmaktadır. Buradan görüleceği gibi, kendini 
bir ülke ve ulus olarak tanımlayan hiçbir ulus kendini koruyacak mekanizmalara zarar verecek 
düzenlemeleri tartışmaya açmaz.”)  
 
262 “Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Basını Bilgilendirme Toplantısı” (Press briefing by the Turkish General 
Staff), November 2, 2004. 
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authority.263 He asserted that the chief of the General Staff is responsible to the 
prime minister, and the NSC is a civilian institution.264 At an earlier briefing the 
prime minister said that the NSC does not function above Parliament and that all of 
its members are conscious of this.265 He explained that a number of issues, including 
the EU membership process, could be discussed in NSC meetings in view of the fact 
that “no decisions will be taken above or against the will of Parliament.” He added, 
“No one has to worry, the Turkish Armed Forces is the pioneer of the processes of 
modernization and democratization in Turkey.”266 Therefore, in the government’s 
eyes, the EU’s remaining points of concerns are groundless. Then Foreign Minister 
Abdullah Gül echoed the prime minister’s position, stating: “The military shares its 
views with the government and leaves the final decision to the politicians.”267 He 
underlined that civilian capacity to take the initiative is a very important dimension 
of implementing the EU’s political criteria.268
 
Similarly, in response to the latest official EU statements, which persist in 
questioning the informal role of the Turkish Armed Forces in Turkish political life, 
Chief of the General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt stated, 
                                                 
263 “Erdoğan: TSK sivil iradenin dışına çıkamaz” (Edoğan: The TAF can’t act outside civilian 
authority), Hürriyet, October 2, 2006. 
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Milliyet, October 3, 2006 
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Milliyet, July 5, 2003. 
 
268 “Gül: Askerler değil siyasetçi suçlu” (Gül: It’s not the military but the politicians that are guilty), 
Milliyet, July 5, 2003. 
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In recent years the role of the military has been widely discussed in Turkey 
… The Turkish Armed Forces is certainly not involved in domestic politics 
and is not interested in being involved. It is our understanding that soldiers 
have four main duties: The first is to train the best possible and best-prepared 
troops for war; the second is to defend the country against foreign threats and 
maintain national interests; the third is to fight terrorism and all forces aiming 
to destroy the unitary nature of the country; and the fourth is to preserve the 
basic principles of the Republic set forth in the first three articles of the 
Constitution. These four matters, from our point of view, are not related to 
domestic politics, and these are our legal responsibilities.269
 
At a later speech at the War Academies in October 2006, General Büyükanıt stated, 
“Nobody is, nor can be, against democratic values and rights … There are attempts 
to paint the Turkish Armed Forces as posing an obstacle to democratization … The 
fact is, as soldiers, we are not involved in politics.” 270 He emphasized that 
preservation of the Republic, including the secular-democratic regime and the 
national integrity of the country, is the responsibility of the Turkish Armed Forces. 
This, he said, is not considered involvement in daily politics but rather a 
responsibility granted by the laws and the Turkish people. 
 
Therefore, despite the ongoing processes of legal-institutional reforms towards 
achieving greater military accountability to civilian authorities, the declarations of 
                                                 
269 “Org. Büyükanıt: Cumhuriyeti korumak siyaset değil görev” (Safeguarding the Republic isn’t 
politics but our responsibility), Radikal, August 29, 2006. (“Son yıllarda Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde 
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ve olmamalıdır … anlayışımıza göre askerin dört temel görevi vardır: Birincisi, kendisine teslim 
edilen birlikleri en iyi şekilde eğitmek ve harbe hazır hale getirmektir; ikincisi, dış tehditlere karşı 
ülkeyi ve ülkenin çıkarlarını korumaktır; üçüncüsü, ülkenin üniter yapısını ortadan kaldırmak isteyen 
terör dahil tüm mihraklarla mücadele etmektir; dördüncüsü ise, anayasanın ilk üç maddesinde 
belirtilen cumhuriyetin temel ilkelerine sahip çıkmaktır. Belirttiğim dört hususun hiçbiri, bizim 
anlayışımıza göre iç siyasetle ilgili değildir ve bu görevler bize yasalarla verilmiştir.”)  
The press briefing is available from http://www.tsk.mil.tr (August 28, 2006).  
 
270 “Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt’ın Harp Akademileri 2006-2007 Eğitim ve 
Öğretim Yılı Açılış Konuşması” (The speech of the Chief of the General Staff, General Büyükanıt at 
the opening of the 2006-2007 academic year of Military Academies), October 2, 2006 (“Demokratik 
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demokratikleşme önündeki bir engel gibi sunulmaya çalışılmaktadır … Ben bir askerim ve yasaların 
bana verdiği görevleri yerine getiriyorum. Asker olarak bizim siyasetle ilgimiz yoktur. Ancak 
güvenlik ve rejim ile ilgili temel mülahazalarımızdan rahatsızlık duyanlar varsa bu, onların kendi 
rahatsızlıklarıdır.”) 
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civilian and military EU officials have led to a backlash from officers. General 
Büyükanıt has stated, “It has been voiced at various occasions that the Turkish 
Armed Forces fully supports Turkey’s membership in the European Union.”271 
Indeed, the previous chief of the General Staff, Hilmi Özkök, had said in his 
retirement speech held at the military academy that the Turkish Armed Forces played 
a pioneering role in the development and transformation of Turkish society and will 
continue to play this role in the future while upholding contemporary values: 
The Turkish Armed Forces stands for the effective and legitimate role that it 
has been playing in terms of the internalization of Atatürk’s principles and 
reforms, which can be considered the accumulation of the longstanding 
transformation and evolution process experienced by the West, as well as the 
preservation and safeguarding of the indivisibility of the nation and the 
country and the secular, democratic regime of the Republic.272
 
He added that it is an urgent necessity to grasp the post-Cold War period’s economic, 
political and security developments and adapt to emerging forms of international 
cooperative environments so as to sustain an effectively functioning state.273 
However, he again asserted that Turkey would not compromise on the principle of 
national sovereignty and integrity, but recognizes the need for cooperation emerging 
from the post-1990 global transformations.274  
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274 “Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök’ün Devir-Teslim Töreni Konuşması” (Retirement 
speech of the Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Özkök), August 28, 2006. 
 186
Following these developments, at an October 2006 press briefing, Olli Rehn, 
commissioner responsible for EU enlargement, said that the EU is always open to 
dialogue with Turkey.275 He stated, “Recently there have been instances of mutual 
misunderstandings between Turkey and the EU.”276 He added that “we have no 
concerns about the professionalism of the Turkish Armed Forces,” and stressed the 
importance of enhanced political and cultural dialogue as part of the accession 
strategy.277 In fact, there is no single standardized practice in the EU due to the fact 
that the member states have quite distinct political histories and institutional 
structures as well as different security and defense concerns (Bonstra, 2006). There 
are institutions similar to the NSC in EU member states as well.278 However, there is 
some common ground in that the EU norms and standards assume the final authority 
– de jure and de facto – should reside in civilian institutions such as the parliament, 
government, or Defense Ministry (Cizre, 2004). According to EU officials, “the 
armed forces should be fully and unambiguously subordinated to the government” in 
practice, and high-ranking members of the armed forces should only speak in their 
professional domain and with the knowledge of the government, in the example of 
the “best practice” in the member states (European Commission, 2005). By early 
2007 the newly appointed ambassador at the Delegation of the European 
Commission to Turkey, Marc Pierini, said that falling faith in EU membership in 
Turkey, among other domestic political factors, also correlated with the expression of 
a number of negative opinions on Turkey’s membership, such as, “Turkey has no 
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place in the EU.” 279 However, he cited the legal reality that the accession negotiation 
process has already begun. While acknowledging the centrality of Turkey’s decisive 
actions, he said, “Legal reforms are one thing, reforming behavior is another, and we 
expect both from Turkey.”280  
 
These latest statements by EU officials demonstrate the existence of a political 
commitment to integrate Turkey closer with the Union as long as the political criteria 
are met. Günter Verheugen, vice president of the European Commission and a 
former commissioner for enlargement (1999-2004), stated, 
the EU and Turkey are already negotiating because Turkey, the Turkish 
nation has undergone decisive changes and substantially changed compared 
to 1999 or even 2002 and in doing so the prospects of Turkish people have 
improved … We are not contemplating an act of charity or doing Turkey 
some kind of favor. This historical project is in our mutual interest because it 
responds to today’s pressing challenges. In the world of the 21st century the 
EU needs Turkey as an anchor and even an exporter of stability and 
democracy … Turkish diplomacy is very active in the Middle East while 
Turkish armed forces work side by side with EU Member States armed forces 
in Lebanon, Afghanistan and the Balkans.281
  
These statements also demonstrate that the EU is aware of the contributions that 
Turkey’s membership could bring to Europe. 
 
In response to these positive evaluations from EU representatives, at the War 
Academies on March 16, 2007, Chief of the General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt said, 
“The Turkish Armed Forces is a constitutional institution which respects the rule of 
law.” He added that while the military recognizes current international 
transformations, and lacks any interest in getting involved in domestic political 
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281 The speech given by Günter Verheugen, January 19, 2007. 
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matters, Turkey’s geographical location makes the country’s security concerns 
vital.282 He said that it was “part of our responsibility to express our worries and 
opinions” on this matter.283 In these public statements, a growing emphasis on the 
army’s respect for the rule of law and democracy is observed. Finally, at an April 12, 
2007 press conference, General Büyükanıt said that the Turkish Armed Forces acts 
with due respect for the rule of law and democracy while fulfilling its responsibilities 
for the security and defense of the Republic of Turkey and the nation.284
 
It is argued in this dissertation that it is difficult to delineate the actual power 
relations between civilians and the military other than legal institutional patterns or 
the policy structure governing these relations along with political rhetoric. According 
to both high-ranking military officers and the government, the Turkish Armed Forces 
is under the control of the civilian authority. Following the just-cited speech of the 
chief of the General Staff, Prime Minister Erdoğan and then former Foreign Minister 
Gül told the press that the government had been informed prior to the General Staff 
press briefing.285 They stated that the briefing had been given within the framework 
of democracy and the rule of law.286 The analysis of rhetoric undertaken in this 
chapter shows that in their public statements, domestic actors have increasingly 
addressed the informal aspects of institutional change proposed by the EU. 
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In conclusion, the formal aspects of institutional change and policy alignment 
processes mediate the diffusion of EU norms and values and informal institutional 
change. However, the deepening of Europeanization depends upon various other 
mediating factors. First, the existence of negative attitudes in the EU towards 
Turkey’s membership bid has led to the questioning of whether full compliance with 
the political conditionality will effectively integrate Turkey into the EU. This factor 
has served to hinder the deepening of the Europeanization process in Turkey. 
Second, informal institutional structures are more difficult to transform than formal 
ones. Yet Turkey’s EU vocation and high levels of identification with European 
norms and values within both the military and key political actors in Turkey is an 
important factor that could facilitate further integration, provided that Turkey’s 
membership status is guaranteed.  
 
In other words, positive incentives from the EU buttressing the credibility of 
membership prospects should Turkey fully comply with the political conditionality is 
the most important factor for promoting further internalization of political reforms. It 
is in that case that the EU membership process, including the norms and ideas that it 
encompasses, would enable domestic actors to muster support for the deepening of 
political reforms. The concluding chapter discusses the findings of the empirical 
chapters and explains how they contribute to the Europeanization approach.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This dissertation analyzed the EU’s impact on domestic political change in the area 
of civil-military relations in Turkey through the lens of the Europeanization 
approach. For this purpose, three forms of Europeanization relevant to the subject 
matter of the study were distinguished in the theoretical chapter. These cover the 
formal and informal aspects of institutional change, and policy change. These three 
forms of Europeanization were tested in the empirical chapters to demonstrate the 
extent to which EU induced change in the area of civil-military relations in Turkey. 
While this was done, the EU’s political conditionality was identified and 
corresponding domestic political reforms were explored. In this process, various 
mediating factors either facilitating or hindering Turkey’s process of Europeanization 
were delineated.  
 
The main conclusion of the study is that in the period of 1999-2006, there has been 
considerable institutional change and policy alignment towards meeting the EU’s 
political conditionality in the area of civil-military relations in Turkey. The main 
argument from the analysis is that Turkey’s political will to become an EU member 
is the main driving force behind the process of Europeanization in this area. 
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However, the credibility of EU policies on Turkey’s membership is the major 
intervening variable that empowers domestic political actors – such as the 
government, state elites, etc. – to realize the domestic reform process. Indeed, 
Turkey’s EU candidacy by the end of 1999 and the European Council’s (2002) 
decision to give a date for the opening of the accession negotiations on the condition 
that the political criteria were met were major incentives that accelerated Turkey’s 
reform process. The next sections summarize the main findings of the empirical 
chapters, such as what has changed or not in the context of Turkey’s membership 
process, and the extent to which the EU is an important external actor triggering 
domestic reforms in the area of civil-military relations.  
 
 
6.1 Formal, Legal Institutional Change: Towards Closer Integration 
 
The political conditionality for membership is the EU’s most effective tool for 
inducing legal-institutional change in Turkey, because compliance with the political 
criteria is a prerequisite for membership. In line with the EU’s formal institutional 
strategy, legal aspects of domestic institutional change were one of the most 
important issues addressed in the Regular Reports of the European Commission 
(1998-2006) and the Accession Partnership documents (2001, 2003, 2006). There 
were two main aspects of reforms addressed in these documents related to the 
improvement of democratic governance of civil-military relations in Turkey. The 
first concerned the composition and functioning of the NSC, through which the EU 
noted that the military is exercising influence in Turkish politics. The second covered 
the issue of accountability and transparency building in security and defense matters. 
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According to the EU, there is a need for a democratic restructuring of relations 
between the military and civilian institutions such as the legislative, executive, and 
judicial institutions. As a result of Turkey’s national policy objective to become an 
EU member, harmonization laws became a most important item on the policy agenda 
of successive governments from 1999 to 2006.  
 
The major finding of the analysis is that in the framework of these reforms, the legal 
competencies of the civilian authority have been strengthened. During this period, 
the EU’s political conditionality for membership triggered significant legal-
institutional reforms concerning the functioning and composition of the NSC. 
Through the introduction of constitutional amendments in 2001 and EU 
harmonization laws (2003-2006), civilians acquired quantitative supremacy in the 
NSC. Furthermore, the reforms brought limitations to the executive power of the 
institution. The NSC no longer recommends its views to the Council of Ministers but 
instead conveys its views upon request, and the government is no longer obliged to 
give priority to the institution’s advice but only assesses the views that are conveyed. 
Currently, the NSC has essentially become a consultative branch of the executive.  
 
Equally importantly, the reform laws brought about legal change concerning the 
accountability and transparency of the military with respect to civilian institutions. 
EU harmonization laws considerably restructured several aspects of relations 
between the military and the legislative, judiciary and executive institutions. First, 
these reforms improved legal arrangements concerning accountability and 
transparency to Parliament in security and defense matters. They expanded the 
mandate of the Audit Court to audit military expenditures, introduced the new Law 
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on Public Financial Management and Control, and strengthened parliamentary 
oversight by changing budgetary procedures. Furthermore, wider democratic 
oversight has been improved by the expansion of citizens’ civil and political rights so 
as to enhance political participation in security and defense policy formulation. In 
this connection, the deepening of democracy in civilian institutions is very important. 
The legal improvement of civilian competencies to oversee and participate in 
governmental decisions on these matters requires further testing. Second, the State 
Security Courts were abolished, and changes to the law on military courts ended 
military jurisdiction over civilians. These are noteworthy developments with regard 
to the independence of the judiciary. Finally, military seats were removed from 
civilian boards such as the Higher Education Council and the Supreme Council of 
Radio and Television. Therefore, the legislation of EU harmonization laws 
civilianized these institutions, which supervise education, art and broadcasting 
policies. 
 
The study delineated several mediating factors that facilitated legal-institutional 
change within the context of Turkey’s Europeanization process. These can be 
divided into EU-driven and domestically driven factors. The EU had a direct impact 
on the legal reform process in Turkey by providing guidelines for reforms, financial 
support and technical assistance and the guarantee of closer integration if the 
political criteria were met. More specifically, the 2002-2006 period was very 
significant in terms of restructuring the formal institutional aspects of civil-military 
relations. The provision of a clear EU perspective on Turkey’s membership by the 
end of 2002 empowered the Justice and Development Party government to legislate 
major reforms in this area.  
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However, domestic political responses, or inputs, were also very influential in 
shaping Turkey’s path to Europeanization and formal institutional change. In light of 
the comprehensive legislative reforms introduced above, it may be argued that the 
degree of fit between the pre-existing domestic legal-institutional setting and the 
EU’s norms and standards was relatively low. Yet, in spite of high “adaptational 
pressures,” the domestic legal system was adequately harmonized following the 
guidelines of the political conditionality. Consequently, domestic legal-institutional 
structures that once hindered Turkey’s Europeanization in the realm of civil-military 
relations were adapted so as to comply with most of the EU’s norms and standards.  
 
Given the pace of legal changes, the pre-existing legal-institutional structures did not 
constitute a major constraint. Turkey’s political will to become an EU member state 
is the main factor mediating formal institutional change. On the one hand, the 
government opted for the legislation of EU harmonization laws in order to accede to 
the EU. On the other hand, the military complied with the government’s reform 
agenda, in light of the long-term political and economic benefits that membership 
would likely bring Turkey. Equally important were the EU’s positive incentives for 
reforms such as the provision of a clear membership perspective by inclusion of 
Turkey in the pre-accession strategy. All these together served to accelerate EU 
harmonization laws in the area of civil-military relations. It is argued that a major 
factor in this respect is that the credibility of membership prospects empowered 
successive governments by providing them with a legitimate anchor to initiate 
legislative changes in one of the most challenging areas of Turkish politics.  
 
 195
The constitutional amendments and supportive legislation passed by Parliament 
demonstrate a clear transformation in Turkey’s democratic governance of civil-
military relations towards the alignment of domestic structures with the EU’s 
political conditionality. Since 1999, and particularly in the period from 2001 to 2006, 
significant legal reforms introduced by Parliament demonstrate the importance given 
to the legal dimension of the reforms by both the EU and Turkey. These reforms, 
besides leading to the opening of accession negotiations, also opened the way 
towards the strengthening of the democratic governance of civil-military relations. 
However, according to the European Commission (2003), several legislative reforms 
remain to be done. For example the status of the chief of the General Staff, who is 
directly responsible to the prime minister rather than the Ministry of National 
Defense, needs to be addressed. Additionally, the EU states that there is a need for 
further efforts to enhance accountability and transparency in the conduct of security 
and defense matters.  
 
Both the government and the military have several reservations about these aspects 
of legislation, stating that they do not fit Turkey’s present needs. According to the 
Turkish General Staff, the current legal-institutional arrangements are in line with 
democracy and the supremacy of civilian authority. The underlying argument is that 
the prevailing institutional setting adequately provides the guarantee of a functioning 
democracy in Turkey. However, it is fair to argue that in the case of the organization 
of defense, EU norms and standards have failed to provide an adequate model for 
Turkey. This latter aspect of legal restructuring requires longer-term research 
towards finding the “best practice” available in the EU member states which is 
potentially compatible with Turkey’s existing institutional setting. 
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The first approach to Europeanization and domestic change, or the formal, legalistic 
approach to civil-military relations reform, is limited in the sense that it 
overemphasizes the procedural aspect of institutional change and only vaguely 
elaborates on the substantial aspects of institutional transformation. As shown in the 
theoretical chapter, from a Europeanization perspective, building on the institutional 
approach to domestic change, legal-institutional reforms for reforming civil-military 
relations are not only expected to “spillover” to influence domestic policy structures 
but also to bring about diffusion of EU norms and changes in collective norms and 
understandings of appropriate behavior. In recent reports and official speeches, the 
emphasis placed on the implementation and deepening of the reform process 
demonstrates that more substantial changes are expected from Turkey. Thus, the 
legal reform process needs to be substantiated by both policy practices and the 
diffusion of norms at least at a discursive level throughout military and civilian 
institutions. The effectiveness of legal harmonization with EU norms is dependent on 
the implementation of these legislative changes as stated in the reports addressing 
policy alignment and the EU’s remaining points of concerns associated with informal 
institutional change.  
 
 
6.2 Policy Change: Towards Democratic Governance of Civil-Military Relations 
 
The second aspect of Europeanization in the framework of Turkey’s EU membership 
process is policy change. In Turkey’s case, the EU insists on particular foreign policy 
standards and has proposed several guidelines for domestic policy change concerning 
the democratic governance of civil-military relations. The political conditionality 
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underlines the importance of the strengthening of civilian authority in the 
formulation of foreign, security and defense policies. First, in relation to domestic 
policy designs, the EU has proposed in its official documents (1998-2006) the 
approximation of domestic policy designs such as the improvement of civilian policy 
competencies and the formulation of civilian solutions to domestic policy problems 
related to national security. The latter embedded the EU’s approach that domestic 
political problems derive from policy weaknesses in coping with regional disparities 
and sources of inequality that can degenerate into illegal activities such as terrorism. 
Second, during the same period, the EU insisted on foreign policy alignment along 
its common policies, such as promotion of peaceful relations with neighboring 
countries, alignment with the European Security and Defense Policy and peaceful 
resolution of the Cyprus problem. These issues are an integral part of Turkey’s 
national security policy, where the EU sees military influence.  
 
The major finding of the dissertation in this section is that from 1999 to 2006 there 
was considerable policy change in Turkey aimed at opening accession negotiations 
with the EU. In this context, it is argued that civilian competencies in the formulation 
of the policies addressed by the EU have been further strengthened, and the military 
has generally complied with the civilian’s policy decisions.  
 
To begin with the approximation of domestic policy formulation, during this period 
successive governments undertook a comprehensive reform program to comply with 
the policy matters addressed in the official documents of the EU. Specifically, this 
happened after the European Council’s decision to give a date to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey not later than 2004 reinforced the credibility of Turkey’s 
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EU membership. Following this development, the government of the Justice and 
Development Party reasserted the governmental commitment to Turkey’s national 
policy objective of becoming an EU member. Turkey’s comprehensive policy agenda 
towards integration with the EU was set by the revision of the National Programme 
for the Adoption of the Acquis (2003). In this period (2002-2006), the government 
passed major EU harmonization laws that move towards improving democratic 
institutions and strengthening civilian authority in the formulation of national 
security policy. Furthermore, various administrative units responsible for the conduct 
of EU affairs were established for the effective implementation of reform policies. 
These developments demonstrated that in that period there was a broad preference 
convergence among domestic actors concerning Turkey’s EU membership.  
 
Turkey’s national policy goal of integration with the EU is a major factor which led 
to change in the policy styles of the military, such as in their relations with the 
civilian authority and their perspectives on policy solutions to domestic policy 
problems. In this respect, first, by 1999 the military came to se direct military 
intervention in politics as a less viable option for solving domestic problems. Second, 
in the period after Turkey acquired EU membership candidacy, the military 
substantially supported the government’s policies of approximating domestic policy 
structures along the EU’s guidelines. Finally, the military started to emphasize the 
need to enhance civilian, humanitarian solutions to protect the people from political 
violence and terrorism. These developments demonstrate a clear shift in the policy 
styles of the military and are in line with the governmental policies of integration 
with the EU.  
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Approximation of domestic policy formulation demonstrates a clear shift in 
governmental policies towards prioritizing Turkey’s democratization process as a 
remedy for domestic political problems. Several mediating factors have contributed 
to this transformation. Prospective political and economic benefits from EU 
membership won over the domestic costs of compliance with the political 
conditionality. Positive incentives from the EU, such as the communication of its 
policy strategy on enlargement to include Turkey in 1999, and the decision on the 
opening of accession negotiations in 2002, have played a major role in accelerating 
domestic reform processes and acted as an anchor for domestic policy designs. 
Therefore, the credibility of membership, promoted by the EU through the 
strengthening of institutional ties, has been a major mechanism boosting the EU’s 
domestic policy influence. In this context, the EU’s conditionality empowered the 
arguments of reform-oriented sectors of political society by altering opportunity 
structures and expectations, and provided a legitimate basis for new domestic policy 
preferences.  
 
However, several aspects of the reform policies are widely debated in Turkey. 
Although European integration provides for alternative opportunity structures 
through political reforms, domestic political actors are still constrained by the 
prevailing policy structures in which they operate. For instance, the government, the 
opposition party and civil society organizations have yet to reach agreement on 
changes to controversial Penal Code Article 301 to improve the legal protection of 
freedom of expression. Additionally, in 2002-2006, there were several instances of 
disagreement between the main opposition Republican People’s Party, the military 
and the ruling Justice and Development Party over the issue of whether some of the 
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reforms would weaken Turkey’s fight against terrorism, increase the potential threat 
of political Islam to the secular-democratic regime, or harm Turkey’s national 
security interests in the region.  
 
Concerns voiced by the military were directed at some of the proposed reforms such 
as the Law on Foreign Education and the Learning of Different Languages and 
Dialects by Turkish Citizens, and the Law on the Establishment of Radio and 
Television Enterprises, which it feared could weaken national unity. The military has 
expressed its consent for democratization packages to the extent that they were in 
line with the principle of secularism and the preservation of national unity as set 
forth in the Constitution. In this connection, the military stated that it is crucial to 
differentiate between the people in the southeast region and the terrorists of the PKK, 
and emphasized the need for objective delineation of the reasons behind participation 
in the ethnic nationalist, separatist terrorist organization. However, the military has 
also underlined on various occasions that as long as terrorist activities continue, 
security forces will continue to develop measures to combat terrorism, by force if 
necessary. In spite of these reservations of the military, the common ground between 
the military and the government’s position is that the improvement of democratic 
institutions has the potential to solve the country’s domestic policy problems and 
facilitate Turkey’s EU membership.  
 
So far it can be argued that the EU membership discourse provided domestic political 
actors with a normative and legitimate frame for domestic policy change. The study 
has comparable findings in the area of foreign policy alignment demonstrating that 
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the civilian authority has asserted power in the formulation of foreign policy matters 
underlined by the EU.  
 
To begin with the promotion of peaceful relations with neighboring countries, in line 
with the pre-accession strategy, Turkey’s relations with Greece have made 
substantial improvements since 1999. In this respect the governmental initiatives 
have been decisive. A succession of Turkish governments from 1999 to the present 
has followed policies of sustained economic, political and cultural cooperation with 
Greece. During this period the military acted in accordance with government 
policies, and implemented the decisions to cooperate on defense and security matters 
with Greece. Furthermore, in line with the EU’s political conditionality, the 
government of the Justice and Development Party developed a comprehensive policy 
program to promote peaceful relations with Middle Eastern countries. In this 
connection, the policy influence of the military remained limited to the essentials of 
national security and defense while affirming that the final decision rests with the 
civilian authority.  
 
Regarding the European Security and Defense Policy, Turkey has expressed its 
political will to become part of this European security and defense structure at both 
the governmental and military level. The main finding of the study is that as long as 
the EU ignores Turkey’s intensified value as the only secular, democratic country in 
the region through delaying its full membership, the alignment of policy in defense 
and security matters will remain limited.  
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A related foreign policy issue in which policy change occurred is Cyprus. During 
2003-2006 there has been a clear shift in Turkey’s foreign policy from prioritizing 
security towards underlining the need to find a democratic settlement to the Cyprus 
issue. For this purpose, in line with the specific policy guidelines provided in the 
Accession Partnership documents (2003), the Justice and Development Party 
supported the Annan plan and the referendum process on the island. During this 
period, the military did not interfere with the government’s policy decisions.  
 
However, the plan’s rejection by the Greek Cypriots in 2004 and the EU’s decision 
in 2006 to partially suspend accession negotiations with Turkey on the grounds that it 
has failed to implement its obligations under the Association Agreement by 
removing trade barriers to Greek Cypriots has led to a major political backlash in 
Turkey. The position of the military is no different from the government’s on that 
issue, which is listed on the NSC’s agenda as vital for the country’s national security. 
Accordingly, a lasting solution is solely dependent on a plan that would take into 
account the demands of the Turkish Cypriots, such as relieving the isolation of the 
North and international recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It is 
argued in this dissertation that the EU membership of Cyprus involving recognition 
of the southern government of Cyprus as the only representative of the island has 
hurt the credibility of the EU’s common foreign policy and left the Turkish 
government limited maneuvering room for peaceful resolution of the Cyprus issue.  
 
In sum, it is concluded that the EU is capable of triggering policy change to the 
extent that it is a credible anchor for domestic reform processes and is able to 
promote effective, viable policies in support of Turkey’s process of Europeanization. 
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The Europeanization of policies depends on the degree of challenge and pressure 
posed by the “fit/misfit” between domestic policy designs and EU-imposed/proposed 
ones. Certain policy problems that have priority from the EU’s perspective may or 
may not have the same importance attached to them at the national level, or 
perspectives on solutions to policy problems may differ. Therefore, Turkey’s ability 
to adopt EU policies is dependent on prevailing policy structures. However, domestic 
actors are capable of framing the Europeanization of Turkey’s foreign policy as long 
as there is the political will for full membership. In this case, compliance is highly 
dependent on the credibility of the EU. Therefore, while the domestic political 
dynamics are not to be underestimated in Turkey’s process of domestic political 
change, the EU is an important external trigger. 
 
This study has so far focused selectively on several policy angles that are related to 
the idea of democratic governance of civil-military relations. In the case of the 
alignment of domestic policy processes, issues pertaining to “high politics” that are 
directly associated with national security or national identity render the process of 
European integration per se rather complicated within the EU. However, one general 
conclusion that can be driven from the study of foreign policy alignment is that 
particularly during 2002-2006, the military acted in accordance with the policy 
decisions of the government. This indicates a clear shift towards further 
strengthening of civilian authority in the formulation of foreign, security and defense 
policies as stated in the EU’s political conditionality for membership. 
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6.3 Informal Institutional Change: The Credibility of EU Discourse on Turkey’s 
Membership as the Major Mediating Factor 
 
A clear shift from the formal aspects of institutional change to more substantial 
aspects of transformation can be seen in the discourse of the EU. The informal 
aspects of institutional change have gotten more and more emphasis, particularly 
starting in 2003, in the Regular Reports issued by the European Commission and 
European Parliament, and in the public speeches of EU leaders. From the perspective 
of the EU, the deepening of political reforms is to some extent dependent on the 
domestic actors’ mindset. In other words, the EU emphasizes how important it is that 
changes brought about by political reforms are fully reflected in the attitude of 
domestic actors. In this connection, one of the EU’s main concerns is the military’s 
informal mechanism of influence in Turkish politics. The European Commission 
reports refer to the public speeches, media statements and declarations of the 
military.  
 
Diffusion of EU norms through the political reforms explored so far is a major 
mechanism behind the informal aspects of institutional change. However, the 
internalization of EU norms and the prospective change in the mindset of the 
political actors running these institutions is dependent on other mediating variables. 
The attitude of domestic political actors, including the military, is dependent on 
several factors emanating both from the trajectory of Turkish-EU relations and 
prevailing informal institutional settings governing relations between civilians and 
the military. Furthermore, international and domestic political developments and 
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their significance for national security conceptions also influence domestic political 
actors’ attitudes.  
 
The dissertation’s main finding in this area is that the dynamics of Turkish-EU 
relations, such as EU institutions’ decisions on Turkey’s accession, perspectives of 
EU and member state leaders on Turkey, and EU public opinion on Turkey’s EU 
membership, have had a strong influence on the military’s attitude within the 
framework of Turkey’s process of Europeanization. In other words, the attitude of 
the military institution is highly dependent on the credibility of the EU’s and its 
member states’ discourses on Turkey’s membership prospects, including intervening 
factors such as the language used in the Regular Reports. A related factor is that 
Turkish public opinion on the EU, which is partially shaped by the EU rhetoric on 
Turkey’s membership, also influences the military’s perspective. 
 
The discourse analysis of public statements, media briefings, and declarations made 
by high-ranking officials reveals that the military sees the EU membership process as 
an extension of Turkey’s process of modernization and Westernization. This 
conception is an important mediating factor that facilitates the deepening of political 
reforms in Turkey in line with the political conditionality. Furthermore, the Turkish 
public’s expectation is that EU membership will bring about socioeconomic benefits, 
increase the stability of democratic institutions and help consolidate the 
democratization process. This provides certain legitimacy to Europeanization such as 
the fulfillment of the Copenhagen political criteria. On top of these factors, the 
present government strongly and clearly believes that compliance with the EU’s 
norms will lead to accession. 
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It has been demonstrated in Chapter 5 that prospects of deepening the reform process 
are highly dependent on the credibility of the EU’s discourse on Turkey’s 
membership. During the period of 1999-2004, rising expectations in Turkey 
concerning EU membership led to positive attitude formation on issues arising from 
EU membership. The official inclusion of Turkey in the pre-accession strategy and 
the expression of political will by EU officials to open the accession negotiations not 
later than 2005 contributed to the positive climate in Turkish-EU relations. In this 
context, the military affirmed numerous times that it supported Turkey’s EU 
membership and related governmental policies, since the fundamental values of the 
Republic, which are shared by the majority of the Turkish people as well as the 
military, are consonant with EU norms and values. Furthermore, the EU’s normative 
discourse covering the strengthening of democratic institutions and norms of 
recognition associated with appropriate state behavior and international image 
became an integral part of domestic political discourses. 
 
However, after the European Council’s decision to start the accession negotiations 
with the EU, the issue of enlargement in general and Turkey’s eligibility in particular 
have increasingly become an area of debate within the Union. In this connection, 
cleavages between the pro-EU enlargement faction who want to include Turkey and 
those who are skeptical of the benefits of Turkey’s membership became more visible. 
Various political actors within the EU consider Turkey’s accession a necessity for 
strategic reasons, including policies to enhance dialogue between cultures and 
promote democracy and plural diversity within the Union. However, Turkey’s 
probable impact on the Union, such as the capacity of EU structures to absorb it, is 
still being called into question. In addition, Turkey’s accession is debated over its 
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large population, economy, democratic credentials, security, and geographical 
location as well as its cultural and religious character. At the same time, public 
opinion polls (Eurobarometer) show low levels of support in various EU member 
states for Turkey’s full membership. On top of all this, after 2004, several member 
states proposed the option of a “privileged partnership” for Turkey.  
 
The prevalence of ambivalent attitudes in the EU towards Turkey’s accession 
negatively influenced the attitude of domestic actors on issues arising from EU 
membership. According to the government, the pace of the ongoing EU 
harmonization reforms was impressive. Moreover, there are high levels of 
identification with the West and particularly Europe among a majority of domestic 
political actors in Turkey. However, these debates within the EU regarding Turkey’s 
accession resulted in weakened credibility that compliance with the political 
conditionality would result in full membership. In this context, the military expressed 
its worries about the prevailing negative attitude in EU member states. In doing so, it 
reiterated the benefits that Turkey would bring to the European economy as well as 
to European common foreign and security policy structures. The military further 
underlined its positive attitude towards Turkey’s membership, emphasizing that it 
has always acted as a driving force of modernization and democracy in the country 
and not as an obstacle to reform. The military concerns mainly revolved around the 
credibility of the EU, such as whether all member states will support Turkey’s full 
membership when the reform process is completed. Furthermore, it asked whether 
the EU’s enlargement policies have failed to grasp Turkey’s national security 
concerns, geopolitical conditions and historical specificity. 
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The analysis of the attitude of the military in 2004-2006 was particularly relevant, 
because this corresponds to a period when the EU progressively expressed its 
concerns about the military’s “informal mechanisms of influence” in Turkish 
politics. Addressing these questions on the influence of the military, the Turkish 
General Staff stated that informing the press and public about national security 
matters is a method supporting the principles of “sharing information and informing 
the public” that are also advocated by the EU. This method aims to inform the public 
about the agenda of the Turkish General Staff on issues concerning the security of 
both the country and the region. From 2004 onwards, high-ranking military officers 
made it increasingly clear in their public discourse that the institution is not 
interested in getting involved in daily political and social matters. They explained 
that media briefings are restricted to issues relating to security and defense, and that 
these speeches are done with due respect for the legal framework and consideration 
of the transparency issues addressed in the EU’s conditionality. Therefore, the 
military considers these briefings part of its efforts towards increasing transparency 
in the conduct of defense and security affairs. This is particularly relevant for raising 
the level of public knowledge of the country’s security and defense matters. It can be 
argued that these public briefings try to integrate the wider political society in the 
formulation of defense and security policy.  
 
Although one can draw conclusions about the statements of a number of officers at 
different ranks, the extent (and direction) of the influence is hard to measure and 
difficult to predict, and as such it is hard to demonstrate the actual power relations 
between the military and the bureaucrats or the government. In the Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4, several statements made by the military and the government diverge and 
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converge on a number of issues. As so far demonstrated in these chapters, during the 
period from 2001 to 2006 civilian initiatives were considerably strengthened in 
issues pertaining to national security and defense policy.  
 
To sum up this section, EU norms and values are diffused through legal reforms and 
policy alignment processes, and trigger informal institutional change. However, the 
deepening of Europeanization depends on various other mediating factors. First, the 
prevalence of ambivalent attitudes in the EU on Turkey has led many to question 
whether full compliance with the political conditionality will effectively lead to full 
membership. This factor hinders the deepening of political reforms in Turkey. 
Second, informal institutional structures, such as the mindsets or attitudes of 
domestic actors, are more difficult to transform than formal ones. Yet Turkey’s EU 
vocation and high levels of identification with European norms and values within the 
military and key political actors in Turkey is an important factor that could facilitate 
the deepening of Turkey’s Europeanization so long as full membership status is 
guaranteed.  
 
In conclusion, the Europeanization approach employed in this dissertation has 
demonstrated the different aspects of the EU’s impact on domestic political change 
in the area of civil-military relations in Turkey. From this perspective, the approach 
is very insightful for understanding: (1) what has changed during Turkey’s EU 
membership process, and (2) what the prospects and challenges of Turkey’s closer 
integration with the EU in the area of civil-military relations are. Therefore, this 
study is an important contribution to the Europeanization approach to the impact of 
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European integration in EU candidate countries. Furthermore, the study is 
complementary to the available literature on civil-military relations in Turkey.  
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